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For Students of Love:
Encomium
Anna Juan,
Bucknell University
In accordance with the purposes of publishing The
Comparative Humanities Review, perhaps it is necessary to
continue, in this second installment, to laud the many struggles
and intellectual forays of (and I say this as one not long ago freed
from the status) the undergraduate student. The conference which
engendered this issue of The Comparative Humanities Review
began, as many ambitious notions do, on a cunning intellectual
whim which was ironically intersected by the normalcies of co-ed
undergraduate life. I say this because the conference, entitled
“Symposium: A Gathering of Students of Love,” took place in the
midst of the notorious Bucknell House Party weekend – to say the
least, the most anticipated bunch of days on the university’s social
calendar for current students and alumni alike. I do not mean to
suggest that would-be academics (as, ideally, that is what student
scholars strive to be) remain in their rooms and develop an eyetwitch and a sickly, sun-starved complexion. Not so. Even Plato’s
speechgivers in Symposium could temper a hangover with the best
of them. The word of Plato’s symposium, however, was
moderation: as the speakers promise “not to overdo it” (Plato
176B) and send away the flute-girl, so too did our conference
participants drag themselves out of bed after the first night of
House Party (its after-effects not quite erased from their visages) to
give their own speeches and opinions on the ever-elusive nature of
The Comparative Humanities Review
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Eros.

JUAN, Introduction

For those who are not familiar with Plato’s Symposium, it is
a dramatic work of philosophy which details a banquet of semiinebriated individuals who proclaim their opinions on love. Some
speakers render love as a god, others reflect on its effects, and
others attempt to distinguish specific elements that love
encompasses. All speakers attempt to answer the question: What
is love? The premise of the conference was to present the
applicability of this concept, over time, across genres, and even in
varied literary forms. It is my aim in this introduction, however, to
examine the role of love in the academic life of an undergraduate
student. As all students know, there comes a time when we
wonder, why in Zeus’ name do we exert so much effort on this
industry of knowledge? I answer that our efforts to obtain and
understand knowledge, manufacture it into a presentable
manifestation of original thought, and then accept an excellent or
poor job done is in itself a labor of love.
In the first installment of The Comparative Humanities
Review, my colleague asserted, “Without the scholarly hardware
of our professors, we undergraduates are forced to reconcile our
status as children, as ‘consumers’ of knowledge, left wondering
what exactly our essays, presentations, and theses are?” Here we
are reminded of the lover/beloved relationship, within the context
of the Symposium, which “ideally, involved the lover in the role of
ethical and intellectual teacher and the boy in the role of his
student” (Nehamas & Woodruff xv). Barring the more taboo
cultural aspects (at least, in most of the modern world) of these
lover/beloved relationships, our professors, at the basest level,
serve as the “lovers” of their respective branches of knowledge as
we student scholars occupy this dichotomous role of
beloved/student. One of the aims of The Comparative
Humanities Review is, indeed, to make a step towards the
student’s transformation from “consumer” to “producer,” and in
the Symposium’s terms, from beloved to lover.
In Symposium, Socrates claims that Diotima corrects his
view of love, saying, “you thought Love was being loved rather
than being a lover” (Plato 204C, emphasis in the translated text).
This statement implies that the beloved recognizes that he or she
must make the transition into becoming the lover. Socrates’
implied passivity, as the object of love, is remedied by occupying
the active role of love: “being” a lover. This incitement to activity,
perhaps, is similarly involved in the students’ role-shift; the
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appearance of these essays in this collection shows a desire to be
‘produced,’ or as Diotima supposedly argues, a move toward
preservation—immortality. As a publication solely committed to
the distribution of undergraduate scholarship, The Comparative
Humanities Review provides a venue for the student as belovedwould-be-lover to speak in an effort to gain this form of
‘immortality’.
This is not to say, however, that the student aggressively
pursues their so-called immortality; ideally, we are not “vulgar
lovers” of texts (181E). Most undergraduate students remember
the moment of receiving their first graded college essay back,
saturated with red ink – what had we done wrong? As explained
in Diotima’s speech, the mystery of Love is acquired by “[going]
always upwards for the sake of this Beauty, starting out from
beautiful things and using them like rising stairs” (211C). As one
continues with his or her ascending journey for/with knowledge,
its subtleties become more obscure but, to the student of love, are
more enjoyable to find. Here, I recall Roland Barthes: “The space
of writing is to be ranged over, not pierced; writing ceaselessly
posits meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it, carrying out a
systematic exemption of meaning” (Barthes 1469). Much like
Pausanias’ distinction between Common and Heavenly Aphrodite,
so too must we, as students of love, think that “the beauty of
people’s souls is more valuable than the beauty of their bodies”
(Plato 210B); a text is not “pierced,” or loved in the “common”
way, its basest meaning extracted from the words. Rather, it is
“ranged over”—loved for its substance, and not its literality; thus,
a student must apply love to his or her ‘craft’—this ‘industry’ of
knowledge.
I am speaking, of course, in terms of the most ideal student
of Love; needless to say, the undergraduate university is not
exactly the place to seek a surplus of virtue. I end with Rainer
Maria Rilke, who says,
…young people, who are beginners in everything, are not yet
capable of love: it is something they must learn… Loving does
not first mean merging, surrendering,and uniting with another
person (for what would a union be of two people who are
unclarified, unfinished, and still incoherent--?), it is a high
inducement for the individual to ripen, to become something in
himself, to become world… (Rilke 69)
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We are unripened lovers; thus, we cannot yet “give birth in
beauty” (206B) because our offspring too is underdeveloped—such
is the case with undergraduate scholarship. The ‘offspring’ we
present in this issue are not yet wholly ‘good’ or ‘beautiful’ or
‘virtuous’ (does it ever really become so?); they strive, however, to
elevate themselves toward something higher. We take sips, as it
were, from the proverbial cup of ‘immortality’ through
reproduction of our ideas, however half-formed, and
disseminating them. For is this not the groping, uncertain, and
exhilarating journey of any student, after all?
~*~

I have attempted to present the essays in this installment in
a semi-grouped, though undivided, whole. I did not choose to
show the original panel divisions, in an attempt to retain a
semblance of continuity and unity—of voices speaking
sporadically between small swallows (or gulps, in some cases) of
wine, perhaps.
The first four essays deal directly with Plato’s Symposium;
the original panel was called “Plato’s Symposium: Love and
Sexuality.” The first essay, by Kang Tchou, entitled “Purificatory
Hermeneutics of Desire,” examines the possibility of alleviating
the modern biases of the term ‘homosexuality.’ In the essay,
Tchou defines the word ‘homo’ both in its Greek and Latin
contexts: the former meaning “love of the same sex,” and the latter
as “love of humanity,” while considering the complexities of Greek
sexuality and emphasizing the marked difference between
“coarse” and “noble” sexual intercourse.
Joseph Schwartz, on a different vein, makes an argument
for the equalization of heterosexuality with homosexuality in his
essay, “Plato’s Validation of Heterosexuality in Symposium.”
Next, Nicholas Rockower (not included in the original
conference panel), in “Love, Laughter, and the Harmony of
Opposites in Plato’s Symposium” discusses the Symposium from the
classicist perspective. Using instances of humor in the original
Greek (his own translations included), he examines the theme of
the harmony of incongruous concepts at the multiple narrative
levels present in the text.
Bryan Kim-Butler, in “The Politics of Transsexual Love:
Hedwig and the Angry Inch and Plato’s Symposium,” deals with the
controversial issue of transsexuality in the film and recalls the
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“John/Joan” case of David Reimer, showing that the power
structure of knowledge and truth intersect with the concept of
love.
We move on, here, to the next panel in the conference,
originally called “After Plato: Classical and Medieval Love.”
Lauren Rutter’s essay, “Ovid’s Military Metaphor and Gender
Transgression in Amores,” analyzes the military metaphors present
in a selection of Ovid’s poetry as a means of displaying its strange
gender confusions, despite the presence of traditional binary
sexuality.
In “ ‘A Light, Formed in the Heavens, Moves You’”: Art
and Sight in Dante’s Purgatorio as an Intermediary to Free Will and
Love,” Joey McMullen asserts that for Dante, art and sight are a
form of truer reality that leads to genuine feeling and an
experience of love that is “pure,” freely chosen and understood.
Lauren Forsythe’s essay, “Platonic Models of Love, Honor,
and Responsibility in Spanish Courtly Love Literature,” weaves
sentimental novels of medieval Spain, Prison of Love and The
Spanish Bawd, with Plato’s Symposium, and discusses the concept of
honor and responsibility between lovers within the context of both
Spanish courtly love and Platonic discourse.
Moving into the era of English Romanticism, Diana
Koretsky begins the next panel of essays (“After Plato: Love and
Modernity”) with “I’m NO Byron: Lermontov, Love, and the
Anxiety of Byronic Influence,” which gives a reading of a selection
of works by Mikhail Lermontov in conjunction with his struggle
with ‘Byron-mania,’ its curious effects on his art, and the
tumultuous conflict between idol, artist, and art.
To continue the trend of obsessive love, Allison Rittmayer’s
“The Cow, The Rhinemaiden, and ‘The Supreme Primal Uterus’:
Love, Worship, and Tribute Language in William Faulkner’s The
Hamlet,” was developed from a chapter in her undergraduate
honors thesis. Rittmayer analyzes three characters as objects of
worship with respect to humor, overt female sexuality, and the socalled “curse” of the American South.
Nick Kupensky, whose essay also stemmed from his
undergraduate honors thesis, examines Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina as
a response to Plato’s Symposium: an act of reading and transfer that
represents a labor of love, of sorts, in “ ‘Don’t Steal Rolls’: Tolstoy’s
Symposium on Love, Literature, Women, and Wine.”
The final panel of the conference, “After Plato: Symposium
as Narrative,” was focused on the symposium as a creative agent.
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Steven McClellan’s essay, “Symposium as Metanarrative” gives a
historical reading of the Symposium, arguing that Plato wished to
lend functionality and legitimacy to philosophy as a way of life.
Michelle Gallagher’s essay, which was the final assignment
in her first-year seminar, is her own version of the symposium
which brings together a true ‘meeting of the minds,’ across time
and disciplines. Plato, Dante, and Sigmund Freud come together
to talk about their notions of love in “An Unconventional
Symposium on Love.”
Finally, we close the essays with Soohyun Alexander Lee’s
rendering of a Socratic dialogue on Forms, “The Illusion of
Forms.” An everyday encounter next to a hotdog stand evolves
into a philosophic discussion on the nature of desire, love, and
hunger. Ending this collection with Lee’s enigmatic “We will be
here a while,” is the true embodiment of our quest for knowledge
as students of Love as we anticipate the ongoing production of
beautiful words, text, and ideas.
~*~

It is my hope, along with the rest of the members of the
editorial board of The Comparative Humanities Review, that
readers of this collection strive also to be Students of Love. Your
responses and comments to the essays in this issue will generate a
larger ‘symposium,’ which, with any luck, will merge with the
voices of the ongoing dialogue on undergraduate scholarship in
the humanities. Thank you.
WORKS CITED
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Purificatory Hermeneutics
of Desire
Kang Tchou,
Bucknell University

In one of the numerous fieldwork trips depicted in the film
Kinsey, Bill Condon’s adaptation of the life and work of the
entomologist-turned-sex-researcher Alfred C. Kinsey, two sex
researchers end their day of data collection with the following
conversation:
Clyde Martin. So what do you think you are now?
Alfred Kinsey. (nervously) Probably around a …three.
Clyde Martin. Have you ever done anything about it?
Alfred Kinsey. (shakes his head)
Clyde Martin. Would you like to?1

The “three” to which Alfred Kinsey refer is his own assessment of
his sexual preference on a heterosexual-homosexual rating scale
developed by Kinsey’s research group. This scale begins with the
assumption that many people’s exposure to notions of sexuality
begins with the binary between heterosexuality and
homosexuality. Kinsey’s scale ranges from 0-6.2
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Rating
0
1

9

Description

Exclusively heterosexual

Predominately heterosexual, only incidentally homosexual

2

Predominately heterosexual, but more than incidentally homosexual

4

Predominately homosexual, but more than incidentally heterosexual

6

Exclusively homosexual

3
5

Equally heterosexual and homosexual

Predominately homosexual, only incidentally heterosexual

After Alfred and Clyde’s conversation, they share a French kiss,
and venture into an experiment of their own sexuality. The
factuality of this scene is not critical to this discussion but the
manner of its depiction is critical to the genesis of this essay.
Most critics and researchers of sexual history would term
the above encounter a homoerotic scene. ‘Homosexuality’ is a
roughly defined term which categorizes all sexual behavior
between two same-sex individuals. The confusion concerning the
definition of this term begins in the linguistic roots of the term. If
the prefix is taken from the Greek homo then homosexuality means
“love of the same sex.”3 Yet if the prefix is of Latin origin, then the
signification of homo changes to “human being” as in homo sapiens
or wise human beings.4 Depending on the derivation, the word
homosexual might mean either same-sex love or love of humanity.
These possible definitions for this term highlight two schools of
thought that have wrestled for the identification for the role of
homosexual love within human society.
The confusion with this term belies the fact that Kinsey
thought “homosexuality” was the least-biased one among a
plethora of other expressions that also describe sexual relations
between two individuals of the same biological gender.5 The
difficulty in finding the perfect signifier to denote this notion
represents the confusion inherent in the topic of same-gender sex.
Kinsey’s two-volume study contributed, for the first time,
statistically significant data on the sexual behavior of the American
population. Yet even Kinsey uses pre-established categories of
sexual behavior to evaluate the behavior of his human subjects.
Kinsey also took into consideration the prejudice of established
terms:

10
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The terms sexual inversion, intersexuality, transsexuality, the third sex,
psychosexual hermaphroditism and others have been applied not
merely to designate the nature of the partner involved in the sexual
relation, but to emphasize the general opinion that individuals engaging
in homosexual activity are neither male nor female, but persons of mixed
sex. These latter terms are, however, most unfortunate, for they provide
an interpretation in anticipation of any sufficient demonstration of the
fact; and consequently they prejudice investigations of the nature and
origin of homosexual activity.6

It is clear that Kinsey tried his best to use unprejudiced terms,
which would allow his investigation to remain neutral. If this is
his goal then one might wonder why he chose to use the term
‘homosexuality’ and also decide to select the same-sex connotation
over the love of humanity definition. It is clear from this example
that even with the best of intentions Kinsey still used
classifications that gave an unjustified bias to his study of
sexuality.
The twentieth-century penchant for classification is not
unique to Kinsey. Most researchers in the field of Greek sexuality
place the love between an older man and a younger boy under the
modern notion of pederasty. Most authors in the sexuality field
will also place pederasty within the larger category of
homosexuality. Kenneth Dover and Michel Foucault both argue
against the use of present day classifiers to categorize the sexual
behaviors of Greek society. Yet even when commenting on the
work of these two researchers, authors such as David Cohen
cannot resist using modern day classifications for sexual behavior:
Kenneth Dover and Michel Foucault have argued that the modern
dichotomization of sexuality as heterosexuality/homosexuality does not
apply to the ancient world, and they have shown how distinctions
between active and passive roles in male sexuality defined the contours
of the permissible and impermissible in paederastic courtship and other
forms of homoerotic behavior.7

Even when explaining Dover and Foucault’s arguments, Cohen
continues to use modern terms to describe Greek notions of
sexuality. The terms “paederastic courtship” and “homoerotic
behavior” are also modern terms not suitable for application to the
study of Greek sexuality. Yet contrary to the habit of classifying
every detail of Greek sexual behavior, no distinction is made
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between the different types of sexual activity that might take place
during the coupling between older men and younger boys. Much
like Kinsey and Martin’s love scene, the actual copulation between
the older male and younger boy is not revealed. Instead the sex
acts are left to the imagination of the reader and then labeled with
general terms such as “pederasty” or “homosexual behavior.”
Using these modern and non-specific terms, scholars hastily point
to the paradoxical nature of Greek notions concerning sexual
relationship between older and younger males.
In Law, Sexuality and Society, David Cohen provides an
excellent example of this type of scholarship which promotes the
complexity and confusion of Greek sexuality. After using
generalized terms to explain both Dover and Foucault’s arguments
for the normality of love between older and younger males, the
author proceeds to point out in his “…opinion, an exploration of
Greek homosexuality ought to begin by insisting very strongly on
the profundity of the conflicts which permeated Athenian values
and practices in this area.”8 Cohen then uses Pausanias’s speech in
Plato’s Symposium to explain that the inherent ambiguity in the
Athenian notion of sexuality is the result of “the simultaneous
approbation and censure which social norms and legal rules attach
to the pursuit of a Paederastic courtship.”9
Using artwork on Greek vases and the writings of Plato,
other scholars suggest that the love between younger boys and
older men was a social behavior that laws were inept to control.
Robert Flacelière makes such a point by describing Greek society
as being unable to resist the temptation of pederasty:
But in Greece, though pederasty was forbidden by law in most of the
cities, it had become so fashionable that no one troubled to conceal it.
On the contrary, such tendencies were respected and even approved.
Plato himself recommended their cultivation as a necessary preliminary
to the successive stages of a philosophic understanding of Being.10

Flacelière chooses to define pederasty as a sexual behavior so
infectious that Athenian law was unable to stop its spread within
the polis.
Both Cohen and Flacelière make use of the term ‘pederasty’
and yet leave their readers uncertain as to its meaning. The
application of such a vague modern term upon Greek sexuality
greatly distorts their conclusions about Greek society’s acceptance
of sexual copulation between younger boys and older men.
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Kenneth J. Dover does not make the same error in Greek
Homosexuality. Instead, he suggests the Greeks were indifferent to
same-sex relations that fulfill certain requirements imposed by
Greek society:
This paradigm included ritualistic conventions such as the requirement
that the boy be courted and play hard to get, that his reputation be
protected, that he not be anally penetrated, that he not receive money,
and that he not enjoy the “intercrural” sex – the older man’s penis
rubbing between his thighs. Any condemnation of same-sex relations
derived not from a disapproval of such relations per se, but from a
failure of the participants in such a relationship to respect these
conventions, thus challenging the political power structure they
reflected.11

Dover introduces a new term “intercrural sex” that does not have
modern preconceived notions. Two examples of Greek vase
artwork help to define the actual process of intercrural sex. The
first example is artwork on a Greek vase.

Attributed to Eucharides Painter, this pelikê is our earliest example
of actual copulation. Source: R371 Kilmer, Martin F. Greek
Erotica. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1993.
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Martin Kilmer utilizes Dover’s new term for sexual behavior
between an older man and a younger boy. He describes the above
vase scene saying, “the position most commonly adopted is
standing intercrural copulation, face-to-face, the passive partner
upright, the penetrating partner with his knees bent, legs outside
his partner’s legs, and usually slightly stooped” (Kilmer 15). He is
also careful to note that this scene is the ideal version of intercrural
sex where “the youth shows no erection” (16). The second
example is from a pelikê from Mykonos.

A pelikê from Mykonos by the Triptolemos painter.
Source: R502 Dover, K.J. Greek Homosexuality.
Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1978.

Both Martin Kilmer and J. K. Dover point to this second
image as an example of the proper courting ritual between an
older male and a younger boy.12 Martin goes further and claims
that this second example “is one of the best-preserved examples of
intercrural intercourse in progress.”13 Again in this copulation
scene, the lack of arousal and interest is clearly demonstrated by
the younger boy:

[The youth] stands upright, looking fondly at the hare he holds
by the ears in his right hand. In his left hand he holds the looped
end of a leash which runs to the collar of a seated dog of a
generally greyhound look…[The boy] seems to be paying
attention strictly to these gifts, not to the things that are being
done to him.”14
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The artwork of these two vases and Dover’s definition of
intercrural sex gives both form and delineation of the substance of
Pausanias’ speech in Plato’s Symposium. Dover’s intercrural sex
becomes synonymous with what Pausanias terms as noble love:
The Love of Heavenly Aphrodite. This goddess, whose descent is purely
male (hence this love is for boys)…[And those who are moved purely by
this Heavenly Love] prefer older [boys] whose cheeks are showing the
first traces of a beard - a sign that they have begun to form minds of
their own. I am convinced that a man who falls in love with a young
man of this age is generally prepared to share everything with the one he
loves – he is eager, in fact to spend the rest of his own life with him.15

In clearly defining intercrural sex, Dover creates a term that
corresponds to Pausanias’ Heavenly Love. This is not a base form
of love that requires the external enforcement of Greek law.
Instead, this noble form of love encourages a stable life-long
relationship between the boy and the man and enhances the
intellectual development of the younger boy.
Applying the term intercrural sex to Greek sexuality also
resolves the dilemmas pointed out by Cohen and Flacelière. The
laws and punishments identified by these two authors are in
condemnation of same-sex practices that no longer conform to the
protocols of intercrural sex. Instead, the younger boy has given in
too easily to the coarse pleasure of anal sex. Pausanias also refers
to the need for law in cases where the man/boy couple resorts to
this transgressive form of sexual practice. He continues in his
speech, “but those other lovers, the vulgar ones, need external
restraint…These vulgar lovers are the people who have given love
such a bad reputation that some have gone so far as to claim that
taking any man as a lover is in itself disgraceful.”16 Likewise the
lack of distinction made between intercrural sex and anal
penetration within our modern notions of Greek sexuality has
caused many researchers to promote that any love between an
older man and a younger boy is forbidden by Greek law and
society.
The speech of Diotima further develops Pausanias’s notion
of noble love. She explains the rites of love that lead to the highest
mystery:
A lover who goes about this matter correctly must begin in his youth to
devote himself to beautiful bodies. First, if the leader leads aright, he
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should love one body and beget beautiful ideas there; then he should
realize that the beauty of any one body is brother to the beauty of any
other and that if he is to pursue beauty of form he’d be very foolish not
to think that the beauty of all bodies is one and the same. When he
grasps this, he must become a lover of all beautiful bodies, and he must
think that this wild gaping after just one body is a small thing and
despise it.17

Diotima’s description echoes the noble love of Pausanias. She
describes the progression of thoughts that should occur in both the
older man and the younger boy during intercrural intercourse. In
a proper relationship, the guidance of the older man should set the
younger boy upon a ladder of love that will allow him to realize
true Beauty.18 This answers the present day dilemma of defining
homosexuality as either the love of human beings or as the love
between same-sex individuals. Kinsey is correct in stating that
homosexuality for the Greeks meant same-sex love. By following
Diotima’s definition, the end result of such same-sex love is the
love of beauty in all of humanity. This is the reason why the Latin
definition for ‘homosexuality’ is defined as love of human beings.
Intercrural sex as the noble form of love between younger
boys and older men is both allowed and promoted within Greek
society. Yet numerous laws and social customs ensure that the
man/boy pair does not fall into the practice of coarse love. Within
proper protocol, the older man serves as a teacher who introduces
notions of beauty to the younger boy. Likewise in realizing the
beauty of the ideas created within the younger boy, the older man
also grows in his intellectual development. The result of
intercrural sex, a purificatory act of desire, is the production of
ideas and knowledge that is the immortal progeny of the union
between the younger and older males.
The clear distinction made between the coarse anal sex and
noble intercrural sex is critical to our modern day understanding
of Greek sexuality. It is also clear that laws and social constraints
in Greek society ensure the restriction of coarse sex and promote
the nobler intercrural sex. This form of sexual behavior provides
for Greek society a method of introducing young Greek males to
the male-dominated public sphere of Greek life. This coupling
between the older male and the younger boy is an opportunity for
the younger boy to practice sôphrosunê or temperance and selfcontrol, which is a virtue of the mind.19 The proper practice of
intercrural sex also provides a bridge for young Greek men to turn
away from a mere preoccupation with physical sexuality and
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harbor a love for the pursuit of both knowledge and wisdom that
is the final product of this noble form of intercourse. Instead of
creating physical progeny, intercrural sex provides Greek society
with a new generation of male adults that are in love with
contributing new ideas and thoughts to the Athenian society.
Yet the separation between coarse and noble love is no
longer prevalent in our modern day notions of sexuality. Having
clearly denoted the Greek concepts of noble and coarse sex, it is
important to trace the disappearance of such a distinction between
the two forms of sexual practice. After Plato’s time, “reflections[s]
on the love of boys lost some of its intensity, its seriousness, its
vitality, if not its topicality.”20 Yet “this does not mean that the
practice disappeared or that it became the object of a
disqualification. All the texts plainly show that it was still
common and still regarded as a natural thing.”21 What occurs is
“obsolescence not of itself, but of the problem; a decline in the
interest one took in it; a fading of the importance it was granted in
philosophical and moral debate.”22
The practice of intercrural sex between younger boys and
older men was an accepted part of Greek society until the time of
Plutarch. In Dialogue on Love, Plutarch begins to break away from
traditional Greek views of love for younger boys:

First, there is the shift resulting from the discussion itself; the question of
the choice the beloved must make between his two lovers surreptitiously
becomes the question of love in its two possible forms - for boys and for
girls. And second, the shift, made possible by the paradoxical situation
of the intrigue, which confers on the relationship with a woman the
same ethical potential as the relationship with a man…What is wanted is
to form a conception of a single love. This conception will not reject the
characteristic values of pederastic love. Instead, it will include them in a
broader, more complete form, which ultimately only the relationship
with women, and more precisely with the wife, will be able to put into
practice.23

By raising the ethical standards of love for women to the same
level as the love for boys, Plutarch and the Greeks of his time
began to shift the purpose for sexual relationships toward
procreation. It was not that intercrural sex became forbidden, but
by claiming that both physical and intellectual progeny was
possible through the love for women, the love for boys was made
to seem inadequate. “To this fundamental role and this
germinative function of physical pleasure, Plutarch gives a solemn
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historical sanction.”24 Plutarch even goes as far to echo Diotima’s
speech in Symposium by stating, “Physical union with a lawful wife
is the beginning of friendship, a sharing, as it were, in great
mysteries.”25 Plutarch continues to proclaim that sexual pleasure
between a man and his wife “is like the seed out of which mutual
respect [timē], kindness [charis], affection [agapēsis], and loyalty
[pistis] daily grow between husband and wife.”26
Promoting procreation as the basic function of sexual
activity, Plutarch argues that sex between males and females
should be dedicated to procreation. Any sexual act without the
intention of producing physical offspring was considered a waste
to society. Relying on the necessity of procreation, Plutarch
defines gender roles within society as the opposition between male
and female. Focusing on the possibility of creating both physical
and intellectual progeny, Plutarch promotes male and female love
as the more value-conscious form of sexual relationship that
should be encouraged by the state.
Since Plutarch’s time, the benefits of man/boy love were
forgotten and have, at best, been seen as a wasteful form of sexual
activity. Victorian prudish notions of sexuality have determined
the gender roles of male and females; males are the active partner
in opposition to their passive female companions. This is the
notion of a clear delineation between male and female, and the
negative perception of love between men and younger boys is still
the dominant notion of sexuality within our present society.
A clear analysis of sexuality within Greek society does not
provide us with a set of permanent criteria for defining gender and
sexuality within Greek society. Yet following Dover and
Foucault’s disciplined usage of language and clear definitions, the
study of Greek sexuality is an opportunity to practice the analysis
of the role of sex within a given society. Unlike historical Greece,
our present day society is still in the process of evolving its own
notions of gender and sexuality. Clear definitions and accurate
analysis are critical to illuminate the role that our society assigns to
sex and its practice. The habitual application of these sound
analytical techniques will ensure the development of a purificatory
hermeneutics of desire that will define both our present and future
notions of what constitutes the ‘norm’ of our sexuality.
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Plato’s Validation
of Heterosexuality
in Symposium
Joseph Schwartz,
Rowan University
In Plato’s Symposium, the subject of homoeroticism and the
relationships between ‘boyfriends’ and ‘lovers’ are discussed in
detail. In the speeches of Phaedrus, Pausanias, and Aristophanes,
this type of relationship is seen not only as natural, but also
superior to heterosexual relationships. However, one can say that
Plato, by using the dialogue of Socrates and Diotima, undermines
the institution of homosexuality and the validity of the ‘boyfriend’
and’lover’ relationship as having a purer and superior form of love
than in heterosexual relationships while elevating the latter to an
equal status.
Excluding Socrates, the other members of the symposium
frequently use the example of a relationship between two men.
Phaedrus shows the power of love using the example of an army
comprised of lovers and boyfriends. However, in this example,
the relationship is not strictly defined by the practice of pederasty,
but rather by the strong emotions of a man for his elder.
It is in Pausanias’ speech that the audience first becomes
aware of the idea of two types of love: Common Aphrodite, born
from Zeus and Dione; and Celestial Aphrodite, conceived from the
male god Uranus. The rationale for the classification of each seems
to stem from the idea that the conception of Aphrodite between a
male and female presence is much more natural and terrestrial in
occurrence than the birth of Aphrodite from the severed member
of a male god. Therefore, this bolsters the idea of male-male
sexuality as celestial since it is through a male alone that Celestial
Aphrodite is conceived.
The Comparative Humanities Review
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Aristophanes’ humorous story of creation puts forward an
idea of homosexuality as a natural and purer form of love, in
comparison to heterosexuality. He explains it using the idea that
every person was a half of a larger being made up of two humans.
These creatures were male-male, female-female, or male-female
and were split in half as punishment from Zeus. According to
Aristophanes, every human wishes to return to his or her other
half. The originally male-female creatures were attracted to any
member of the opposite sex, and are usually adulterers; while the
male-male and female-female beings were in search of their true
same-sex other half. When they find their other half, they desire to
be one with that person again in order to be whole. This is the
definition that Aristophanes gives to love: “the pursuit of
wholeness.”1
Here, it seems that Plato is again reinforcing the idea of
homosexuality as purer than heterosexuality. However, in this
claim, Plato also shows a weakness in Aristophanes’ argument in
that he does not defend it with any practical reason or rationale.
He also does not explain why the quest for a homosexual person’s
“wholeness” is more divine than that of a heterosexual
individual’s. Therefore, though the presentation and content of
the story is amusing, it does little to strengthen the logical
validation of homosexuality, while still taking time to criticize
heterosexual relationships.
The speeches of Eryximachus and Agathon deal less with
the gender roles that love tends to follow and focus more on the
idea of love as an objective concept. Eryximachus, a physician,
approaches the issue in a way that explains how love interacts
with the human body. Agathon, who is being honored at this
party for his prize-winning plays, concentrates on the actual god
Love, who is described in masculine terms and only affects males.
The members of the symposium oppose each other in
different ways. Most try to defend the idea of homoeroticism by
praising the concept of the ‘lover’ and ‘boyfriend’ relationship, but
do not succeed in rendering their arguments irrefutable. Another
manner in which they try to validate homosexuality is through
their attempts to discredit heterosexual relationships by either
referring to them as “common” (as is seen in Pausanias’s speech)
or crediting them with adultery (mentioned in Aristophanes’
speech). The discussion is driven by the merits of the different
types of love, rather than the idea of love that is later explained by
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Diotima through Socrates. As a result of Socrates’s speech, the
speakers are shown to be unable to defend their definitions of love
due to their lack of logical reasoning and the superficial thinking
presented in their dialogues, which discredits the views and
opinions held by those individuals.
Socrates’ speech is considered the climax of the symposium
and therefore the most anticipated. The fact that he immediately
introduces the female aspect in the guise of Diotima, a factor that
the other speakers ignored, seems to be intended to weaken the
foundations of the previous speeches. Socrates vouches for her
credibility by addressing her as being an “expert in love, as well as
in a large number of other areas too.”2 With Diotima comes the
introduction of a new concept of love. This definition follows the
idea of different levels, starting with the love of one particular
body (in this case a male body) and ascending to the highest level,
that of the love of beauty in its purest form. It is this highest form,
according to Diotima (and therefore Socrates) that all individuals
should strive for, but only the enlightened will achieve.
Since it is Diotima who teaches Socrates about the purest
type of love, it becomes clear that this type, the love of beauty in its
purest form, can also be explained and experienced by a woman.
However, Plato is subversive in the manner in which he uses
Diotima’s presence to refute the speeches of the others attending
the party. He carefully has her speak in male terms referring to an
individual experiencing celestial love as “he.”3 However, he adds
a specifically female aspect to the idea of love, one that makes for
the strongest argument for Plato’s validation: the idea of
pregnancy.
By using the idea of pregnancy in her explanation, Diotima
incorporates an exclusively female aspect to the concept of love.
The lack of a male’s ability to become pregnant in the scientific
sense of the word requires a need to add a female presence in the
definition of love. When this occurs, according to Gregory Vlastos,
“Diotima undertakes to state the most general condition which the
pursuit of Beauty has to meet to qualify as eros, her phrase, ‘birth
in beauty’ is all to patently a generalization of the procreative –
hence necessarily heterosexual – love.”4 By doing this, Plato draws
a parallel between “common” and “celestial” love. Both types of
love are aimed toward the same goal of immortality and the desire
to create or continue “beauty,” yet the method of achieving these
goals differ. This is best explained by Margalit Finkelberg when
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she speaks of the idea of pregnancy in the Symposium saying,
“Owing to this offspring, the spiritual parent partakes in
immortality, just as the bodily parent does by bearing real
children.”5
Diotima’s definition of physical pregnancy is exclusive to
heterosexual relationships, yet in her definition of mental
pregnancy she switches from using strictly male identifiers, such
as “he” and “his,” to more ambiguous ones such as “someone” or
“a person.” At one point she comments on the idea of mental
offspring saying, “We’d all prefer to have children of this sort
rather than the human kind.”6 By using the ambiguous term
“we’d,” Diotima, and therefore Plato, is expressing that the desire
of what Pausanias would call “celestial love” is felt by both men
and women. In his studies, David Halperin has commented on the
ambiguity of Diotima’s language by stating that she has created
“delineation of a peculiar type of eroticism (pregnancy) in which
the distinction between sexual and reproductive functions has
been totally abolished.”7 As a result of this interesting use of
language and intentional blurring of gender roles, it seems as if
what is possible for men in the area of love is also possible for
women and vice versa. Halperin goes on to say, “The two strands
of sex and reproduction are so thoroughly interwoven in Diotima’s
discourse that they are virtually impossible to disentangle.”8
Using this rationale, it could be said that if women are capable of
feeling and desiring “celestial love” which, according to Diotima,
is simply the love of beauty in its purest form, then the
relationship between a man and woman can be considered equal
in its purity to that of a lover and his boyfriend.
Also, when one compares Diotima’s/Socrates’s view of the
purest form of love, it can be said that no other speaker in the
Symposium has been able to transcend past its lower forms. That is,
the speeches of the other speakers are more focused on the
physical act rather than the transcendent concept. Through the
mingling of heterosexual ideas and ambiguous terminology,
Diotima is able to create a love in which both orientations have
equal validity. This, in turn, questions the opinions held by the
other speakers that the boyfriend/ lover relationship is superior to
a heterosexual relationship due to the fact that each is still steeped
in the physical.
Another way that Plato can be seen as undermining the
homoerotic ideal of the time would be the fact that he exempts
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Socrates from having any physical relationships with men. The
fact that Diotima is a woman rules out the possibility that he
acquired his knowledge of the subject from a male lover. His
interactions with Alcibiades and the account that Alcibiades gives
of his encounters with Socrates, also allows one to infer that
Socrates is not interested in the male body, but more so the
transcendent idea of beauty.
Alcibiades states that several times he tries to seduce
Socrates by getting them to be alone together, going to the
gymnasium, or keeping him at his house. However, each time
Socrates ignores his advances until Alcibiades is finally able to
spend a night with him. Yet, even after all of his attempts he states
that his night with Socrates was as if he had “been sleeping with
[his] father or an elder brother.”9 While Alcibiades is somewhat
insulted by this encounter he also marvels at Socrates’ character
and self-control. It can be said that what Plato is trying to
accomplish here is to show that even though Socrates admires and
appreciates Alcibiades’ physical beauty, he does not need to act on
it by having a homosexual relationship; by doing so, he shows the
purist and highest level of love.
When one compares the relationship between Diotima and
Socrates with that of Socrates and Alcibiades, there arises another
of Plato’s attempts to discredit the idea of the paederastic
relationship. The relationship between Diotima and Socrates can
be viewed as the kind of “celestial” love that was described by
Pausanias earlier in the Symposium. However, unlike Pausanias’
definition, this type of love is occurring between a man and a
woman, without any physical relation being consummated. The
relationship of Socrates and Alcibiades, on the other hand can be
seen as Alcibiades physically pursuing Socrates. This view can be
supported by Alcibiades’ constant attempts to get Socrates alone in
order to have a sexual relationship with him. Therefore, according
to Pausanias, this type of love would be considered “common
love” and expected to occur between a man and woman.
Accordingly, as expressed by Christine Allen, if this interaction is
being used to express Plato’s view of homosexuality, “then it
becomes clear that his main concern is to elevate love above the
sexual level rather than to compare male homosexuality with
heterosexuality.”10 As a result, Plato further defends the idea that
heterosexual love is equal to that of homosexual love by holding
each one to the same standard, regardless of individual
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orientation.
It should not be said that Plato was necessarily trying to
dissuade the entire practice of homosexuality when writing
Symposium. However, it does seem that Plato was trying to give
validity to heterosexual relationships and discredit the idea that
homoerotic relations were superior. By making Socrates, who was
considered the base of knowledge at the time, explain love as
being an ambiguous idea that transcends the body, and therefore
gender, he was able to achieve this point. This point was furthered
by his interactions between Diotima, compared to Alcibiades.
By giving heterosexual characteristics to Socrates and
emphasizing his lack of physical homoerotic desire (both of which
are present in the other orators), Plato gives greater credit to the
idea of a nonphysical love. Socrates, the oldest and wisest of the
speakers, does not indulge in physical homosexual relationships,
but is still able to appreciate an individual for his or her mind.
Therefore, Plato shows how it is possible to love the mind of a man
(or woman), without the necessity of loving the body.
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Love, Laughter, and the
Harmony of Opposites
in Plato’s Symposium
Nicholas Rockower,
Bucknell University
The interpretations of Plato’s Symposium are as varied and
contradictory as the very encomia they address. The disparate
parts of the text may be viewed as sophisticated philosophy,
laughable pedantry, tragicomedy or beautiful sophistry. As a
whole, it can be equally opaque and intimidating. This essay does
not presume to suggest some transcendental means of interpreting
the work; indeed, to suppose that such a method exists is to ignore
its complex, multi-faceted nature. Rather, the specific and
recurring theme of the harmony of opposites throughout Plato’s
Symposium will be elucidated with reference to the use of humor
and dialogue.
From the very beginning, Plato’s Symposium contains
complicated trends and permutations within the dialogue. The
first difficulty a reader faces is apparent within the opening lines:
the speaker, Apollodorus, is responding to a question which is not
contained within the text. Moreover, the questioners are
composed of unnamed persons1 who remain anonymous
throughout the entirety of the dialogue. The first difficulty is
easily overcome as Apollodorus recalls a recent incident in which
he answered the exact same question (172a4-b8); this development,
while elucidating the original question, introduces a second level
of narration.2 The use of multiple narrative levels is not limited to
the beginning of the work; indeed, it is a prevalent and important
theme throughout. In this instance, the second narrative level is
The Comparative Humanities Review
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employed only briefly, but serves a threefold purpose.
Firstly, the dialogue within this narrative sets a humorous
tone: Apollodorus recounts being hailed by Glaucon in a teasing
manner (καὶ παίζων ἅµα τῇ κλήσει [and jesting as he called];
172a4).3 Here, the first distinctive thread of γέλως [laughter] is
established and remains a theme which runs throughout the
entirety of the work. Secondly, the nature of the question is (as
stated above) clarified: both Glaucon and (presumably) the
unnamed audience within the primary narrative level are
interested in οἱ ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι [the speeches of love] of Agathon,
Socrates and Alcibiades (as well as those of ‘the others who were
there’) (172b1-b4). Thirdly and finally, it clearly indicates that the
symposium at which these λόγοι occurred has subsequently
entered the realm of legend: Glaucon mentions that he has heard
the story before; “ἄλλος γάρ τίς µοι διηγεῖτο ἀκηοὼς Φοίνικος
τοῦ Φιλίππου [for some other described it to me, having heard it
from Phoinikos, son of Philippos]” (172b4-b5). Furthermore, he is
confused about the date at which this symposium took place,
mistakenly believing that it was a fairly recent occurrence.
Glaucon is startled to hear that it occurred a long time ago –
Apollodorus himself only knows details because he heard the
story from Aristodemus (who was present at the symposium)
(172c1-173a7). The symposium is still clearly generating a great
deal of interest, despite the temporal gap. Thus, the tale is
portrayed as a legend; in a sense, it has escaped the bonds of time.
With the termination of this second narrative level, a brief
dialogue between Apollodorus and his questioner[s] commences
(173c1-174a1). Notably, the theme of gentle jibing and general
humor already established by the exchange between Apollodorus
and Glaucon appears yet again in lines 173d6-d10; the trope is
crossing narrative levels. When the tale finally begins (l74a2), it
occurs within a third narrative level: Within the primary level,
Apollodorus is telling a story to the unnamed questioners; within
the second narrative level, Aristodemus tells the tale of the
symposium. Thus, all the action occurs within this third narrative
level, passed to the extradiegetic audience through multiple
narrative levels.4 The reader is repeatedly reminded of this fact
throughout the remainder of the work via the near-constant use of
indirect speech.5 Unlike the start of the work, the account does not
begin mid-way through a conversation: indeed, the story begins
outside and preliminary to the realm of the symposium. Lines
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174a2-a4 depict Socrates as unusually well-dressed and clean, to
Aristodemus’ subsequent surprise: he asks where Socrates is going
“καλὸς γεγενηµένος [having made himself beautiful]”. Socrates
explains that he is headed towards Agathon’s δεῖπνον [feast]; he
adds that he ἐκαλλωπισάµην [embellished himself] in order to be
as beautiful as Agathon (174a2-a8). There is most certainly a
comedic note within this exchange, for Socrates is notoriously
ugly, just as Agathon is notoriously beautiful. Moreover, the idea
that Socrates would consider himself ‘beautified’ by such
superficial means is absolutely ridiculous: the Socratic notion of
‘beauty’ is antithetical to this suggestion.
Thus far, one must wonder why this λόγος as
(purportedly) earned such interest; it seems as though it will be
nothing but a comedic account of a gathering of drinking
companions. The first signal that these expectations are erroneous
appears simultaneously with the entrance into the symposium: as
Aristodemus is hailed by Agathon, both Aristodemus and the
reader become aware that Socrates has, at some point, wandered
off. Socrates is discovered standing, oblivious to the world around
him, on the neighbors’ porch (174d5-175a9). This, of course,
continues the theme of comedy: Aristodemus himself admits that
he is experiencing something amusing (if slightly awkward): καί τι
ἔφη αὐτόθι γελοῖον παθεῖν [and he said that he then suffered
something comic]. However, it is nonetheless incongruous:
Socrates’ earlier description emphasized his desire to appear well
before Agathon; now he stands, seemingly absorbed entirely
within himself, without a care for what others might think.
Agathon’s response to a description of his guest’s behavior is,
naturally, one of surprise: “ἄτοπόν γ’ ἔφη [‘very strange,’ he
said]”(175a10). Socrates’ behavior is both ἄτοπος [strange,
unusual] with respect to Agathon’s view8 and, in addition, to the
sympotic tradition. One of the primary purposes of the traditional
symposium is to fashion a world which binds together the
participants, removing social boundaries and subduing
consciousness of the outside world.9 By standing outside, refusing
to communicate, Socrates is acting in a way antithetical to the
traditions of the sympotic culture—or perhaps, as though he is
enjoying his own, entirely internal ‘symposium.’
Though this event is without a doubt comedic, it
incorporates an odd contrast. It startles the host, Agathon, who is
only pacified by Aristodemus’ assurances that the behavior is

THE COMPARATIVE HUMANITIES REVIEW

29

‘normal.’ Agathon’s discomfort with the situation is clearly
indicated by his continuing attempts to send for Socrates; only by
the intervention of Aristodemus does Socrates’ ‘vigil’ remain
undisturbed. By remaining outside, Socrates has created a
situation which is both γελοῖος [humorous] and ἄτοπος
[unusual]. This combination of incongruous concepts is a trend
that will play an important theme throughout the remainder of the
symposium: contrasts abound throughout the entirety of the text.
Even as Socrates first reclines beside Agathon, a brief jesting
dialogue ensues, drawing a contrast between their individual
forms of σοφία [wisdom] (175d1-e10). In fact, it is apparent that
this particular symposium itself is incongruous: although a
‘symposium’ is literally a ‘drinking together,’ the participants of
this symposium decide that they will in fact moderate their
drinking.
The proposition is delivered by Eryximachus, a doctor who
is portrayed in a strongly pedantic manner, after he hears several
complaints concerning the heavy drinking of the night before (at a
certain point Aristophanes states that he was ‘baptized’ in wine)
(176b3-b5). After giving a bombastic medical warning against an
excess of alcohol, Eryximachus brings about a democratic
agreement to have a more leisurely symposium. This is unusual
not only in reference to the etymological connotations of the word
‘symposium’: the ritual presented the opportunity, for those
participants who had a more philosophic goal in mind than mere
drunken παιδιά [play], to experience the ‘euphoria-dysphoria
opposition,’ which Pellizer defines as “the half-way between
sobriety and drunkenness, so that all could enjoy liberty and ease
of speech, gaiety and release from cares, without falling into the
unregulated, violent excesses practiced by barbarians, but also
without the sterile gravity of the sober and non-drinkers” (Pellizer
1990, 179).10 In other words, this specific sympotic tradition could
be described as the interweaving, with reference to humor, of
σπουδή [seriousness] and γέλως [laughter]. It seems as though
this symposium will not fall into the euphoria-dysphoria
framework; σωφροσύνη [moderation] will be the keyword of this
gathering.
Eryximachus’ next proposition, however, has the full
support of traditional sympotic behavior. He proposes that each
participant, in turn, deliver a eulogy in praise of Ἔρως.11 The
practice of dialogue being passed along by the members of a
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symposium is a well-established ritual. Moreover, the subject of
ἔρως is an extremely popular among the established sympotic
topics (Pellizer 1990, 180). The first encomium is given by
Phaedrus (as Eryximachus indicates that he originally conceived
the idea). Phaedrus’ encomium is perfectly suited for a
symposium, if lacking slightly in independent thought. He quotes
the archaic poets and draws upon several mythological stories;
recitations of this type are common within symposia. He presents
Ἔρως as the oldest of gods, a force leading mortals away from
αἰσχύνη [dishonor] and towards ἀρετή [virtue], for “no-one likes
to appear cowardly before his beloved.”12 He unfortunately makes
no attempt to define what belongs within the realm of ἀρετή/
[virtue], nor within the realm of αἰσχύνη [dishonor]. His rhetoric
seems to operate on the assumption that there exists an unspoken
but perfectly definitive means to distinguish between these
concepts (Hunter 2004, 42). As any reader familiar with Socrates’
method of interrogation knows, these are rhetorically suicidal
errors. Although Phaedrus’ encomium is one of the least notable
(he is significantly not included within Glaucon’s list of those
present), it is now clear why this symposium has acquired its
mythic status; the members of the symposium are persons of
note—some with famed poetic or rhetorical abilities—each about
to deliver a speech on a pervasively intriguing topic.
Aristodemus’ account continues, bypassing “ἄλλοι τινές
[some others]” who are, apparently, worthy of remembrance with
reference to neither their names nor their ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι [erotic
speeches]. He then proceeds to narrate Pausanias’ speech.
Pausanias opens with the rhetorical trope of finding some fault
within the previous speech: he claims that it is incorrect to speak of
Ἔρως as one being a single deity, for “δὴ δύο ἐστόν [in fact, there
are two]” (180d5). Pausanias elucidates that, just as there is a
Common (Πάνδηµος) Aphrodite and a Heavenly (Οὐρανία)
Aphrodite, so also is there a Common and a Heavenly Ἔρως. He
further incorporates concepts of gender within his encomium:
unlike Common Aphrodite, Heavenly Aphrodite is ἀµήτωρ
[motherless], as she is born from the sea foaming about the
dismembered ‘parts’ of Οὐρανός. This contrast plays an
important role within Pausanias’ speech, which is given over
mainly to praise of the pederastic relationship between an ἐραστής
[lover] and his ἐρώµενος [beloved] (181c4-185c4). This topic again
is appropriate within the symposium, for many of the sympotic
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poems are composed on the subject of pederastic relationships.13
Furthermore, Pausanias’ clearly elitist distinction between
Common Aphrodite and Heavenly Aphrodite indicates a
hierarchical mindset: another potential facet of the symposium was
a means for the elite to distinguish themselves from the lower
classes.14
Although the dialogue is progressing in a clearly sympotic
manner, the humor of the situation seems to have vanished
entirely as the various jests and Socrates’ comic behavior have
given way to epic recitations on the nature of Ἔρως. After
Pausanias, however, comes a brief interaction between
Eryximachus and Aristophanes. The comic poet has suddenly
succumbed to a fit of hiccoughs, giving the doctor both a chance to
grant his medical advice and deliver his encomium ahead of
schedule. Aristophanes’ ailment is the first discordant note since
the start of the encomia. He destabilizes the pattern, causing a
brief dialogue and re-arranging the natural order of speeches. This
event signals a change in tone as Eryximachus, in full medical
glory, begins his eulogy.15 Rather than using stories of heroes or
gods to advance his argument, Eryximachus employs his own
medical knowledge. His encomium expands the domain of Ἔρως
to include ‘everything which exists.’ Although such a discourse
may not seem as appropriate for the sympotic tradition as the
encomia of Pausanias or Phaedrus, Eryximachus nonetheless
manages to include an extremely relevant trope: he speaks on the
harmony of opposites, arguing against an imbalance toward any
extreme. His speech is overly technical and, in the end, as much
an encomium of medicine as of Ἔρως (Hunter 2004, 56).
Nonetheless, it is startling to note how his eulogy embodies a
specific sympotic theme, to a greater extent than either of the
previous encomia: just as Phaedrus is concerned with the concepts
of αἰσχύνη [dishonor] and ἀρετή [virtue], and Pausanias with the
two contrasting types of Ἔρως, Eryximachus also speaks of polar
opposites. However, unlike either of his predecessors,
Eryximachus is concerned with establishing a balance between any
two extremes (186b4-188e3). This perfectly echoes the sympotic
concern of finding the perfect harmony between drunkenness and
sobriety, violent excess and sober gravity, and, significantly,
γέλως [laughter] and σπουδή [seriousness]. The suggestion that
Eryximachus is an embodiment of the sympotic trope is, of course,
absolutely absurd. His character is portrayed clearly as
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excessively pedantic and sober. It may be said, perhaps, that
Eryximachus obeys the Delphic precept of µηδὲν ἄγαν [nothing to
excess] to an excessive extent: he employs σωφροσύνη
[moderation] extravagantly. Nevertheless, he acts as a catalyst for
sympotic themes: his pedantic nature is unwittingly amusing and
brought about the correct atmosphere for the ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι to
occur.
Eryximachus is followed by Aristophanes, who has
managed to both cure his hiccoughs and make a jest: he announces
his recovery while simultaneously mocking Eryximachus’ speech.
His humorous tone is not surprising; he is a comic poet, a fact
which no doubt influences Eryximachus to warn him, in response,
not to indulge in humor within the upcoming encomium.
Aristophanes corrects him, indicating that what must be avoided is
not humour (as laughter is his specialty), but rather he must avoid
saying καταγέλαστα [ridiculous things]. Implicit within this
statement is again the idea of avoidance of extremes; furthermore,
there is a possible undertone that Eryximachus did not avoid this
excess: Eryximachus rightly spoke from his area of expertise, but
was in deliverance and tone immoderate. Aristophanes, as one
would expect from a comic poet, does not end his jests here: in
fact, his entire encomium may be perceived as a joke at
Eryximachus’ expense. He describes the original form of
ἄνθρωποι [humanity] as two humans conjoined, with three
potential genders (male-male, male-female, female-female). Due
to the excess of power inherent in this form, the gods found it
necessary to weaken the race: Zeus split everyone down the
middle, resulting in the current human form, with the threat that
he will do it again if they continue to behave outrageously.
Aristophanes attributes the birth of Ἔρως to this act: each half
yearned to be re-united with its other half (189d7-193d6). This
speech clearly has comedic aspects. It mocks Eryximachus in that
it asserts a biological truth; a truth which is, of course, patently
fatuous. It does not require any specialized knowledge to interpret
– one method of reading Aristophanes’ speech is as characteristic
‘of unsophisticated, subliterate folklore’ (Dover 1966, 45).
Moreover, it contains a multitude of logical flaws. The story itself
is remarkably different from any extant Aristophanic text;16 its
comedic traits are balanced by a tragic subtext. Robert Wardy
sums up the contrast neatly with his statement: “What is so very
poignant in this fiction is the collocation of defective human flesh
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with divine machinery…. Human nature, without the intervention
of divine artifice, is doomed to perpetual erotic frustration:
comedy or tragedy?” (Wardy 2002, 21)17 Ultimately, Aristophanes’
encomium contains the same message inherent in Eryximachus’
eulogy. Both advise embracing σωφροσύνη [moderation]:
Eryximachus, due to ‘scientific’ reasons; Aristophanes, due to the
threat that we may again be split and doomed to wander forever
on one leg. Thus, Aristophanes’ encomium may be viewed as a
humorous, yet tragic mirror—a σπουδαιογέλοιον [seriocomic]
inversion—of Eryximachus’ speech.
It is worth noting that, at some point, Aristodemus himself
was passed over. He shares a couch with Eryximachus and
Aristophanes, yet the order of speeches oversteps him without any
objection. It should not be assumed that this is some rhetorical
trope to make the reader feel present within the symposium; the
persistent use of indirect speech is a consistent reminder that
everything is delivered via a narrator. Instead, it serves to place
Aristodemus outside the symposium: he is granted a bird’s-eye
view of the scenario, an untainted image that is now passed on to
the reader. One might expect, perceiving the sympotic trend
developing thus far, that the subsequent eulogy (delivered by
Agathon) will offer further and even more complex tropes.
Surprisingly, despite the fact that he is the tragedian following the
comic poet, he concerns himself not at all with the harmony of
contrasts. Instead, he gives a beautifully rendered, but nonetheless
empty, speech in praise of Ἔρως—in Hunter’s words, “a beautiful
sound signifying nothing” (Hunter 2004, 73).
In essence, Agathon’s speech functions as a springboard for
the following speech of Socrates. There is again a dialogue
between the end of Agathon’s speech and the start of Socrates’
(198a1-201c9): Eveually, Socrates leads Agathon to admit that
every assertion within his encomium was utterly mistaken.
Socrates then gives his eulogy in the form of a story, repeating a
conversation between himself and his (purported) former teacher,
Diotima. This exchange creates yet another narrative level atop
the already exorbitant construction. Within this narrative level,
the dialogue echoes what just took place between Agathon and
Socrates; however, in this instance, it is Socrates who is being
cross-examined. More importantly, his interrogator is woman.
Socrates has gained rhetorical dominance in the midst of a
patriarchal ritual, only to attribute that dominance to the wisdom
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he gained from a female. Thus, the contradictions inherent within
the premises of Socrates’ encomium fit the sympotic theme; as
before, however, Socrates’ actions are ἄτοπος [unusual]. His
encomium is nonetheless amusing, as he portrays himself as a
naïve student, blindly falling for Diotima’s every rhetorical trick.18
Within Diotima’s speech, Ἔρως is established as the child
of Πενία [Lack] and Πόρος [Way, Resource]. He is neither
beautiful nor bad, neither beautiful nor ugly, neither wise nor
ignorant—but rather somewhere between these extremes.
Furthermore, he is not a god, but a “δαίµων µέγας… µεταξύ ἐστι
θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ [a great power… (which) is between god and
mortal]”(202d13-e1), acting as a mediator between mortals and
gods. It seems that Diotima is portraying Ἔρως as the
embodiment of the sympotic middle. From this point, however,
the narrative breaks the recurring trend: Diotima’s description of
the path towards beauty builds slowly toward an ideal,
culminating when suddenly (ἐξαίφνης), one catches sight of “το
θεῖον καλόν… µὴ ἀνάπλεων σαρκῶν τε ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ
χρωµάτων καὶ ἄλλης πολλῆς φλυαρίας θνητῆς [the sacred
beauty… not full of human flesh and skin and much other mortal
nonsense]” (211e1-212).19 The sheer number of narrators at this
point creates a dizzying effect for the reader: the words of Diotima
come echoing out of an abyss, blurring the lines between narrative
levels. The extradiegetic audience blends with the diegetic, with
Apollodorus, and even Aristodemus; just as a symposiast sees
himself reflected in a sympotic mixing-bowl, so too is the modern
reader reflected through this mise en abîme. Plato’s Symposium is, in
a way, a literary mixing-bowl, its sides decorated with beautiful
renditions of sympotic themes while Diotima’s words echo up
from the Gorgon-headed centre. And, just as the Gorgon-head
reminds the symposiasts of the outside world, so too do Diotima’s
words break the sympotic circle.
All the audiences are drawn back in, however, as suddenly
(ἐξαίφνης) the famed drunken Alcibiades staggers in, his κῶµος
[band of revelers] invading the symposium. Alcibiades’ entrance
is extremely comic,20 functioning to break the ‘spell’ of Socrates’
words.21 His subsequent encomium of Socrates draws the
audiences full back into the realm of the symposium—a
symposium which now no longer may be categorized by its
σωφροσύνη [moderation]. Moreover, his eulogy makes full use of
the sympotic middle; it is thoroughly σπουδαιογέλοιον
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[seriocomic], insulting and praising Socrates in one. Ultimately,
his speech portrays the philosopher in a manner equivalent to
Diotima’s previous depiction of Ἔρως, suggesting that Socrates
strives to exemplify the pathway to ideal beauty.22 The
symposium is denigrated to drunken revel, ending the next
morning with Socrates explaining to Agathon and Aristophanes
that a tragedian is also a comic poet, and vice-versa (212c4-223d7).
In the article “Plato on the Psychology of Humor,” Shelley
asserts that “Plato viewed humor as the recognition by the intellect
of what modern scholars would call incongruity—the special
juxtaposition of incoherent concepts” (353). Shelley goes on to
state that, in an ideal world, humor would not exist; however,
given the present state of affairs, humor is a useful tool to balance
“excessive seriousness,” (361): “Plato implies that laughter is good
at least insofar as it restores the soul to a healthy condition by
balancing out the ill feeling of malice” (354). Although Shelley’s
article does not address the Symposium directly, its assertions are
nonetheless clearly applicable. The work portrays a sympotic
setting, revealing the efficacy of the unification of opposites. Thus,
accepting Shelley’s interpretation of the Platonic view of humor,
the symposium and its ideals on moderation may be seen as
placed, hierarchically, immediately below the Socratic ideal; as the
Socratic ideal has not yet been attained, the symposiasts content
themselves with the lesser superlative of the sympotic ideal.
However, in this instance, the trinity of Ἔρως, the philosophical
sympotic setting, and Socrates work in harmony to build the
symposium to a transcendental vision: a flagrant contrast from
moderation into idealized excess startles the audiences,
functioning to elevate them from the sympotic into the Socratic.
Thus Plato, acting behind the narrative levels as an authorative
sympotic δαίµων, utilizes the attributes of the symposium to
create a realm in which, for a brief moment, the spectators may
perceive “τὸ θεῖον καλόν [the sacred beauty].”
ENDNOTES

1. Inferred by the use of πυνθάνεσθαι in second person plural. Cf.
Plato, Symposium, ed. C. J. Rowe, (Oxford: Oxbow Books), 1998, 127
n.172a1; R. G. Bury, The Symposium of Plato (Cambridge: W. Heffer and
Sons), 1909.
2. The dialogue between Apollodorus and the unnamed persons
comprises the primary narrative level, with Plato as the narrator. Plato
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exists outside the text: in narratological terminology, Plato narrates from
the ‘extradiegetic level’; cf. Gerald Prince, A Dictionary of Narratology
(Aldershot: Scolar) 1988.
3. The exact nature of Glaucon’s joke is not understood; cf. Rowe, 128 n.
172a3-4.
4. The logical question of authenticity is answered by 173b5-b6.
5. There are many instances where direct speech is used; they occur,
however, within a narrative that is nearly always indirect.
6. Cf. Rowe, 131 n. 174a4.
7. Richard Hunter, Plato’s Symposium (New York: Oxford University
Press) 2004, 71.
8. Rowe summarizes this with the slightly whimsical phrase “what
[Socrates] is doing is not what people like Agathon go in for” (132 n. a10).
9. Cf. Walter Donlan, “Pistos Philos Hetairos” in: Theognis of Megara, ed.
Gregory Nagy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).
10. Stephen Halliwell, “The Uses of Laughter in Greek Culture,” The
Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1991), 290: “The occasions
within Greek culture which possess such a framework of convention are
paradigmatically those of conviviality and festivity…. These contexts
have in common a distance or detachment from normal, everyday affairs,
and, in certain areas, a suspension of usual standards of behaviour.”
11. Ezio Pellizer, “Outlines of a Morphology of Sympotic Entertainment”
in: Oswyn Murray, Sympotica (Oxford : Clarendon, 1990), 179: “…in the
symposion are developed the rules of an elaborate system of
communication…” i.e. the ‘logos sympotikos.’
12. “τὴν ἐπὶ µὲν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνην, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς καλοῖς φιλοτιµίαν
[the shame for shameful things, and ambition for beautiful things]”
(178d2-d3).
13. Cf. Theognidea 237-54.
14. Lesley Kurke, Coins Bodies, and Gold: The Politics of Meaning in Archaic
Greece (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 19.
15. For an argument against the perception of Eryximachus as a pedant,
see Ludwig Edelstein, “The Role of Eryximachus in Plato’s Symposium,”
in Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol.
76, (1945), 85-103.
16. Cf. A. M. Bowie,”Thinking with Drinking: Wine and the Symposium
in Aristophanes,” in The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 117, (1997), 1-21.
17. Cf. Harry Neumann, ‘On the Comedy of Plato’s Aristophanes’ in The
American Journal of Philology, Vol. 87, No. 4 (1966), 420-426.
18. Cf. Hunter, 82; Rowe, 173 n. 201d1-204c8.
19. Alexander Nehamas, “Only in the Contemplation of Beauty is Human
Life Worth Living: Plato, Symposium 211d” in European Journal of
Philosophy, 15,(2007), 3: “The Form of Beauty, then, may be more beautiful
than everything else and the intensity of the true philosopher’s love may
dwarf our everyday feelings….” This functions as one of the few
extremes found within the Symposium which is not accompanied by its
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polar opposite.
20. Frisbee C. C. Sheffield, “Alcibiades’ Speech: A Satyric Drama” in
Greece & Rome, 48, (2001), 200-201: “Alcibiades introduces this section of
his speech as a parody of the mysteries of philosophy.”
21. Hunter, 101: “Socrates is… a Marsyas… whose music is used in ritual
initiations for its qualities of manic possession.”
22. Sheffield, 194: “Many scholars have argued that the speech is
designed to show Socrates as the embodiment of the erotic theory
outlined in his own speech….”
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The Politics of Transsexual Love:
Hedwig and the Angry Inch and
Plato’s Symposium
Bryan Kim-Butler,
Vassar College
At the heart of the recent film Hedwig and the Angry Inch
(2001) is the question of love. A stage play adapted and directed
by, as well as starring, John Cameron Mitchell, Hedwig has become
well-known as a queer film, exploring issues of gender, sexuality,
race, nationality and performance. The film’s story, narrated by
Hedwig herself through voiceover and song, is roughly thus:
Hedwig, born Hansel, is raised in East Berlin in the years
immediately after the Berlin Wall is erected. The young Hansel
listens to American rock music and dreams of escaping
Communist East Berlin, which he does by becoming Hedwig,
taking his mother’s name, marrying an American G.I. and moving
to the US. But the sex reassignment surgery Hansel/Hedwig must
undergo goes wrong, and she is left with “a one-inch mound of
flesh,”1 the titular Angry Inch she eventually takes as the name of
her band.
I frame love in Hedwig and the Angry Inch as a question, as it
functions in the story in often ambiguous and unexpected ways.
The prospect of love also functions as a question, or rather a
quality of life put into question by a threat, in the real life of David
Reimer, who became known in the 1970s as the “Joan/John Case,”
another instance of medical intervention gone wrong, a case I will
elaborate to reflect back on Hedwig. I am providing a reading of
trans narratives in light of and exemplified by Hedwig and Reimer.
I will suggest that love in trans narratives, far from a pure or
transcendental category, often operates as a mechanism of social
The Comparative Humanities Review
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control and domination. The prospect of love or lack thereof, holds
a threat that has been utilized to forcibly define the limits of
intelligibility, of what will count as true and what will be possible.
In this way, love operates as an instrument in what Foucault calls
the politics of truth, the power/knowledge structures that define
the possibility of what we can know to be true.
Hedwig and the Angry Inch is largely about origins. The
central song of the film, “The Origin of Love,” recounts
Aristophanes’ familiar myth from the Symposium. Hedwig begins:
When the earth was still flat, and clouds made of fire, and mountains
stretched up to the sky, sometimes higher, folks roamed the earth like
big rolling kegs, they had two sets of arms, they had two sets of legs,
they had two faces peering out of one giant head, so they could watch all
around them as they talked, while they read; and they never knew
nothing of love, it was before the origin of love.2

Aristophanes’ speech describes the original humans as being of
three kinds; male beings who were the offspring of the sun, female
beings of the earth, and “androgynous” beings of the moon. When
their ambitions became threatening to the gods, Zeus cut the
beings apart into individual bodies as we know them.
Aristophanes continues:

This, then, is the source of our desire to love each other. Love is born into
every human being; it calls back the halves of our original nature
together; it tries to make one out of two and heal the wound of human
nature.3

At the end of the song, Hedwig directs her words to a “you”: “The
last time I saw you, we’d just split in two.”4
To whom is Hedwig singing? Tommy, her future lover
who will eventually betray her? Or perhaps herself? Leo Bersani’s
reading of the Symposium, which he calls “[p]erhaps the founding
text of desire as lack in the Western tradition,”5 provides insight
into these textual ambiguities. He reads Socrates’ questioning of
Agathon as instituting the idea of desire being a state of absence:
Love cannot be beautiful if it desires beauty. But, as Bersani
argues, Socrates does not in fact have textual authority; the
Symposium is a “highly selective and approximate account”6 and
the voice that might be given authority, Diotima’s, is heard only
through a recreation from Socrates’ memory. This means
“meaning itself is reconceived as a certain kind of movement”7 in
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the text, which calls our attention to its “disseminated authority.”8
Diotima’s articulation of Love as an intermediary is a “textual echo
of our textual betweenness” – a betweenness that Hedwig also
displays. Hedwig’s intermediary qualities occur in her
relationships, including her relationship to herself, to her own
body and psyche.
Bersani continues, discussing Aristophanes’ myth, namely
the question – can one desire oneself?:
If love in Aristophanes’ fable is a desire motivated by lack or need, what
the lover lacks is identical to what he is. It is more of what he is. This is a
lack based not on difference…but rather on the extensibility of
sameness…All being moves toward, corresponds with itself outside of
itself…We love, in other words, inaccurate replications of ourselves.10

In this movement of the self toward its self outside of itself, Hansel
seeks to find his double in America, explaining to his mother that
soldier Luther Robinson is going to “get me the hell out of here.”11
When Luther leaves Hedwig in a trailer park in Kansas City in
1989, she is further distraught by news from the television that the
Berlin Wall has just been brought down. The promise of love,
based on a transnational and transgendered journey, had had
politics in its scope the entire time.
Hedwig’s next lover, a teenager named Tommy Spec, is a
born-again Christian whose father is an abusive Army general. It is
of note that all of the men in Hedwig’s formative years are
connected to the U.S. military: her father was also an American G.I.
The betrayals and lost love she experiences are played against a
backdrop of military presence. Tommy, explaining the Biblical tale
of the Fall, another origin story, says, of Jesus,
You know what He saved us from was his fucking father. I mean, what
kind of God creates Adam in his image, pulls Eve out of him to keep him
company, and then tells them not to eat from the Tree of Knowledge? …
Eve just wanted to know shit.12

The story of paradise lost introduces the question of knowledge as
well as its connection to the question of love. “She gave him the
apple because they were in love,”13 Tommy says. Just after she
sings “The Origin of Love,” in voiceover, Hedwig raises a number
of questions of what exactly she desires, making love a question of
knowledge:

THE COMPARATIVE HUMANITIES REVIEW

41

It is clear that I must find my other half. But is it a he or a she? What
does this person look like? Identical to me? Or
somehow…complementary? Does my other half have what I don’t?
Were we really separated forcibly, or did he just run off with the good
stuff?14

“[R]un[ning] off with the good stuff” likely refers to Tommy’s
betrayal of Hedwig: while they are songwriting partners and
lovers for a time, he eventually steals the songs they write, even
songs she wrote before knowing him, and becomes a famous and
successful musician. Her authorship, in a way the authorship of
her own life, is stolen by the man who may have been her gateway
to the western dream of freedom: the ostensibly All-American boy
she mentors who yet betrays her by stealing her textual authority.
The film’s present action consists of Hedwig and her band, the
Angry Inch, shadowing his tour, playing gigs at diners and
recounting the story of her life in song.
It is knowledge, or rather the lack of knowledge, that
separates Hedwig and Tommy. While kissing, Hedwig moves
Tommy’s hands to her genital region, when he stops and says,
“What is that?” Hedwig pauses and replies, “It’s what I have to
work with.”15 The unknowability of deviant anatomy creates a
wall between teacher and student, lover and loved.
In Undoing Gender, Judith Butler considers the regulatory
norms placed in the psychic life of gendered power, but
insightfully also thinks through the body, how social knowledges
about gender are present in bodies. “[I]t is not just that there are
laws that govern our intelligibility, but ways of knowing, modes of
truth, that forcibly define intelligibility,”16 she writes. Butler
continues:
Justice is not only or exclusively a matter of how persons are treated or
how societies are constituted. It also concerns consequential decisions
about what a person is, and what social norms must be honored and
expressed for “personhood” to become allocated, how we do or do not
recognize animate others as persons depending on whether or not we
recognize a certain norm manifested in and by the body of that other.17

To return to the case of David Reimer, I suggest that we may view
Hedwig and other representations of trans love as existing within a
certain disciplinary framework whose domain is knowability,
thinkability, and intelligibility. Hedwig and Reimer share strange
continuities, both being victims of medical mistakes that affect
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their very personhood as viable gendered subjects. Both are in
threat of dissolution in the face of the law due to their precarious
positions in relation to and through gender.
Reimer was born as what we understand to be a normal,
healthy boy, but at eight months, his penis was burned and
severed by a doctor performing a routine procedure with a
machine others found unnecessary, which he had excessively
increased the power to and burned away a major portion of the
penis. David’s distressed parents heard of Dr. John Money, a
popular and controversial doctor who argued that a child could be
healthfully and successfully socialized as the gender other than
what s/he was assigned at birth. Money recommended that
Reimer be raised as a girl; they gave David the name Brenda and
assumed things would proceed normally. But Brenda began to
exhibit strong stereotypically “male” desires, which caused Milton
Diamond, a gender essentialist opposed to Money’s social
constructionist thesis, to intervene. In his teenage years, David
decided he wanted to live as a male, and underwent phalloplasty,
breast removal, and hormone treatment.
Butler gestures toward a reading of Reimer’s story as an
allegory with his body as marker:

This body becomes a point of reference for a narrative that is not about
this body, but which seizes upon the body, as it were, in order to
inaugurate a narrative that interrogates the limits of the conceivably
human. What is inconceivable is conceived again and again, through
narrative means, but something remains outside the narrative, a resistant
moment that signals a persisting inconceivability.18

The framework of power within which David developed can be
found in David’s recalling his doctors’ advice and coercion:

Doctor said “it’s gonna be tough, you’re gonna be picked on, you’re
gonna be very alone, you’re not gonna find anybody (unless you have
vaginal surgery and live as a female).”19

I continue with Butler’s apt reading of David’s comments: “Here
David makes a distinction between the ‘I’ that he is, the person
that he is, and the value that is conferred upon his personhood by
virtue of what is or is not between his legs. He was wagering that
he will be loved for something other than this or, at least, that his
penis will not be the reason he is loved.”20 It is clear that the
prospect of love was cruelly wielded by David’s doctors, who
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threatened him with harassment and isolation if he did not
conform to the ideas – the grid of social intelligibility – they had
made manifest in his body. The “extensibility of sameness” and
correspondence of a self “with itself” Bersani discusses are
mediated in the terms and the name of social conformity, as well
as the very intelligibility that sociality depends upon.
However, Butler insists that David retains a critical stance
toward his circumstances and his existence within them.
“Something exceeds the norm,”21 she writes, referring to David’s
insistence that there is a difference between the value of what
genitals he has and the person he is, the value of his self that may
come to be loved. “[A]nd he recognizes its unrecognizability,”22
she continues: “It is, in a sense, his distance from the knowably
human that operates as a condition of critical speech, the source of
his worth, as the justification for his worth.”23
Butler conceptualizes the normative “restrictive discourse
on gender that insists on the binary of man and woman as the
exclusive way to understand the gender field”24 as one that
“performs a regulatory operation of power that naturalizes the
hegemonic instance and forecloses the thinkability of its
disruption.”25 The symbolic law, for her, is enforced by the
iterative utterance of “It is the law.” This “utterance…
performatively attributes the very force to the law that the law
itself is said to exercise. ‘It is the law’ is thus a sign of allegiance to
the law, a sign of the desire for the law to be the indisputable law.”
Butler’s claim rings especially true for those of us who have felt
distinctly policed by a law simply by a descriptive phrasing of
what the law “is,” for instance, “Heterosexuality is just natural.”
David’s doctors’ insistence on their correctness, as well as their
simplification of terms – “You’re gonna be picked on, you’re
gonna be very alone” – show the immensity of the “desire for the
law to be the indisputable law.”26 The stated lack of love David is
told to expect becomes a performative instance of the statement “It
is the law.”
Hansel also comes up against a law, early on when Luther,
the American soldier who wishes to marry him, informs him that
the government will be doing a full physical exam, meaning he
will have to undergo sex reassignment surgery. The bodily norms
that have impacted Hedwig’s life from the very beginning
continue through his relationship with Tommy, when Tommy’s
confusion at her anatomy sends him running.
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Yet Hedwig, like Reimer, maintains a critique of the role
love has played in the definitional norms that have shaped her life.
Perhaps echoing the interlocutors in the discourse of love of the
Symposium, Hedwig says, “I believe love is immortal.” Tommy
asks, “How is it immortal,” and she responds, “I don’t know,
perhaps because…love creates something that was not there
before.”27 In the inaugural possibility inherent in her statement is
Foucault’s conception of critique: “critique…exists in relation to
something other than itself: it is an instrument, a means for a
future or a truth that it will not know nor happen to be.”28
Hedwig’s songs and performance – not least the performance of
polymorphous gendered play – could be said to reflect what
Foucault calls an “arts of existence,” which he articulates as
“those…actions by which men not only set themselves rules of
conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change
themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an
oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain
stylistic criteria.”29 Hedwig’s artistry, her persistent idea that love
is creative, is the critical unrecognizability of her life, a question
rather than an answer. Hedwig’s transformation of her formerly
male self, the German child who idolized American rock stars, into
“the internationally-ignored song stylist, barely standing before
you,”30 creates a continuity of love, a practice, a labor of love.
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Ovid’s Military Metaphor
and Gender Transgression
in Amores
Lauren Rutter,
Bucknell University
Ovid’s Amores utilize an extended military metaphor that
creates a gendered dichotomy for sexuality. Through a series of
erotic poems about love, the Amores celebrate transgressions from
the Lex Julia: a series of laws which laid the groundwork for
appropriate sexual behaviors and described punishments for
deviant sexual acts. Ovid’s compilation of Amores also evidences
his own societal and gender transgressions. Writing poetry was
criticized by his father as being a “totally useless act,” yet Ovid
sought to create a work that shed light on love and sexuality in an
otherwise nationalistic and militaristic society. While other
Romans were fighting in wars or at least writing war epics, Ovid
was writing about love. In various personas, the Amores explore
sexual violence, sexual activity/passivity, and victimization
among other themes in a way that makes aspects of love
ambiguous. Ovid’s poems are so dynamic that he appears as a
character both in masculine and feminine forms (at different
times). Despite the fact that sometimes Ovid is extremely active in
his sexuality (thus masculine), he becomes an effeminized male in
other poems through the more passive thoughts and behaviors
that he displays. The military metaphor and Ovid’s aggression are
an aid in maintaining a masculine tone for the majority of the
poems, but there are times that his feminine voice appears and he
shifts out of his masculine-gendered zone into a passive sexual
role in the female realm. However, in both the masculine and
feminine persona, Ovid is a victim of amore.
The Comparative Humanities Review
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Ovid’s Amores elicit the notion of sexual victimization with
regard to violent sexuality and the power of love in his military
metaphor. The historical background that influenced Ovid to
write in this style relates to the emperor of Rome, Augustus.
According to his Lex Julia, a woman could be put to death even if
she was raped because a raped woman has lost her honor. There
was no concept of the victim in this set of laws. Hippocrates’
“two-seed model” also contributed to the subjection of feminine
sexuality. The notion of two seeds implies that woman releases
her seed during orgasm and only then can she conceive a child.
The problem with this is that when a raped woman becomes
pregnant, she was believed to have experienced pleasure during
the rape.
Women of Ovid’s time were thought to be sexually passive
because sex meant being penetrated and not actively penetrating.
The penetrator held the power and was a male or masculinized
figure. Ovid himself is penetrated by love and gives in to the
power of it. Referring to the power of love, Ovid writes, “All right,
I give in” (line 10; bk. 1, sc.2). He is a victim of love, even going so
far as to literally state, “So I’m coming clean, Cupid: here I am,
your latest victim” (19; bk. 1, sc. 2). Leslie Cahoon comments on
victimization and warfare, saying, “Like a Roman victor, Cupid
subjugates and enslaves the conquered; Roman love demeans and
enslaves the lover” (Cahoon 295). She goes on to say that Ovid
“delights in being Cupid’s victim because he can thereby victimize
others” (295). This idea of being victimized and victimizing others
contributes to the notion that Ovid’s masculinity and femininity
are expressed simultaneously. Being in love is being enslaved, and
Ovid uses military imagery to show that love can become violent.
In Book 1, Sections 1 and 2, Ovid describes being pierced
by Cupid’s arrows. He writes, “heart skewered / by shafts of
desire, the raging beast….” (6-8; bk. 1, sc. 2). This military
metaphor is an example of a way in which Ovid feminizes himself.
He is being penetrated. All those who are punctured by Cupid’s
arrows are women in the sense that they are passively victimized
and must give in and accept their penetration. The man is in
control.
ii. Control and Sophrosyne
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Male control over sexuality is a key feature in looking at
sexual behaviors in ancient times. The notion of sophrosyne refers
to the wisdom that comes from controlling the passions. Men
were thought to have better control than women and control over
women as their sexual victims. Sometimes women are the victim
of lover’s rage (amator’s furor), most notably in Book 1, Section 7.
In this poem, Ovid’s agency is compromised by his maturity and
he again becomes a feminized man. He is fickle, upset with his
woman over a trifling issue, not knowing what she wants and
pulling her hair. He writes, “I could have ripped down her dress
from neck to waistline – the belt would have stopped me there.
Instead, I grabbed the hair off her forehead, tore at those ladylike
cheeks with my nails” (47-50; bk. 1, sc. 7).
Ovid’s violence against the woman is feminine, but hurtful
nonetheless. It isn’t until the girl starts to cry that Ovid ceases to
assault her. Cahoon argues that this implies “that a woman’s
attractions are her soldiers in a violent war” (297). A woman can
use her emotions to wage her own war, but this puts her in an
active role and is a rare occurrence.
iii. Violence and Ovid’s Military Metaphor

Book 1, Section 9 is a perfect example of the interplay and
overlap of love and war. Lovers and soldiers have similar
lifestyles, according to Ovid, “Cupid has his headquarters in the
field. Fighting and love-making belong to the same age-group – in
bed as in war…” (3-5; bk. 1, sc. 9). Love is as violent as war and
love is a substitute for Ovid who does not physically fight in wars.
Ovid also writes about sexually violent acts in Book 2, Section 12
when he talks about the Sabine rapes. Cahoon writes that Ovid,
“draws attention…which gradually and implicitly brings
responsibility for rape, violence, and war home to Rome in spite of
the explicit responsibility of the unknown but apparently universal
femina of the lover’s paranoia (299)… In the militia of love, the lover
is the defenseless captive (deprensus inermis)” (302). The male takes
no responsibility for violence committed against women.
Extreme critiques of Ovid express the horror of violence
that makes his poems so warlike. Ellen Greene argues that, “Ovid
is a pornographer who encourages the reader to enjoy violence
inflicted on women” (Greene 344). While this opinion may be
drastic, it is obvious that Ovid’s representation of women is “the
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site of violence” (345).
After much violence in war, the winner often receives a
prize. In the case of Ovid’s military metaphor, woman is the prize
and therefore becomes objectified. Greene discusses woman as the
object:
Not only is the woman presented as a commodity intended to advance
the poet’s own fama, but her marketability is closely linked to the
arousal of male sexual desire…The amator’s presentation of his mistress
as vendibilis defines her exclusively in terms of her function – use as a
vehicle of enhance between a male poet and his audience of sexually
excitable (perhaps predatory) men. (349)

The woman is thrown into a passive role without control over
herself.
iv. Active and Passive Sexuality

Ruth Mazo Karras attempts to explain the confusing and
contradictory parts of ancient sexualities, and her views are a tool
to examine Ovid’s violence and gender transgressions in the
Amores. First, it is necessary to understand that, “sexuality is not a
thing that can be found in all cultures, but is created by the various
discourses of particular societies, and the active/passive
dichotomy…categorized sexual behaviors or identities not by the
gender of the participants but by the sexual role that each played”
(Karras 1250). Many scholars have come to agree that “gender
roles – masculine or feminine, active or passive – were more
important than object choice in the ancient world” (1255). This
notion relates to Ovid’s voices in his poems because as a male
writer, he can transgress his gender. According to the
active/passive model, the one who is penetrated is gendered
feminine, but “women who penetrate and men who are penetrated
are seen not primarily as sexual deviants but as gender
transgressors” (1256).
The Athenian view of sex was an act that one does to
someone else, “a hierarchical act, rather than something two
people do together” (1259). However, the penetrated, though
passive, were not always seen as objects. According to James
Davidson, “The one who is penetrated does not have to be inert or
apathetic in order for intercourse to be understood as one person
doing something to someone else...it is not that he is penetrated

50

RUTTER, Military Metaphor and Gender Transgression in Amores

but that he desires to be penetrated” (1259). This is a new way to
look at passivity in sexuality. It makes passivity an anatomical
construct rather than emotional or mental.
Jonathan Walters discusses the significance of
impenetrability to Roman concepts of manhood. He writes, “to
have a woman’s experience” is to be the passive partner, but to be
penetrated “was not just the experience of a woman, but also that
of a slave or freedman” (1261). This concept correlates to the
military metaphor along with social hierarchies in that the man
who is the strongest warrior carries the sword and makes many
penetrations. He is the most active and the most masculine.
There is no penalty for penetration; in fact, there is honor in it.

Elizabeth Thomas writes that “the passion of love gives rise
to warfare” (Thomas 162). Ovid’s military metaphor is an effective
way to capture the readers’ attention because the parallel of love
and war is also analogous to many aspects of the gender
dichotomy in ancient Greece and Rome that governed sexuality.
Throughout the Amores, Ovid transgresses gender and societal
bounds to interpret and explore sexuality and love. His technique
of writing in many voices allows the reader to experience a
continuum of gender and sexuality. Perhaps sexuality is not as
dichotomous as it seems.
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“A Light, Formed In The Heavens,
Moves You”: Art and Sight in Dante’s
Purgatorio as an Intermediary to
Free Will and Love
A. Joseph McMullen,
Bucknell University
In Canto XXXIII Beatrice says to Dante, “I wish that, if not
written, then sketched out, / you carry what I’ve said inside
you…”1 For Dante pilgrim, the art of Purgatory is central not only
in purging the penitent, but also in understanding and
transference of meaning. Primarily, art is used in Purgatory as a
means of reliving one’s sin in order to completely purge it from the
body and conscience. However, art and sight are also the main
methods by which Dante pilgrim comprehends and is able to make
sense of Purgatory. He sees and because he sees, he is able to
understand. This being the case, Purgatory becomes a realm
written in images. Dante pilgrim must write what he sees, even if
he can not realize complete meaning. If he cannot write it, Beatrice
asks him to at least sketch it out – in images. Purgatorio, in effect,
then becomes a living canvas where images connect and, in some
cases, even transcend a subject-object split. However, to
completely purge oneself, a conscious choice to embrace sight and
art is necessary. The penitent must use the exemplars to gain a
more profound understanding of self and of their past sins. To
accomplish complete purging, they must choose art. They have to
make this choice because, for the penitent and denizens of
Purgatory, art is the real. Therefore, art acts as a form of
intermediary to free will. For Dante pilgrim, it is through sight
and art – which, in Purgatorio, doubles as the real – that the
concept of the “good” love, the correct desire, and the true choice
of free will can, as a nascent quality, make itself manifest.
The Comparative Humanities Review
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Clockwise from top left: Fig. 1. Gustave Doré, “Arachne” Fig. 2.
Salvador Dalí, “Arachne” Fig. 3. Gustave Doré, “Whore and
Giant” Fig. 4. Salvador Dalí, “Greed”
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i. “But In Their Artistry More True In Their Resemblance”:
Defining Art In Purgatorio

Before connecting art to free will, art must first be defined
within Purgatorio. There are primarily two types of image
classifications in Purgatorio. The first is that of the exemplars used
to reveal sin to the penitent and to cause them to relive their pain.
In Canto XII, Virgil instructs Dante to cast down his eyes to the
floor, to the carved images. The prideful, hunched over by heavy
stones on their backs, see these images as they walk.
As gravestones set above the buried dead
bear witness to what once the were,
their carven images recalling them to mind,
making us grieve with frequent tears
when recollection pricks and spurs
the faithful heart with memories,
so were these figures sculpted there
along that road carved from the mountainside,
but in their artistry more true in their resemblance.2

The images are meant for the penitent to grieve. As the sculpted
figures are exemplars of pride – such as Nimrod, Sennacherib,
Arachne, or Troy – the examples are not only simple pictures of
pride but actual experiences. These images recall the penitent’s
past sins to mind and are the cause of frequent tears. The images
make them feel.
These images are able to make the penitent feel because
they move beyond the realm of plainly an image, of basic art. In
Purgatorio, the art is essentially more true than the real thing, in the
former’s resemblance: “Dead seemed the dead, living seemed the
living.”3 For Dante pilgrim, these images live and breathe. This
sentiment is magnified in the intersemiotic translations4 of
Purgatorio painted by Salvador Dalí (Fig. 2) and Gustave Doré (Fig.
1). In illustrating the circle of the prideful, both choose to create a
living Arachne in their painting rather than a carven image. These
paintings reveal an Arachne who is clearly not an image. Both
artists envision a spider that is not a carven figure but is as real as
the penitent in purgatory. This is the same reaction that Dante or
the penitent would receive when “experiencing” Arachne.
Walking over the “image” would become so real that grief would
be inevitable. The “images” are so real that the penitents are
forced to relive their sins.
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The second primary use of images and sight in Purgatorio is
found within the concept of ‘to see is to understand’. The images
that Dante pilgrim relates as happening within the Earthly
paradise transcend Earthly limits. The allegory of the Church
Triumphant, the gryphon as Christ, and the transformations of the
Church in this world in Canto XXXII are all observed. Matelda tells
Dante, “My brother, look and listen,”5 at the coming of the
processional of the Church Triumphant. Dante pilgrim does not
have to ask what the processional means, nor does he ascribe any
meaning to it. The processional is simply art to the reader –
something observed but which, as the carven exemplars of pride
reveal, in Purgatory can become more than an image, can
transcend image and become complete truth.
Thus, Doré and Dalí’s intersemiotic translations of the
corrupt Church – the beast with seven heads and ten horns and, to
signify the Avignon papacy, a prostitute – in the allegory of the
transformation of the Church is a creature that has no description.
As the text relates: “Thus transformed, the holy edifice / put forth
heads on all its parts, / three on the shaft and one at every
corner— / the first three bore horns like oxen, the others had a
single horn upon their foreheads— / such a monster as never seen
before.”6 Doré (Fig. 3) then created a monster that truly had not
been seen before. This painting not only reveals a beast with no
exact form, but a creature that is stripped of visible meaning. Only
through allegory can one see that this is the Church. Likewise, the
second Dalí painting (Fig. 4) is that of the “prostituted Church.”
The artist again creates an image, this even more so than the Doré,
that is chaotic. Meaning in this painting transcends the viewer’s
Earthly limit. It is not apparent to an Earthly observer that this is
the Church. For Dante pilgrim however, sight is all that is
necessary for understanding.
ii. “If Not Written, Then Sketched Out”:
Art as Sight vs. Sight and Art

In Purgatorio, art clearly has a function distinct from simply
observing. Since art breathes, lives, and exists, understanding is
inherent in its code. The art of Purgatorio is alive and as of such,
when Dante pilgrim sees an image, he receives understanding. In
the exemplars of the prideful, the images in Purgatorio are truer
than the real thing. With God as the artist, the experience of art
becomes the experience of reality. The penitents become what
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they observe and, in doing so, relive life and their earthly sins. Art
becomes the medium through which the penitent can purge
themselves. Seeing the art allows them to truly see their sins.
Thus, seeing art allows for understanding of sin and an
experiencing of their sin unlike anything the penitent felt on Earth.
This understanding extends to Dante pilgrim’s observations as
well. As he sees the exemplars, he loses track of time and must be
scolded by Virgil: “…Raise your head! / This is not the time for
walking so absorbed.”7 Dante is so immersed in the image that he
is taken from the real and placed within the art as he begins to
purge himself.
As Dante pilgrim makes his way through Purgatory and
enters Earthly Paradise, seeing becomes the ultimate
understanding. Instead of the concept of art as sight, sight
becomes fused with art and meaning. Upon meeting Matelda:
“…and there appeared to me, as suddenly appears / a thing so
marvelous / it drives away all other thoughts, / a lady, who went
here and there alone, singing…”8 sight and thought begin to
combine as one. There is no longer any contemplation – simply
sight and understanding. The sight of Matelda drives away
thought and, as discussed with the procession of the Church
Triumphant, meaning is ascribed purely by seeing. Even though
the reader must derive meaning from the image, in the Earthly
Paradise meaning is completely familiar to Dante pilgrim. Just as
art, Dante pilgrim must only see it to understand it.
What results is the deconstruction of a signifier/signified
split. On viewing Beatrice, Dante is even more absorbed than
when he was purging his soul: “My eyes were fixed and so intent
/ to satisfy ten years of thirst / that all my other sense were
undone, / walled off from anything around them…”9 His eyes, in
seeing Beatrice, are immersed in her beauty and virtue. Paralleled
in the procession of the Church Triumphant, no longer is reflection
necessary for completion of the signifying chain. Since seeing is
understanding for Dante pilgrim, seeing Beatrice is as seeing
virtue or seeing the gryphon is seeing Christ. Similar to how
observing the art of the prideful is reliving the exemplar’s pride,
seeing anything in the Earthly Paradise is as seeing art in
Purgatorio. What to the reader are words that relate an image, to
Dante pilgrim is both image and word. He relates to Beatrice,
“And I, ‘Even as wax maintains the seal / and does not alter the
imprinted image, / my brain now bears Your stamp.”10 The
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‘words’ of Beatrice are as an image to his consciousness. Revealing
that all of his other senses were undone except sight, Beatrice’s
sounds – her words – are viewed as an image. He is not reflecting
– simply seeing and knowing. It is through this sight that semiotic
synthesis occurs.
Since there is a fusion of signifier and signified, Beatrice
can instruct Dante pilgrim to write as she speaks: in images. To
write in images is, in effect, to write in signifieds. For a linguistic
sign system which embraces the duality of the acoustic image as
signifier and the meaning as the signified, to write in images
would require a liminal state not found on Earth. In Structure,
Sign, and Play, Derrida suggests one of two ways to erase the
distinction between signifier and signified is simply ‘reducing or
deriving the signifier, that is to say, ultimately in submitting the
sign to thought.’ As Dante pilgrim is no longer on the earth
proper, the reader can watch him easily partake in this kind of
fusion in unobstructed sight. Beatrice wants him “Therefore, to
serve the world that lives so ill, / keep your eyes upon the chariot
and write down / what now you see here once you have gone
back.”11 This imperative should then be carried out as follows: “I
wish that, if not written, then sketched out, / you carry what I’ve
said inside you…”12 Beatrice is hoping that Dante will be able to
write down the knowledge that he attains from the Earthly
Paradise. However, even if he cannot write it down, the images
that she speaks will at least be etched into his heart and,
ultimately, thought as sight assimilates the sign to thought –
similar to the way the images are carven on floor in the prideful
terrace. Her spoken images will be carved into Dante pilgrim’s
soul in a way that, no matter where he is, if he looks within he can
relive his experience in Earthly Paradise. What Beatrice speaks and
sketches is art.
iii. “Their False Delights, Turned Back My Steps”:
Art and Sight as a Link to Free Will

Art, as expressed within Purgatory and Earthly Paradise,
has the power to cut Dante pilgrim off from the sensual world. In
seeing Beatrice his senses are undone and in observing the
exemplars of the prideful he is absorbed to the extent of losing his
sense of time. He is often so immersed in the image that he is
taken from reality. Dante pilgrim finds, in Purgatorio, that one can
choose to look back and down or ahead and up. Throughout the
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whole of the text Dante pilgrim must continuously raise his eyes
and is warned early: “he who looks back must then return
outside.”13 And yet, there is choice, Dante pilgrim can choose
which way he desires to look and how long he wishes to look.
However, he cannot choose what he sees. As the penitents are
subject to the exemplars, he too must see and observe Purgatory.
What he sees, what he observes, is the art of Purgatory. As he sees
the art, he lives the art. Becoming fused with what he sees, he
chooses the art and the art in return purges him. With his
purification must come the realization that once Dante pilgrim
ends his journey and sign systems return to normal, he will have
to once again choose his signified. He will have to choose an
image and choose his own art to live in.
Art and sight then, act as an intermediary to free will. An
art that purges allows the penitents to make the “good” choice. As
this same art purges and reforms Dante pilgrim, it is through art
that he can come to understand the truth about love. Dante
espouses an Aristotelian/Aquinas metaphysics to describe free
will. Aquinas established a compatibilist14 notion of free will
which maintains that “Man has free choice, or otherwise counsels,
exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments
would be in vain.”15 Holding that we are capable of voluntary
actions, he discounts determinism.16 Dante has a similar notion of
free will:
You who are still alive assign each cause
Only to the heavens, as though they drew
All things along upon their necessary paths.
If that were so, free choice would be denied you,
And there would be no justice when one feels
Joy for doing good or misery for evil.
Yes, the heavens give motion to your inclinations.
I don’t say all of them, but, even if I did,
You still possess a light to winnow good from evil,
And you have free will. Should it bear the strain
in its first struggles with the heavens,
Then, rightly nurtured it will conquer all.17

The same Aquinas sentiment is related within Dante: the heavens
do draw things along the necessary path however man still has
moral responsibility. Man cannot blame God because God gives
man choice. Man must choose what is moral. The speaker, Marco,
tells Dante pilgrim it is not God one must blame, but poor
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leadership and, ultimately, oneself.
Virgil then asserts that choice is to be found within love.
Virgil differentiates between a “good” and “bad” love. Good love
is natural and “always without error.”18 Bad love however, “may
err in its chosen goal / or through excessive or deficient vigor.”19
Thus, the sins that the penitent suffer for in Purgatorio are all
examples of “bad” love. Avarice, gluttony, and lust are loves
which are too excessive, wrath is a desire which has a wrong
chosen goal, etc. All of these loves however, are governed by free
will. As man has moral responsibility, Dante pilgrim must learn
that he can choose to not embrace these sins. Since love,
ostensibly, allows every virtue or every punishment, one must
orient it in order to live a life of “good” love. This notion is
reflected in Canto XXXI when Beatrice asks Dante pilgrim what
disoriented his eyes from her to sin. Dante pilgrim replies that,
“Things set in front of me, / with their false delights, turned back
my steps / the moment that Your countenance was hidden.”20 His
love was no longer oriented on the “good” but the “bad” and it is
because of this that Dante pilgrim must eventually take his
journey. And thus, Dante pilgrim learns that he must orient his
love up and ahead. He must be able to see that desire from which
he must turn away – he must know sin. It is through the art of
Purgatorio that Dante pilgrim can gain knowledge of free will. The
art has purged him and, since he is purified, he can embrace past
experience and with that knowledge, follow a true path of desire.
Thus, the art of Purgatorio serves as an intermediary to free
will. Art, as defined in Purgatorio, is truer than the real and can, in
fact, come to life. The living image is able to purge the penitent as
they relive experience of their sins through sight. As well, for
Dante pilgrim, sight becomes understanding. To comprehend
allegory and image, all Dante pilgrim does is see. Often he is
removed from his senses: “At this my mind had so withdrawn into
itself/there was no impulse from outside/that could impinge
upon my senses,”21 and left only with sight – in his example it is
the images of Ahasuerus, Esther, and Mordecai that he observes.
Frequently, the only sense available to Dante pilgrim is sight. As
he delves deeper into Purgatory, sight becomes more closely fused
with thought until there is no longer a difference. To see clearly is
to understand. This is magnified as the difference between
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signifier and signified is erased. Beatrice speaks in images and
hopes that Dante can at least sketch the image if he cannot write it
down. He is instructed, if he can, to actually write in images.
Imagination, as a variation of sight, behaves similarly: “O
imagination, which at times so robs us / of outward things we pay
no heed, / though a thousand trumpets sound around us, / who
sets you into motion if the senses offer / nothing? A light, formed
in the heavens, moves you / either of itself or by a will that sends
it down.”22
Imagination, as Hollander paraphrases, the “imagereceiving capacity of the mind,”23 is moved by a will sent down by
heaven – what can be thought of as free will. Through observation
of art and sight in general, Dante pilgrim comes to the meaning of
“good” love. He learns, through being purged, how to correctly
orient one’s love toward that which is pure, toward Beatrice and
God. Due to the art that he observes and because of what he is
taught through seeing, he can attain the heavenly orientation of
free will. With this free will, Dante pilgrim can then choose true
sight and the art he desires to become.
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Platonic Models of Love,
Honor, and Responsibility
in Spanish Courtly Love Literature
Lauren Forsythe,
Davidson College
The sentimental novel of fifteenth-century Spain detailed
the era’s ideal of courtly love. A noble typically fell in love with a
queen or other married woman of higher standing, desiring an
impossible relationship. He was to ask of his beloved only one
thing: the acceptance of his lifelong service to her. The consent to
his service represents the highest level of consummation a courtly
lover could hope for; any level of physical or emotional intimacy
between members of different social classes was highly
dishonorable to the beloved’s reputation. Thus, the responsibility a
lover held to serve his beloved extended to an accountability for
her honor; her reputation was his burden, and the ideal lover was
obligated to protect his beloved in the public eye.
This responsibility traces back to the classical world and
can be viewed with particular interest through Plato’s discourse,
the Symposium. The shadows of classical responsibility and honor
in love relationships transform through Spanish courtly love
literature from strictly following the traditional code to completely
inverting the typical gender roles of the time. During the revival of
the classical world in fifteenth-century Spain, Diego de San Pedro’s
Prison of Love (1492) and Fernando de Rojas’ The Spanish Bawd
(1499) demonstrate how courtly love literature takes its cues from
Plato’s classical text to move from the masculine responsibility of
courtly love in the former text, to a feminine possibility of honor
and power in the latter.
The platonic service and honor between lover and beloved
are best originally accessed through Pausanius’ speech when he
The Comparative Humanities Review
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claims,
When the lover realizes that he is justified in doing anything for a loved
one who grants him favors, and when the young man understands that
he is justified in performing any service for a lover who can make him
wise and virtuous . . . then, and only then . . . is it ever honorable for a
young man to accept a lover.1

The lover holds a responsibility to behave honorably towards his
beloved by serving him. Only by combining “service” and
“kindness,” then, can a love relationship come honorably to
fruition. The responsibility to perform this service is the
culmination of the desire to keep the relationship honorable as
well as to demonstrate its decency to the public before further
physical consummation occurs.
Proceeding from this classical model, then, service becomes
the defining factor of courtly love through which the male can
typically demonstrate his desire for his beloved publicly, without
doing dishonor to her. It therefore typically becomes the male’s
responsibility to preserve his beloved’s honor at all times by
serving her properly. In this sense, Lillian von der Walde Moheno
describes the complex, servile nature of courtly love: that one must
view “...the concept of love as a phenomenon based on volition
and free will. Thus, service is provided willingly, with no
obligation attached to it.”2 Her honor signifies the public and
private perceptions of the beloved’s social propriety, intentions,
and especially her virginity; it is a generally feminine concept.
Diego de San Pedro’s Prison of Love demonstrates the
essential principles of courtly love service. The noble Leriano has
loved princess Laureola from afar for years. After sending a
mediator to speak with her, the two exchange letters in which
Laureola eventually accepts Leriano’s service. When both
characters finally come face to face, a jealous suitor accuses them of
an illicit relationship; Laureola is imprisoned and Leriano exiled.
The only proof of relationship between the two is the letters
Leriano has from his beloved. He lets himself die, but before he
does, he takes the time to responsibly destroy this compromising
evidence in a novel way.
Leriano’s service to Laureola is ideal, following the code of
courtly love to the extreme. In his letter to her he writes, “And if,
because I have dared to write to you, you think I deserve to die,
command my death, for I shall count it far better to die for your
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sake than to live without hope of your goodwill.”3 He later offers
his service in greater degree by taking full responsibility for her
imprisonment. He writes: “if I should die in the endeavour, you
will be freed from your imprisonment and I released from all my
miseries, so that one death shall be the cause of setting free two
people.”4 No sacrifice is too great for the sake of Leriano’s
beloved; his service to her and his desire for her freedom
ultimately culminate in his own death.
James A. Flightner reminds us how this code comes to life
in courtly love literature: “Leriano’s task as a courtly lover has
been clear: he will love faithfully, perform whatever deeds are
necessary to demonstrate his love, and die as a testimony to the
sincerity and nobility of his love if his affections are not returned.”5
The context of this idea of unwavering service can be traced back
to Plato’s original ideas in the Symposium: through what Pausanius
calls “virtuous service,” the lover can demonstrate and proclaim
his love in an honorable way, reflecting the responsibility he has
taken upon himself to uphold his beloved’s honor.
Classical models of service in Pausanius’ discourse are
followed by explorations of honorable and dishonorable attitudes
a lover can hold toward his beloved. “Now you may want to know
who counts as vile in this context. I’ll tell you: it is the common,
vulgar lover, who loves the body rather than the soul,” he claims,
condemning superficial love of beauty over the profound love of
one’s soul and spirit.6 Plato uses Pausanius to illustrate his ideal
of the beloved’s physical beauty as a means to love the soul and
spirit, thereby elevating the lover to a higher sphere of existence.
Elaborating on the classical text, Andreas Capellanus’ twelfthcentury work, The Art of Courtly Love, explains the spirituality of
love beginning with the body: “For when a man sees some woman
fit for love and shaped according to his taste, he begins at once to
lust after her in his heart; then the more he thinks about her the
more he burns with love, until he comes to a fuller meditation.”7
Echoing the discourses in the Symposium, Capellanus supports the
courtly lover’s honorable desire for a relationship connecting the
souls, without the expectation of a physical consummation.
Leriano demonstrates this in a letter to Laureola when he states,
“Your beauty drew my affection, affection led to desire, desire to
anguish, and anguish to audacity.”8 He focuses on upholding his
beloved’s honor through the spiritual love of one’s soul, not one’s
body, a question that de Rojas parodies in The Spanish Bawd.
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If San Pedro illustrates Plato’s models of service,
responsibility, and honor, then de Rojas’ provides us with a
counter example. In this Pre-Renaissance anti-model of courtly
love, the lover, Calisto, immediately pursues his beloved, Melibea,
at a purely physical level. At first she resists, but Calisto soon
forces physical consummation upon her, destroying her honor by
devastating her reputation. Calisto dies suddenly and accidentally,
leaving Melibea publicly shamed: he has taken her virginity with
no offer of marriage to restore her feminine honor. De Rojas ends
the play with Melibea’s suicide.
Subverting both Plato’s discourse and Leriano’s exemplary
courtship, Calisto does not take on the responsibility of service to
his beloved, as he clearly violates society’s physical boundaries of
chastity. Instead, Calisto aggressively destroys Melibea’s honor in
order to use her body as a means to his own satisfaction:
What do you mean, mistress? Why can there be no peace for my
passion? So that I may suffer again? So that the game will begin again?
Forgive me, my lady, for my shameless hands, for they never thought
they would be able to touch your clothing because of their baseness and
little worth; now they delight in reaching your gracious body and your
beautiful and delicate flesh.9

However, no transgression goes unpunished; soon enough, this
“vulgar lover” suffers an untimely and certainly dishonorable
death. This is the way in which de Rojas chooses to condemn
Calisto, warning his readers in the text’s prologue, “All of you who
love, take this example.”10 While San Pedro posits Leriano as the
exemplary lover, de Rojas establishes Calisto as the anti-lover, a
negative exemplary counterpart, who, as Peter Earle notes, “. . .
has several [weaknesses]: he is impatient and overbearing toward
his servants; he leads an idle and disordered life and is generally
egotistical. His worship of Melibea, furthermore, is far more
voluptuous than reverent.”11 As Plato supports an elevation of the
lover through the respect and love of the soul that can be achieved
by means of service and responsibility, so de Rojas parodies that
anti-lover, the lover of the body as an end, rather than a means to a
spiritual love. He ultimately takes his cue from Plato in
condemning Calisto and his love as invalid and worthless,
demonstrated in Calisto’s meaningless and reversed exemplary
death.
In courtly love, then, exemplary death is typically
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masculine, whereas honor remains a feminine concept. But where
does male responsibility for honor end and female control over it
begin? Could the female take responsibility for herself, and die in
place of the male? In the Symposium there are suggestions of a
feminine version of responsibility through death, brought to light
by Phaedrus’ speech on the nature of love. He states, “no one will
die for you but a lover, and a lover will do this even if she’s a
woman.”12 Courtly love exists on the foundation that the male
lover should die for the sake of the female beloved’s honor.
Phaedrus’ comment that women are capable of this same kind of
sacrificial death, however, is less common for both classical models
of love as well as for the typical Spanish courtly love. His story of
Alcestis, a Greek woman who chooses to die so that her husband
can continue to live, is a direct parallel to de Rojas’ powerful
female character Melibea in The Spanish Bawd. Both Alcestis and
Melibea portray powerful female roles in periods of literature in
which such power and control is rare and looked down upon.
They represent women faced with cowardly, irresponsible men; in
response, they take control over their own fates and choose their
deaths accordingly.
The ultimate step in following the traditional, self-elevating
path of courtly love is the dramatic, sacrificial death of the male in
a final effort to preserve the honor of his female beloved.
Borrowing from the Platonic model, San Pedro constructs Leriano
as the ideal courtly lover through an exemplary death:
When he thought of tearing [the letters] up, it seemed to him that it
would be an insult to Laureola to allow such precious words to be
thrown away. When he thought of entrusting them to one of his
servants, he feared that they might be read, whereby she who had sent
them might be endangered. So, taking the surest way amidst these
doubts, he called for a cup of water, tore the letters into pieces, and
dropped them into the water, and when he had done this he ordered
them to sit him up in bed, and when he was sitting, he drank them in the
water, and rested content.13

Accordingly, Leriano dies while taking responsibility for his
beloved’s honor. By choosing to die consuming the letters, he
physically destroys the material evidence that would undoubtably
compromise Laureola’s reputation and honor in the public eye,
therefore making a powerful statement of service to his beloved in
his death.
In typical courtly love, and occasionally in the classical
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world, this paradigm of masculine death for the feminine honor
transforms the male into an exemplary instrument – Leriano is the
ideal instructor in courtly love because he follows the model to
every detail; he lives, breathes, and dies serving his beloved. San
Pedro fashions him as an instructor through the way in which he
embodies exemplary love in an honorable, courtly manner and
holds entirely to the classic gender roles assigned in medieval
Spain. Conversely, one of the key instructors in matters of love in
the Symposium completely and importantly disrupts our
understanding of those gender-driven models: Diotima, a wise
female, is “the one who taught [Socrates] in the art of love.”14
Diotima’s presence in the Symposium, otherwise notably
devoid of women, is demonstrative of the possibility of female
self-awareness and knowledge in love relationships. She becomes
a wise teacher-figure who knows more than the male figures do
and must therefore impart her knowledge to them, teaching
Socrates that “love must desire immortality” and that lovers are
ready “even to die for the sake of glory. . . . for they are all in love
with immortality.”15 This knowledge over male philosophers
holds heavy implications for the gender roles later driven by
ancient Greek literature; the power that such extreme knowledge
imparts to her gives Diotima an ability to choose to share this
wisdom with men.
If the Symposium suggests a feminine legacy and hints at a
powerful, honorable female death, The Spanish Bawd brings them
to life in Melibea’s exemplary suicide. Due to Calisto’s inability to
restore Melibea’s honor by marriage, she transforms to take control
over her own fate by making a powerful statement in her death.
Her honor destroyed by a disrespectful, irresponsible lover,
Melibea has one choice to make: continue to live in her town,
permanently shamed and dishonored, or take her own life, defying
tradition, public opinion, and general boundaries of patriarchal
responsibility: she chooses to die on her own terms, challenging
the customary gender roles of courtly love. She laments, “I was the
cause for all of this […] I am the reason for why the earth no
longer delights of the most noble body that was ever created in this
city. And since you will be shocked by the sound of my unusual
offenses, I want to clarify them for you.”16
The groundwork Plato lays for women in the Symposium
through Phaedrus is demonstrated clearly through Melibea’s
death: the idea that women, too, can die for the sake of love. De
Rojas, however, uses Diotima’s wisdom to push exemplary death
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one step further: Melibea’s suicide embodies how women, in
addition to men, can also die for the sake of their own reputation
and, ultimately, for their honor. After all, as Arlene Saxonhouse
notes in her examination of the Symposium: “It is the female
Diotima holds as the model for all mankind.”17
De Rojas invokes Socrates’ dialogue of immortality through
love to construct Melibea as a direct didactic parallel to Diotima.
As the wise instructress guides Socrates through the meaning of
love and its connections to mortality, Melibea explores that very
partnership, making a statement in her death. What men cannot
and do not know, Diotima teaches and Melibea lives out, actively.
Diotima instructs and Melibea acts out. She acknowledges her own
ability to break out of the expectations of her gender and chooses
to die publicly expressing a new, reformed version of
responsibility to herself and to her feminine honor. She reflects on
this after Calisto’s death:
Because of that sad fall some of the most inmost parts of his brain were
strewn all over the stones of the walls. The fates cut his threads, they cut
them without allowing him confession, they cut short my hope, they cut
short my glory, and they cut short my companion. So, what cruelty
would it be, my father, that he could die having fallen from a wall, and
that I should live and suffer?18

Ultimately, Melibea dies as Diotima teaches: in a manner that will
create for her a legacy of power and honor.
From Diego de San Pedro’s Prison of Love to Fernando de
Rojas’ The Spanish Bawd, and from their firm roots in classical love
literature, it becomes clear that someone must take responsibility
for the female beloved’s honor; the burden cannot be protected on
its own. As illustrated by Leriano, this burden falls onto the
shoulders of the male courtly lover, who fulfills this classic model
described so clearly in Pausanius’ discourse. As de Rojas sets up
his anti-model of courtly love, however, he sets up the male lover
to fall short in carrying out his responsibilities for the honor of his
beloved. When Calisto breaks the stereotype in failing to protect
Melibea’s reputation, he not only breaks the courtly love formula,
but causes Melibea to do the same by taking responsibility for
herself. Drawing from the Platonic “vulgar lover,” de Rojas
succeeds in formulating a new model of feminine responsibility
Not only does Melibea teach through her death, but she becomes a
responsible example of a powerful female leaving a legacy behind
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her. Like Diotima in her teaching, Melibea needs no male to brave
the path before her; she does this on her own, following the
classical hints of the feminine possibility of a female legacy, which
Plato established so long ago.
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“I’m NO Byron”:
Lermontov, Love, and the
Anxiety of Byronic Influence
Diana Koretsky,
Bucknell University
Do not swear at all.
Or if thou wilt, swear by thy gracious self,
Which is the god of my idolatry,
And I'll believe thee.
~William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, 2.1, ll. 154-7
Let not my love be called idolatry.
~William Shakespeare, Sonnet 105

As one of history’s seminal love poets, Shakespeare teaches
us that there is a fine line between love and idolatry, and that to
cross that line is to cross into the territory of sacrilege. These views
imply a tension between the worship of an ordinary human being
and the worship of the divine; but what happens when the divide
between humanity and divinity is eliminated, and a mortal object
of idolatry becomes the ultimate ideal? More specifically, what
effect does this kind of worship– more typically known to our
society as “fandom” – have on the development of an aesthetic
philosophy that is already culturally imbued with considerations
of divine ideals? Two centuries after Shakespeare, Lord Byron
begins to address these questions even as he himself, the first
major celebrity in Western culture, raises them. He selfconsciously plays with his status when he writes to his publisher,
John Murray,
They made me without my search a species of popular Idol – they –
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without reason or judgment beyond caprice of their Good pleasure –
threw down the Image from its pedestal – it was not broken with the fall
– and they would, it seems, again replace it – but they shall not. (Byron,
BLJ, 6, 106)

The intersections between love, idolatry, fandom and
worship really begin to play themselves out when a fellow poet
becomes enamored of Byron’s work and comes to establish himself
as not only one of the preeminent writers of his day, but also one
of Byron’s all-time greatest fans.
Mikhail Yur’evich Lermontov made no secret of his affinity
for Byron. Byronic echoes permeate Lermontov’s poetry, and a
myriad of studies have compared and contrasted Byron’s and
Lermontov’s literary legacies. However, the extent to which
Lermontov’s artistic development is directly correlated to Byron’s
legacy constitutes a considerable debate in Russian literary studies.
According to some, Byron’s influence on Lermontov is so
pervasive that it has come to be “taken for granted” by scholars
(Diakonova 80). Conversely, some studies have recently proposed
that a focus on the differences between the poets finds that Byron’s
influence on Lermontov has been overstated. In this paper, I argue
precisely the opposite to be true, finding in Lermontov’s Romantic
poetry more than simply an incorporation of Byronic elements; the
fundamental struggle between Lermontov’s desire for an
autonomous literary identity and his aspiration to write like Byron
weaves its way into most, if not all, of Lermontov’s poems. This is
the point at which this paper departs from previous scholarship
that compares Byron and Lermontov. Lermontov’s obsession with
Byron ran much deeper than his invocation of typically “Byronic”
tropes would suggest. Certainly, Lermontov strove to find his
individual voice, but he found it only when he wrote his magnum
opus, A Hero of Our Time – a work of prose Realism – and even
here, he does not fully separate himself from Byron. A close study
of his Romantic writings reveals a writer perpetually struggling
against the influence of Byron, who was indisputably the principle
“god of [Lermontov’s] idolatry.”
Lermontov’s adoration of Byron is made apparent in the
numerous lyric poems in which he compares himself to the British
poet. Most famously, Lermontov undermines his poetic abilities in
a famous lyric, written in 1832, which begins, “No, I’m not Byron”
(“Нет, я не Байрон”). He writes, “I began younger, I will finish
younger, / My mind will not produce a lot” (“Я раньше начал,
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кончу ране, / Мой ум немного совершит,” SS, Vol. 1, 361). In
this poem, as in numerous others, Lermontov, compares his soul to
the soul of his idol by invoking the image of the ocean, a trope
commonly associated with Byron in Russian Romantic poetry1 :
“In my soul, as in the ocean / A heap of broken hopes lies dashed”
(“В душе моей, как в океане, / Надежд разбитых груз лежит,”
SS, Vol. 1, 361). A little further down, Furthermore, Lermontov
refers to himself and his idol interchangeably as he meditates on
the public’s perceptions of their poetic legacies:
Who, gloomy ocean, can
Learn your secrets? Who
Will tell the crowd my thoughts?
I alone – or God – or no one!

Кто может, океан угрюмый,
Твои изведать тайны? Кто
Толпе мои расскажет думы?
Я - или бог - или никто! (SS, Vol. 1, 361)

These lines, which conclude “No, I’m not Byron,” signify what will
become the most significant of Lermontov’s artistic struggles – the
relationship between the artist, his art and the public that receives
it.
This relationship is given closer consideration in the longer
lyric, “Death of a Poet” (“Смерть поэта,” SS, Vol. 1, 412-415), in
which Lermontov invokes the Byron legend to bring to light the
ways in which the phenomenon of celebrity and the public’s
tendency toward idolatry (making no explicit reference to his own)
has essentially killed the poet and turned him into an abstract
celebrity figure. The poem largely presents the poet as a victim
“by rumor slandered,” referring to the mob mentality often
associated with Byromania in England. Byron, in this sense, was
both the sufferer, and, in some cases, instigator, of perpetual
gossip. As many scholars have noted, the public so deeply
conflated the Byronic hero with the poet, himself, that it knew
virtually nothing of Byron, the man, whom we know from his
correspondences and journals to have been insecure and paranoid–
quite unlike his fictional protagonists. Lermontov, himself, notes
this in his novel, A Hero of Our Time, where he discusses the
Byronic attitude as becoming a trend in the higher levels of society,
asserting that “those who were really and truly bored strove to
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conceal their misfortunes as if it were a vice” (A Hero of Our Time
35-36) (“впрочем, разочарование, как все моды, начав с высших
слоев общества, спустилось к низшим, которые его
донашивают, и что нынче те, которые больше всех и в самом
деле скучают, стараются скрыть это несчастье, как порок,” SS,
Vol. 4, 317). Thus, he writes, “Byron was nothing more nor less
than a drunkard” (A Hero of Our Time 36) (“Байрон был больше
ничего, как пьяница,” SS, Vol. 4, 317). However, I have
mentioned, A Hero of Our Time reflects Lermontov’s ultimately
coming to his own narrative voice. In his Romantic poetry,
Lermontov is still very much a poet struggling to find it. Thus, in
“Death of a Poet,” rather than undermine Byron, he elevates him
to the level of a martyr, and then proceeds to lash out at the
reading public for misconstruing his work and exploiting his
legacy, concluding with an allusion to some possibility of
retribution: “But justice also comes from God, corruption's friends!
/ The judge most terrible awaits you” (“Но есть и божий суд,
наперсники разврата! / Есть грозный суд: он ждет,” SS, Vol. 1,
415).
Based on this and other instances in which Lermontov
mentions divine judgment in like terms, as well as the prominence
of Kant and other German idealist philosophers in Russia at this
time, it seems likely that “God” here may refer to a definitive
judgment of art, an ideal Form of Beauty. If this is the case and a
standard exists for art, it is only logical to conclude that, for
Lermontov, Byron set that standard.
We know that for Lermontov, art and the aesthetic
experience were heavily tied to some notion of the divine. This is
most prominently expressed in the 1831 lyric, “The Angel”
(“Ангел”), in which a newborn soul, having heard the music of the
heavens, must find a way to exist on Earth without it:
Long it languished on Earth,
Full of dreams and desires,
And the sounds of the heavens could not be replaced,
By the dull songs of earth.
И долго на свете томилась она,
Желанием чудным полна;
И звуков небес заменить не могли
Ей скучные песни земли. (SS, Vol. 1, 239)

In “The Angel,” Lermontov implies the possibility for reconciling

74

KORETSKY, Lermontov and Byronic Influence

the fundamental divide between the spiritual and the earthly
through art. That is, the young soul in the poem is spiritually
bound to the heavens but physically rooted in the material;
however, its memory of the aesthetic experience – the heavenly
music – bridges the gap between the two realms, raising the
question, what are we to do in the face of this state of things? One
might strive to regain the lost paradise through art which, in the
view of Kant and Schelling, the two most widely read
philosophers during Lermontov’s time, brings one closer to nature
and love. However, as one critic puts it, “the upward striving
contains the germ of its own dissolution. When frustrated, its own
inner momentum can lead to a reverse swing of the pendulum, to
a dynamic embracing evil” (Davidson 177), opening up the
possibility for art to have a demonizing effect, an idea with which
Lermontov’s poetry often engages. Generally speaking, it seems
unlikely that art could be intrinsically demonic in this schema,
because it is fundamentally tied to divinity. However, I would
argue that for Lermontov, there is a fine line between his Christian
God and Byron, the “god of his idolatry.” To some degree,
Lermontov is perpetually walking the very thin divide between
fandom, idolatry and religious worship. These elements find their
most complete consideration in his most important and most
Byronic narrative poem, The Demon (Демон).
Written between 1829 and 1841, The Demon was revised
eight times, apparently never quite meeting Lermontov’s vision for
what he felt it should be. In point of fact, there is no evidence to
suggest that the eighth revision of the poem was meant to be final,
as Lermontov was killed in a duel shortly after completing it.
Lermontov’s obsessive revising of the poem, which really spanned
most of his short literary career, in itself, highlights his neurotic
attitude toward his art, which is only compounded by the poem’s
highly Byronic undertones. Not incidentally, the brooding
protagonist is reminiscent of many of Byron’s characters. On a
rudientary level, The Demon might even be viewed as a reworking
of The Giaour in that it centers on the same basic elements: a
woman, her fiancé (or her master, in Byron’s poem) and the demon
who loves her. However, unlike The Giaour, which is primarily
oriented around the title character’s internal suffering,
Lermontov’s poem is plot-driven. In the “final” version of
Lermontov’s poem, which is the one most widely read, the lonely
Demon falls in love with Tamara, a young woman who represents
the epitome of beauty and purity. Perceiving her as his greatest
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challenge, he attempts to seduce her. This scene, written in
dramatic verse form, rings with reminiscences of Byronic
seductions, and, I will show, recalls episodes of Romantic
vampirism from the British canon (Russia had no strong tradition
of literary vampires at this time). Ultimately, Tamara resists the
Demon’s advances and he rapes and kills her. As he prepares to
take her soul, an angel suddenly descends from Heaven and saves
it, preserving her honor.
Taken as an extended metaphor of the conflict between art
and the artist, the Demon can be viewed to represent Lermontov
himself and Tamara, his art. The Byronic elements of the Demon’s
character can arguably stand for Lermontov’s aspiration to be
Byron, and Tamara’s purity represents Lermontov’s desire to write
like the English Romantic whom he idolized. The Angel, then,
represents the ultimate judgment of art that we saw in “Death of a
Poet,” the Kantian Form of Beauty, or, for Lermontov, the Byronic
aesthetic, itself. Lermontov as the Demon tries to achieve the
Byronic aesthetic in taking over Tamara’s soul, but to no avail.
Lermontov views his aspiration as a corruption of the Byronic and
therefore undermines himself by writing his Demon to ultimately
fail in his seduction of Tamara. The Angel pulls Tamara back to
her pure state, her Byronic perfection, and the Demon –
Lermontov – is left alone, without an aesthetic to call his own.
The seduction scene becomes instrumental to reading the
poem in these terms. As I have mentioned, the scene reverberates
with images of literary vampirism. The figure of the vampire,
particularly the Romantic vampire, has been equated with the
relationship of the artist to his work. James B. Twitchell, one of the
seminal critics of the vampire, writes of the Romantic artist:
In no other movement has the artist been so aware of his inner self and
of his exchanging of energies, not only with those around him, but with
the work or art as well. He is both enervated and energized by the art of
creation…Hence, vampirism, simply as a process of energy exchange, is
implicit in the creative process…For the Romantic artist this ‘process’
usually involves four relatively stable parts: the artist, the audience, the
object of art (artifact), and the subject of art (Twitchell 142).

In Twitchell’s terms, if the Demon is the artist, then the Angel, who
sees the Demon’s transgressions against Tamara and eventually
stops them, is the audience within the poem (which is not to say
that the Angel represents Lermontov’s audience, as I will explain).
The subject of the work is Lermontov’s perception of himself as
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fundamentally corrupting the Byronic aesthetic, and the object
becomes the poem, itself, which is then read by a real audience.
The real audience will, of course, judge the work for themselves,
but, given Lermontov’s views on the public in “Death of a Poet,”
we know that he does not trust his readers to understand art.
Thus, the final outcome of Lermontov’s poem will circle back to
his notion of a definitive aesthetic judgment, which has nothing to
do with the public and everything to do with the degree to which
Lermontov achieves the Byronic. In this sense, Lermontov’s
relationship to Byron might be called vampiric, or at the very least,
parasitic, as Lermontov relies on the Byronic aesthetic as a host of
sorts, through which he will validate himself as a poet.
Indeed, vampirism manifests itself in The Demon in a more
direct way, which becomes instrumental to understanding the
implications of my reading of the title figure as representing
Lermontov himself. Vampirism is heavily implicated in the
language that the Demon uses to attempt to convince Tamara to
join his world. We know that the Demon is immortal, but during
his exchange with Tamara, he qualifies his immortality by hinting
that he is actually “undead,” the kind of immortality typically
associated with vampires: “And secretly, suddenly, I began to hate
/ My undeath and my power” (“И тайно вдруг возненавидел /
Бессмертие и власть мою,” SS, Vol. 2, 525). This line is more
commonly translated as “”My immortality and my power,” but as
I will show, the word “undeath” seems to be closer to the
implications of the Russian “бессмертие.” Several lines later, he
says, “To not live, like you, began to pain me” (“Не жить, как ты,
мне стало больно,” SS 525). The word “immortality” literally
means “not dying” or “unending life,” whereas a state of immortal
“not living” denotes the “undeath” characteristic only of vampires
in folklore and literature. The Russian word, “бессмертие,” itself
means immortality, though it literally breaks down into “without
death,” a somewhat closer variant to “undeath” than the English
“immortality.” It is possible that because of the potential for
confusion here, Lermontov qualified the state of the Demon’s
immortality by having him state that not only does he never die,
he does not live – thus, he is not simply immortal, but actually
undead – a vampire.
The association between the Demon/vampire and the
figure of “the author” is made explicit at the very end of the poem.
In wrapping up the tale, the narrator tells us that the hands of time
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have swept away any traces of the story that we have just read; the
paradox being that the author has allowed for the perpetuation of
the story in spite of the passage of time. Implied, then, is that, like
the Demon, the author represents the eternal force of the world.
To reinforce the poet’s association with the Demon, in his third
revision of the poem (1931), Lermontov begins with an epigraph
from Byron’s Cain, followed by a short prologue which reads:
Like a demon, calm and severe,
I would amuse myself with evil-doing.
Deceits were not new to me,
And poison was on my heart.
Now, as this gloomy Genius,
I, near you, have again revived,
For pure pleasures,
Both for hopes, and for the heavens.
Как демон, хладный и суровый,
Я в мире веселился злом.
Обманы были мне не новы,
И яд был на сердце моём.

Теперь, как мрачный этот Гений,
Я близ тебя опять воскрес,
Для непорочных наслаждений,
И для надежд, и для небес.
(SS, Vol. 2, 566-7)

On the surface, Lermontov directly compares himself to a demon,
telling his readers that his life felt full of evil until he discovered
some unnamed force which “revived” him because it possessed
some other “gloomy Genius.” Given Lermontov’s idolatry,
coupled with the epigraph that immediately precedes this
prologue, one can only take the “gloomy Genius” to be Byron,
which leaves the act of writing poetry as that which revived the
“demonic” Lermontov.
Though Lermontov’s relationship to his work is explicated
for us in this version of the poem, as it progresses, and
subsequently with each revision, Lermontov consistently
problematizes it. Despite various changes to the plot, the Demon’s
multifarious Byronic traits serve to tie him to Lermontov’s idolatry
of Byron, and his ultimate failure to seduce the object of his
affection can be read as Lermontov’s feeling of inferiority to the
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British poet. There is only one version of the eight revisions in
which the Demon successfully takes over Tamara’s purity.
However, Lermontov changed it back in the last revision before his
death in 1841. In point of fact, The Demon is not the only instance
in which Lermontov invokes Byronic tropes only to undermine
them in the end. In the following statement, Elizabeth Cheresh
Allen, one of the major critics on the subject, summarizes
Lermontov’s tendency to step down from creating a truly Byronic
work:
Lermontov would adopt Byron’s favorite form, the narrative poem, and
yet subvert its drama; he would extensively employ exotic settings and
impassioned plots but somehow deflate them; he would portray
seemingly typical Byronic characters and then complicate them by
showing them falling short of their expected scale and vitality; he would
manifest a Byronic awareness of the threats of the human spirit posed by
self-consciousness, passivity, and dependence, while only partially
endorsing Byron’s ideals of activity and transcendence. (Allen 15)

So, if the Demon represents Lermontov, his struggle with Tamara
is necessarily analogous to Lermontov’s attempts to formulate his
art in Byron’s style.
Interestingly, in 1841, while still working on The Demon,
Lermontov completely reconceived his female protagonist in a
lyric poem titled “Tamara” (“Тамара,” SS, Vol. 1, 535). Whereas
in every version of The Demon, Tamara was the epitome of chastity,
purity and honor, in this poem, she becomes an extension of the
cruelty and corruption of the Demon himself, described as “Like a
demon, treacherous and evil” (“Как демон, коварна и зла,” SS,
Vol. 1, 535). I take this to be a moment unabashed frustration with
himself as a writer, in which Tamara no longer represents the
Byronic aesthetic with which Lermontov struggles, but rather
becomes, completely, the fundamentally corrupt work that he sees
himself to have created. Viewing himself to have fallen short of
achieving Byron’s poetic abilities, Lermontov thus places himself
among the mob that misconstrues and kills the poet in “Death of a
Poet.” So, in as much as he tries to write his poetic identity, he
ultimately fails and must turn the pen on himself, poetically
undermining The Demon by reworking his view of his art in
“Tamara.”
Significantly, the role of the Angel was also drastically
reworked. In his seventh revision of The Demon, Lermontov
eliminates the struggle with the Angel altogether, leaving
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Tamara’s soul to the Demon in the end. Of particular interest is
the fact that Lermontov intended this version of the poem to be
read aloud to some friends (Tomashevskij, 696-697). Prior to this,
the poem had not been released to the public in any form. (It was
first published posthumously, in 1843, based primarily on the
eighth and final revision). Lermontov’s allowing the Demon to
triumph at the end of the seventh revision may be read as an
attempt to assert control over his art for the purposes of presenting
it before an audience. That is, with no Angel to stand in his way,
the Demon is allowed to triumph completely – or, Lermontov’s art
is not judged against an aesthetic ideal, and therefore does not
have a chance to fall short of the Byronic. Clearly, however, this
ending did not fulfill Lermontov’s poetic vision for The Demon, and
he ultimately did change the story back, allowing the Angel to
redeem Tamara’s soul and leaving the Demon to wander the earth
alone for eternity.
Lermontov’s revisions of The Demon span almost the
entirety of his literary career. It was in the midst of writing and
revising The Demon, with the shadow of Byron perpetually
looming overhead, that he wrote most of his other poetical works.
I have shown the possibility of reading The Demon allegorically, as
an expression of Lermontov’s corrupting his art (Tamara) with the
anticipation of being rebuked by a standard of aesthetic judgment
(The Angel). As a result, I argue that most, if not all, of
Lermontov’s poetry should be understood, at least on some level,
as an expression of his frustration with his inability to rise to the
level of his idol. Thus, although his 1831 assertion, “Я не
Байрон,” has been typically translated into English as “I’m not
Byron,” perhaps it is more appropriately read, “I’m no Byron.”
ENDNOTES

1. For more on the manifestations of this motif, see Catherine
O’Neil’s “Byron’s Sea in Pushkin and Lermontov” in The Byron
Journal, 32.2 (2004): 101-13.
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The Cow, the Rhinemaiden,
and the “Supreme Primal Uterus”:
Love, Worship, and Tribute Language
in William Faulkner’s The Hamlet
Allison Rittmayer,
Bucknell University
I begin with a quote from William Faulkner’s The Hamlet,
regarding a suitor of Eula Varner’s:
“This was he against whom, following the rout of the Memphis
drummer, the youths of last summer’s trace galled mules rose in
embattled concert to defend that in which apparently they and the
brother both had no belief, even though they themselves had failed
signally to disprove it, as knights before them have probably done.”
(Faulkner 1991, 151)

William Faulkner creates his Yoknapatawpha County to
explore the “curse of the South”. The Hamlet is the first book in the
Snopes trilogy, which chronicles the rise and fall of Flem Snopes
and his family. Because of its genealogical aspect, The Hamlet
allows Faulkner to continue his study of the “curse of the south” –
the inability of family members to love each other. This curse is a
result of the Old South’s obsession with legacy and chivalry, two
concepts that are thrown into confusion in post-bellum
Yoknapatawpha. It is not surprising, then, that Faulkner’s work is
full of the language and imagery of courtly romance, and that this
language is constantly embattled in criticizing and lamenting the
fate of the South. This paper studies the imagery and language
Faulkner uses around three characters. The first is Eula Varner,
later Eula Snopes, who is the object of worship of the men of
Frenchman’s Bend. Faulkner consistently refers to Eula in
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mythological terms, and he endows her with the status of a
goddess at a young age. The other two characters – Ike Snopes
and Jack Houston’s cow – form a counterpoint to the town’s
obsession with Eula. Ike is the mentally challenged cousin of Flem
Snopes who is ignored by his family and cared for by Mrs.
Littlejohn, an innkeeper. Ike starts sneaking away to watch the
cow and eventually falls in love with her, even attempting to run
away with her. Ike’s obsession with the cow can be read as a
repetition of the obsession with Eula that the young men of
Frenchman’s Bend ritualistically developed each summer.
However, since the relationship between Ike and the cow is
exclusive compared to the mass-courtship of Eula, the town’s
fascination takes on an obscene voyeuristic quality, which ends
tragically. I show that Faulkner uses the story of Ike and his cow
to show the ultimate failure of love in the South, and the
impossibility of a Southern courtly romance, especially when
Eula’s story is read as a parallel.
i. The Uterus

Faulkner’s ideal woman has been discussed in Faulkner
studies as the “Natural Woman,” a sharp contrast to the remote,
deformed Southern Lady. However, the Natural Woman does not
escape Faulkner’s critical gaze. As Faulkner’s criticism is
frequently delivered through his humor, a brief study of humor is
important to a reading of The Hamlet, or any other Faulkner work.
The Natural Women are just as likely to fall victim to Faulkner’s
humor as any of his other female characters. He often relies on
comic strategies found in Southwest humor when talking about his
Natural Women. He plays with Southwest Humor’s techniques of
flamboyant exaggeration and hyperbole, while incorporating his
own ironic and satirical voice (Collins 1975, 262). The result is
what François Pitavy calls comic “inflation” and “deflation” – an
alternation of overstatement and understatement to create a
mocking voice (Pitavy 1984, 195). Pitavy develops this argument
in the context of Shreve’s voice in Absalom! Absalom!, where
Shreve’s language belittles “Aunt Rosa” because he fails or refuses
to recognize and understand the very different cultural
significance between the Southern terms of address “Miss” and
“Aunt”. These techniques of comic inflation and deflation are
employed in other works by Faulkner. In regards to his women,
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especially the Natural Women, Faulkner insists more on the
inflating aspect of this device, but the result is always an inflationwhich-deflates, or undercuts itself.
Perhaps the most consistent example of this inflationwhich-deflates is in the language surrounding Eula Varner in The
Hamlet. This accompanies her textual birth – in the first paragraph
of the book dedicated to her, Faulkner offers the following
description: “even her breasts were no longer the little, hard,
fiercely-pointed cones of puberty or even maidenhood. On the
contrary, her entire appearance suggested some symbology out of
the old Dionysic times” (Faulkner 1991, 105). Although this
depiction of Eula as suggesting some sort of divine female
decadence at the age of “not quite thirteen” is an exaggeration, it is
not entirely outlandish (Faulkner 1991, 105). It is easy for the
reader to explain that Eula was simply an early bloomer, and that
her physical maturity coupled with her actual youth accentuates
the freedom of childhood, while rendering it decadent through the
flesh.
Faulkner depicts Eula as a corporeal and thus sexual object.
Faulkner writes that any time Eula had to go out with her mother
after outgrowing her perambulator, “she would be carried by their
negro manservant. […] the negro man staggering slightly beneath
his long, dangling, already indisputably female burden like a
bizarre and chaperoned Sabine rape” (Faulkner 1991, 105). While
Eula is first depicted as having an extraordinary sense of self, she
is unable to articulate it, and becomes reduced to the “indisputably
female burden” that is moved and fed when necessary. The fact
that she is “indisputably female” points the reader to some
sexualized image of the child, which is reinforced by the
comparison to a “Sabine rape.” Faulkner attempts to force the
humor, saying this rape is “bizarre and chaperoned.” The inflation
granted by the allusion to the mythic rape of Sabine women is
deflated by the fact that Faulkner has made it clear to his readers
that Eula is not bothered by the forced transportation of her body;
unlike the Sabine women, she would definitely not be screaming,
flailing, or otherwise resisting her abduction. She simply will not
show complicity by walking. She is encumbered by her growing
body, but doesn’t yet know what to do with it aside from nothing.
The first description of the disillusioned Eula and Eula-thebody also juxtapose different types of maturity against Eula’s real
youth. Her consciousness of the monotonous, cyclical nature of
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life that masks the trajectory she knows her life will take is silenced
throughout the novel, as Eula rarely speaks. Depictions of Eula as
a sexual object do evolve over the course of the novel, gradually
growing more complex from object, to idol, to oracle. Here, Eula is
the entirely passive object –contrary to the image of a Sabine rape.
She lets herself be carried because she does not care to move
herself, and sees no difference between movement and stasis. She
has not figured out what movement she herself wants to take, and
ignores whatever expectations others have for her actions. She
does not resist the objectification undertaken by her mother and
the servant as a violation of her identity, but accepts it because her
identity is internal, not prescripted, and not tied to any action.
Rather, for Eula, her actions are tied to her internal identity.
This lack of purpose changes once Eula matures and is
forced to leave her home to go to school. She is driven back and
forth to the nearby schoolhouse because she “declined to walk
there,” but she still does not participate in an active refusal to fill
the script written for a young Southern Lady (Faulkner 1991, 109).
If anything, Eula is being forced out of the script because receiving
a classical education is not necessarily a part of being a Southern
Lady. This chauffeuring required Eula’s brother Jody to make
many extra trips between the school and his store, a mere 200 feet
away. After a month, he refuses to continue the nonsense of
picking her up at lunch, only to drive her back afterwards, and
then pick her up again at the end of the day. Jody and the reader
are both astonished when Eula agrees to walk back and forth from
the school and the store at lunch. However, on the second day of
the arrangement, Jody discovers why Eula had been willing to
comply. He exaggerates the explanation to his mother, “‘If you
could arrange to have a man standing every hundred feet along
the road, she would walk all the way home! She’s just like a dog!
Soon as she passes anything in long pants she begins to give off
something. You can smell it! You can smell it ten feet away!’”
(Faulkner 1991, 110). Her description moves from the state of
being a simple, even victimized, object that is transported by
others, to being recognized as an animal, a dog, a bitch. Not
pristine, or ideal, Eula’s sexuality is temporarily deflated to a
brutish, primal, instinctive state that invokes the senses rather than
an image from mythology. This exaggeration of Eula’s sexuality
through Jody’s explosive reaction is undercut by Eula’s being only
eight years old, and most likely not yet sexual at all.
Yet, the primal aspect of Eula’s sexuality that Jody and
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Faulkner here evoke also lends itself to abstraction and the
creation of an empty symbol where Faulkner and others can
deposit their views of pure female sexuality. It is exactly the dual
nature of the word “primal” as being something uncivilized and
thus wild, but also uncivilized and thus pure and untainted by
culture that allows for Eula to be rebuilt as an object once more.
This time, however, she is reconstructed as an idol, complete with
her first worshiper. Faulkner presents a portrait of Eula on her
first day of school at age eight through the eyes of her male
schoolteacher Labove:
Then one morning he turned from the crude blackboard and saw a face
eight years old and a body of fourteen with the female shape of twenty,
which on the instant ofcrossing the threshold brought into the bleak, ill
lighted, poorly-heated room dedicated to the harsh functioning of
Protestant primary education a moist blast of spring’s liquorish
corruption, a pagan triumphal prostration before the supreme primal
uterus. (Faulkner 1991, 126)

On a first glance, the tribute language Faulkner employs
describing Eula’s physique perhaps seduces the reader, in the
same way the image of Eula seduces Labove. The image of Eula
“crossing the threshold” immediately brings images of marriage,
tradition, and ceremony to the reader’s mind; Eula is presented for
Labove to gaze upon. The discipline connoted by the “harsh
Protestantism” of the room, and Labove’s status as the teacher,
incorporates the chivalric ideas of control, propriety, and
forbidden love. This idea of chivalric tribute is heightened by the
last image of “pagan triumphal prostration before the supreme
primal uterus,” which draws up images of Labove bowing down
at some altar, or directly to a goddess. However, upon a closer
reading, the passage becomes comical in its flamboyant,
exaggerated tone. Faulkner begins with a reduced blazon of Eula;
he describes her face, and then her body as a traditional blazon
would describe a woman from the top of her head, down. As the
description progresses, Eula’s physical age becomes exaggerated,
going from eight, to fourteen, to twenty. This progression leads to
the final equation of Eula to “the supreme primal uterus.” Eula
becomes the woman-as-uterus, or woman-as-body – she becomes a
complete goddess, and yet merely a corporeal organ. She has been
stripped of her excess flesh – the arms and legs that she formerly
had no use for – and so has been spared becoming an animal, as
Jody described her, because she has been reduced to a single
essential organ.
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ii. The Cow

Then he would hear her, coming down the creekside in the mist. It
would not be after one hour, two hours, three; the dawn would be
empty, the moment and she would not be, then he would hear her and
he would lie drenched in the wet grass, serene and one and indivisible in
joy, listening to her approach. He would smell her; the whole mist
reeked with her; the same malleate hands of mist which drew along his
prone drenched flanks palped her pearled barrel too and shaped them
both somewhere in immediate time, already married. (Faulkner 1991,
183)

It is hard to imagine that this passage, with its overblown
language and sensuality is actually written about a cow. In the
love story between Ike Snopes and Jack Houston’s cow, love and
sexuality become embodied in an animal in a way that is the direct
opposite of the vision of Eula-as-dog that Jody Varner presents.
The love between Ike and the cow at first appears to be an ideal
courtly romance – Ike is mentally retarded and the cow is not
human, so no love could possibly be consummated between the
two. Additionally, the cow is exalted and idealized, appearing,
“blond among the purpling shadows of the pasture, not fixed amid
the suppurant tender green but integer of spring’s concentrated
climax, by it crowned, garlanded” (Faulkner 1991, 186). She is
surrounded by purple shadows, purple being the color of nobility,
and also crowned. Ike acts as an obedient servant to her, following
her and watching. His attempts to make physical contact with the
cow are refused with a bellow, or interrupted by the cow’s owner.
Ike even attempts to rescue the cow from a brushfire in one
scene. However, a horse is also caught in the fire and keeps
charging at the pair. The horse eventually causes Ike and the cow
to fall down into a small ravine, with the cow landing on top of
Ike. Ike quickly gets himself up but,
When he moved toward her, she whirled and ran […] in a blind
paroxysm of shame, to escape not him alone but the very scene of the
outragement of privacy where she had been sprung suddenly upon and
without warning from the dark and betrayed by her own treacherous
biological inheritance, he following again, speaking to her, trying to tell
her how this violent violation of her maiden’s delicacy is no shame, since
such is the very iron imperishable warp of the fabric of love. (Faulkner
1991, 192)

This scene of falling into the ravine and “violation of her maiden’s
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delicacy” is the first sexual encounter between Ike and the cow.1 It
important that even for Ike, sexual activity is not transgressive as
long as it is pursued in the spirit of love; whereas, for the rest of
Frenchman’s Bend, sexuality is completely divorced from any idea
of love, and is worshiped for its own sake.
Faulkner later plays on the gender ambiguity of the cow as
being not-human, but also as a being which possesses both a
vagina and multiple phallic organs. After the fire, Ike attempts to
run away with the cow. After a day of walking, the cow becomes
irritated, and Ike realizes that it is because she has not been milked
— her bag is full. Ike proceeds to milk her:
At first she would not let him touch her bag at all. Even then she kicked
him once, but only because the hands were strange and clumsy. Then
the milk came down, warm among his fingers and on his hands and
wrists, making a thin sharp hissing on the earth. (Faulkner 1991, 198-9)

This reinforces the image of Ike as the inexperienced, virginal
lover, but also feminizes him, and posits the cow as the virile,
experienced male lover.

Once Houston has recovered Ike and his cow from their
attempted elopement, he decides that he will give the cow to Ike so
he will be rid of the problem. Mrs. Littlejohn gives Houston Ike’s
only money (which Ratliff had previously given to her), as
payment for the cow, and Houston reluctantly accepts. Mrs.
Littlejohn then gives the cow its own shed, and Ike spends the bulk
of his time there. When Ratliff, a traveling salesman, returns to
town after a prolonged absence, he finds that the men have been
whipped into a frenzy, incomparable to anything seen before.
People are asking him if he is “going to watch” and telling him
that he “has to watch”. At first Ratliff is oblivious, but he quickly
comes to realize
He was walking a path, a path which he had not seen before, which had
not been there in May. Then that rear wall came into view, the planks
nailed horizontally upon it, that plank at head-height prized off and
leaning, the projecting nails faced carefully inward, against the wall and
no more motionless than the row of backs, the row of heads which filled
the gap. He knew not only what he was going to see but that, like
Bookwright, he did not want to see it, yet unlike Bookwright, he was
going to look. (Faulkner 1991, 216-217)

The entire male population of the town has become obsessed with
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Ike and the cow. It is one of Ike’s own cousins who is charging
admission to watch the “show.” This obsession is very much a
replacement for the men’s obsession with Eula, who has been sent
off on her “honeymoon.” In fact, Eula does not reappear until
after the cow is gone. To cure Ike of his “sinful” inclination, his
relatives try a folk remedy – they kill the cow and feed a piece of
its meat to Ike to rid him of his taste for it. However, this forced
internalization of his other does not cure Ike, and he is eventually
bought a toy cow to make him less lonely.
iii. The Rhinemaiden

When Eula returns after her marriage and the birth of her
child, she is much less visible in The Hamlet, and portrayed very
differently. There is no longer the frenzied ritual of courtship, but
rather a reverence, as of an oracle. This reverence is very different
from the adoration she formerly received, and can even be read as
a mockery of the excess that was lightheartedly laughed at in the
beginning. At the end of the story of the wild horses, V.K. Ratliff
leads a group of the men to Will Varner’s house to fetch him to
tend to Henry Armstid who has been injured as a result of the
horses running through town. The men arrived at the Varner home
and
They stood, clumped darkly in the silver yard and called up at the blank
windows until suddenly someone was standing in one of them. It was
Flem Snopes’ wife. She was in a white garment; the heavy braided club
of her hair looked almost black against it. She did not lean out, she
merely stood there, full in the moon, apparently blank-eyed or certainly
not looking downward at them – the heavy gold hair, the mask not
tragic and perhaps not even doomed: just damned, the strong faint lift of
breasts beneath the marblelike fall of the garment; to those below what
Brunhilde, what Rhinemaiden on what spurious river-rock of papier
mache, what Helen returned to what topless and shoddy Argos, waiting
for no one. (Faulkner 1991, 338)

The passage begins with an image comparable to some pagan
ritual calling for the appearance of an oracle, and when the oracle
does appear, she is without identity. It is “Flem Snopes’ wife,” not
Eula, and her face is not clearly visible to the men below; even if it
were, she is wearing a mask. Eula is no longer the idol and object
of admiration that appeared early in the story, in full flesh, but is
now a cold distant figure – marble and statue-like. While the
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image of Eula is presented as very symbolic and elevated to the
status of Wagner’s Brunhilde, she is simultaneously reduced to her
mortal reality by being seated on an imagined papier-mâché rock,
which would disintegrate if it were placed in real water.
William Faulkner makes it very clear that public worship
and adoration are integral to the system of courtship and chivalry
of the Old South. This public nature serves a policing function for
both the lovers presented, and the common person. For Eula, the
public attempts to ensure that her courtship goes according to
tradition, and that she remains property of the men of
Frenchman’s Bend. When the town’s love affair fails and Eula is
impregnated by a stranger, everything is thrown into disarray.
The love between Ike and the cow serves as an analogy for the
obsession the town had for Eula, who was constantly trying to
escape convention and prescription, just as the cow initially
avoided Ike’s touch. The cow eventually submits and becomes
property of Ike in the same way that Eula is forced to marry Flem
Snopes and become his property. The townsmen are there to
gawk at Eula and ridicule Flem’s impotence just as much as they
are present to jeer at Ike’s obsolete consummation with the cow.
ENDNOTES

1. As a side note, it is debatable whether or not there is any
consummation in this scene because Ike is later referred to as still
being virginal, although this may just be a condition of his mental
state.
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“Don’t Steal Rolls”:
Tolstoy’s Symposium on
Love, Literature, Women, and Wine
Nicholas Kupensky,
Bucknell University
i. “Don’t Steal Rolls”: Tolstoy and Platonic Thought

In a diary entry dated 14 October 1897, Tolstoy claims that
“when people are carried away by Shakespeare or Beethoven they
are carried away by their own thoughts and dreams evoked by
Shakespeare or Beethoven, just as people in love don’t love the
object of their love, but what it evokes in them.”1 This statement
brings together two of the most problematic issues within
Tolstoy’s entire body of art and thought – his views on aesthetics
and love. Tolstoy’s essay “On Shakespeare and the Drama” (1906),
for example, has attracted a significant amount of condemnation in
the Western world for its argument that Shakespeare’s popularity
and the firmly-established opinion that he is an artistic genius is
one of the greatest delusions in the history of literature. At the
same time, Tolstoy is famous for his long internal struggle to
reconcile his own sexual desire with his religious and
philosophical principles, eventually compelling him to completely
renounce sexual activity even within marriage; while some have
read Tolstoy’s attitude towards sexuality as “reflecting his
ambivalence and free-floating hostility toward women,”2 in the
quote above, one can see how both of these issues are connected to
Tolstoy’s larger project to bring his artistic, philosophic, and
religious views into a single coherent system.
Indeed, his diary entry from 30 August 1894 illustrates the
extent to which Tolstoy saw aesthetics and love as intrinsically
connected. He writes that “novels end with the hero and heroine
The Comparative Humanities Review
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married. Instead, they should begin with marriage and end with
the couple liberating themselves from it,”3 and one can see how
this statement reflects the principles which eventually compelled
Tolstoy to reject the conclusions of War and Peace and Anna
Karenina on aesthetic grounds. While Tolstoy’s opinions regarding
love, sexuality, and aesthetics traditionally have been the issues
which are most irreconcilable with his celebrated realistic novels,
Tolstoy’s sense of the individual’s place within the flux of
historical time likewise can illuminate how the principles
underlying Tolstoy’s discourse on literature and on love are
intimately connected to his discourse on history from the Second
Epilogue of War and Peace.
In the Second Epilogue, Tolstoy writes that a just account of
historical movement takes as its first step the renunciation of what
he calls “the independence of personality” and “free will,” which
are “only…expression[s] for the unknown remainder of what we
know about the laws of human life.”4 If Tolstoy in the Second
Epilogue confronts historians for brainwashing readers into
believing that historical personalities like Napoleon exercise their
freedom over history rather than being subjects to historical
processes, then this theory of history similarly doubles as a theory
of the history of literature and a history of sexuality as well.
Taking into account Tolstoy’s sense of freedom and contingency,
then the principles guiding his views on love and literature
similarly reject those who glorify the volition and agency of the
free individual and place him at the center of all universal
processes. Thus, what I am interested in is Tolstoy’s sensitivity
towards the agency of the individual and how this agency is
manifested within the constellation of historical, literary, and
sexual experience. One can see in all three cases how Tolstoy
energetically confronts the moments in history, literature, or sexual
experience when narcissism and self-love are inscribed by each of
their respective means of production, and what I would like to
focus in this essay is how Tolstoy’s ultimate rejection of the
centrality of the individual in these three spheres is intimately
connected with his experience as a reader of Plato. First, I focus on
the motivations contributing to Tolstoy’s dialogue with Plato by
looking particularly at how Tolstoy “translates” Plato’s Symposium
into his own Russian symposium in Anna Karenina, and using
Tolstoy’s discourse on history, I will explore the possibilities when,
in the terms of the Symposium, the act of reading (or one might say
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the act of translation) transforms into an act of love.

ii. “Spring Water that Sets the Teeth on Edge”:
Tolstoy Reading Plato

Plato perhaps exerted the strongest influence on Tolstoy’s
art and thought of any writer throughout his long literary career.
Tolstoy listed Plato’s Symposium as one of the books which had
made an impression on him during his youth, and during the
winter of 1870, he voraciously began to study Greek. His wife
notes in her diaries that after a theological student from Moscow
arrived to teach him “the rudiments of the language”:

From the first day, the forty-two-year-old pupil threw himself into Greek
grammar with a passion, pored over dictionaries, drew up vocabularies,
tackled the great authors, [and] . . . in a few weeks[, ] outdistanced his
teacher. He sight-translated Xenophon, reveled in Homer, discovered
Plato and said the originals were like ‘spring water that sets the teeth on
edge.’5

Armed with a knowledge of Greek, Tolstoy repeatedly placed
Plato alongside Schopenhauer as the two writers who “set a true
objective for philosophy and…seek the meaning of life without
dividing into their constituent parts the essential things which
make up the life of every man.”6 If Tolstoy esteems Schopenhauer
because of their shared view of preferencing the cosmological scale
of historical time over the importance of the effect of an individual,
then Tolstoy’s affinity for Platonic thought is intimately connected
to its all-encompassing implications on the subject of love and
sexuality. Because this totalizing principle which permits Tolstoy
to place Schopenhauer and Plato in the same category emerges in
its most comprehensible form in War and Peace, it is necessary to
turn to the Second Epilogue to restate Tolstoy’s understanding of
“freedom” and “inevitability” (необходимость) and their roles in
determining the course of historical movement.
Tolstoy’s theory of history comes out of the conviction that
all action is governed not by a single individual’s act of volition
but instead by every last individual who partakes in an event. He
writes that
So long as histories are written of separate individuals, whether Caesars,
Alexanders, Luthers, or Voltaires, and not the histories of all, absolutely
all those who take part in an event, it is quite impossible to describe the
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movement of humanity without the conception of a force compelling
men to direct their activity toward a certain end.7

Tolstoy uses this computational approach to construct a theory of
history which places emphasis on every single individual present;
at the same time that a historical moment is constituted by these
“histories of all,” likewise our sense of an individual’s freedom is
governed almost exclusively by our ability to judge the infinite
number of factors influencing an individual at any given moment.
Tolstoy proposes that if we consider an individual in
isolation and do not take into consideration the influence of the
external world, time, and the causes leading to an action, the
individual surely appears to possess freedom. He suggests that if
we see an individual’s “connection with anything what[so]ever –
with a man who speaks to him, a book he reads, the work on
which he is engaged, even with the air he breathes or the light that
falls on the things about him – we see that each of these
circumstances has an influence on him and controls at least some
side of his activity.”8 The difficulty in observing and judging the
totality of these circumstances has discouraged historians from
subscribing to this God’s-eye-view perspective on history and led
them to believe that the most important force directing historical
movement is the freedom of the individual, for, Tolstoy writes,
“when we do not at all understand the cause of an action…we
ascribe a greater amount of freedom to it….. [W]e recognize in it
more individuality, originality, and independence.”9 While
Tolstoy ultimately believed in varying degrees that an individual
does indeed possess a type of moral freedom in the spiritual realm
(and I will qualify these terms in a moment), the effect of Tolstoy’s
theory of history by calling into question the privileged position of
the individual on the larger historical scale and the privileged
position of freedom on the human scale can be seen as remarkably
reminiscent of Freud’s proposition of the three blows to the
megalomania of Western culture. In fact, the Second Epilogue
effectively mirrors each of the stages in which Freud argued
humanity’s self-importance was challenged – in the cosmos
through the explosion of the geocentric universe, in the animal
kingdom through the theory of evolution, and in the mind through
psychoanalysis.
On the cosmological scale, Tolstoy self-consciously aligns
himself with Copernicus, and just as the explosion of the
geocentric universe elicited a radical rethinking of the individual’s
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position in the world, so too does Tolstoy’s theory of history. The
effect that shifting our sense as free individuals to participants in
the movement of historical inevitability is conceived by Tolstoy as
commensurate with the heliocentric universe where our planet is
no longer the center of all the heavens. He writes:

From the time the law of Copernicus was discovered and
proved, the mere recognition of the fact that it was not the sun but the
earth that moves sufficed to destroy the whole cosmography of the
ancients…..
As in the question of astronomy then, so in the question of
history now, the whole difference of opinion is based on the recognition
or nonrecognition of something absolute, serving as the measure of
visible phenomena. In astronomy it was the immovability of the earth,
in history it is the independence of personality – free will…..
In the first case it was necessary to renounce the consciousness
of an unreal immobility in space and to recognize a motion we did not
feel; in the present case it is similarly necessary to renounce a freedom
that does not exist, and to recognize a dependence of which we are not
conscious.10

Moving down from the cosmic sphere, challenging the self-love of
mankind in the realm of history can meaningfully be compared
with the effect that evolution has had on conceiving the
individual’s place within historical movement. And while Tolstoy
would surely have resented any comparisons to Darwin, some
evolutionary biologists – such as Stephen Jay Gould – occasionally
use War and Peace as a literary analogue for evolution when
arguing that contingency plays a vital role in the evolutionary
process. Gould, in his magnum opus The Structure of Evolutionary
Theory, writes that “although contingency has been consistently
underrated (or even unacknowledged) in stereotypical
descriptions of scientific practice,…our great novelists have
reveled in this theme, as Tolstoy devoted both [epilogues] of War
and Peace to explaining why Napoleon’s defeat in Moscow in 1812
rested upon a thicket of apparently inconsequential and
independent details, and not upon any broad and abstract claim
about the souls of nations or the predictable efficacy of Russia’s
two greatest generals, November and December.”11
For Tolstoy, sexuality’s influence over an individual’s
subjectivity is also roughly analogous to what Freud calls “the
psychological blow to human nature.” Again, while one would
imagine that Tolstoy would resent the methodological foundations
of psychoanalysis, Tolstoy’s iconoclastic tone and approach in the
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Second Epilogue is in many ways echoed when we hear Freud
describe this third stage:

Psychoanalysis has sought to educate the ego. But these two discoveries
– that the life of our sexual instincts cannot be wholly tamed, and that
mental processes are in themselves unconscious and only reach the ego
and come under its control through incomplete and untrustworthy
perceptions – these two discoveries amount to a statement that the ego is
not master in its own house.12

While the trauma inflicted upon the self-love of mankind primarily
occurs on the cosmological scale in War and Peace, Anna Karenina is
structured by the principles evocative of Freud’s psychological
blow to the centrality of the free individual, and one can witness
this discourse woven into Tolstoy’s translation of Plato’s
Symposium in the novel.
iii. “Don’t Steal Rolls”: Tolstoy’s Symposium

From the very first page of Anna Karenina, Tolstoy
establishes that love and sexuality are at the core of the ensuing
chaos of the novel, writing that “everything was upset in the
Oblonskys’ house. The wife had discovered an intrigue between
her husband and their former French governess, and declared that
she would not continue to live under the same roof as him.”13
Stiva Oblonsky’s infidelity towards his wife disrupts the peace of
the nuclear family, and the novel called Anna Karenina begins its
signification of its title character when Anna Karenina – Stiva’s
sister – arrives to restore order. A few chapters later – when the
narrative moves to the Shcherbatsky house – Tolstoy similarly
frames the question of how a girl ought to choose her husband in
the ideological chaos of the age:
The French way, of parents deciding a daughter’s fate, was not accepted,
and was even condemned. The English way, of giving a girl perfect
freedom, was also rejected, and would have been impossible in Russian
society. The Russian way, of employing a professional match-maker,
was considered monstrous, and was laughed at by everybody, including
the Princess [Shcherbatskaya] herself. But how a girl was to get married,
or how a mother was to get a daughter given in marriage, no one knew.14

At this point in his life Tolstoy still placed some currency in the
nuclear family and saw marriage as the ideal place to synthesize
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physical and spiritual love, and one can sense the Princess’s
palpable anxiety that for Kitty “intimacy might be followed by
love and that her daughter might fall in love with some one who
had no intention of marrying or was not fit to be her husband.”15
As such, the issues underlying Tolstoy’s ensuing symposium are
not inscribed by pederasty or intercrural sex but by the anxiety of
how to properly set love into motion and whether marriage serves
its purpose as the proper telos for love.
So at the onset of Anna Karenina, Tolstoy puts these issues
into dialogue by translating Plato’s Symposium into a Russian pir.
Stiva Oblonsky and Konstantin Levin sit down to an extravagant
dinner that consists of three dozen Real Flensburg oysters, potage
printanier, turbot, sauce Beaumarchais, poulard à l'estragon, macédoine
de fruits, and – of course – an endless bottle of champagne. The
occasion for the dinner is that Levin has returned to Moscow to
propose to Kitty Shcherbatskaya, and in Tolstoy’s symposium,
Stiva and Levin each ruminate on the trials and tribulations of love
over the course of the meal. Generally speaking, the Oblonskys
and the Levins embody the two diametrically opposed and
seemingly irreconcilable lifestyles that determine the trajectory of
Anna Karenina. The first instance when Levin and Stiva meet in the
novel, the narrator provides a telling description of their
friendship:
Levin and Oblonsky were almost of the same age; and…were fond of
one another as friends who have come together in early youth often are,
in spite of the difference in their characters and tastes. Yet, as often
happens between men who have chosen different pursuits, each, while
in argument justifying the other’s activity, despised it in the depth of his
heart. Each thought that his own way of living was real life, and that the
life of his friend was – illusion.16

The differences between the two families are striking: Oblonsky is
plump, extravagant, superficial, a womanizer, an urbanite, an
officer worker; Levin is athletic, reserved, pensive, a faithful
husband, a landowner, a farmer. Their attitudes on the subject of
love and what constitutes a “true life” and what constitutes a life
of “illusion,” naturally, are no exception.
When their conversation addresses the tumult preceding
the symposium – that “everything was upset in the Oblonskys’
house” – Levin refuses to entertain the possibility that he is
capable of adultery and likens it to theft: “It’s quite
incomprehensible to me. It’s as if…just as incomprehensible as if I,
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after eating my fill here, went into a baker’s shop and stole a
roll.”17 It is important to note that the “roll” here is a “калач”,
which is a type of bread typically used only during religious
holidays and weddings, harkening back to the Christian sacrament
of the Eucharist, which also equates flesh with bread. Interestingly,
the “калач” reappears later in the novel in a telling scene when,
after having his marriage proposal accepted, Levin treats himself
to a cup of coffee and a “калач” is served too:
Levin tried to drink a little coffee, and put a piece of roll [калач] into his
mouth, but his mouth decidedly [didn’t know what to do] with it. Levin
[spit it out,] put on his coat, and went out to walk again…. All that night
and morning Levin had lived quite unconsciously, and felt quite outside
the conditions of material existence. He had not eaten for a whole day,
had not slept for two nights, had spent several hours half-dressed and
exposed to the frost, yet he felt not only fresher and better than ever
before, but quite independent of his body.18

This passage illustrates how Levin’s body viscerally rejects any
possibility of eros, and the fact that he uses this symbol of the
“калач” to confront Stiva calls attention to the dichotomy between
eros and agape in this scene.
Stiva delivers a passionate rebuttal to Levin’s admonition,
and responds by appealing to Levin’s sensual side: “Why not?
Rolls sometimes smell so [good] that one can’t resist them!”19 Both
men are amused at the metaphor, but Stiva quickly becomes more
serious in order to justify his eroticism. He ultimately sees his
affairs as inevitable because of his insatiable sexual appetites and
excess of libidinous energy.

What is to be done? Your wife gets older, and you’re full of life. Before
you've time to look round, you feel that you can't love your wife with
love, however much you may esteem her. And then suddenly love turns
up, and you're done for. . . . But what is to be done?20

The question, “What is to be done?” – or in Russian, “Что
делать?” – is loaded with philosophical significance, particularly
in Tolstoy’s ethics.
In a letter to N.N. Strakhov in 1875 – the same year he
began writing Anna Karenina – Tolstoy claims that the purpose of
philosophy is to answer all of Kant’s questions in order to find the
meaning of life. In response to Kant’s question – “Что делать ?”—
Tolstoy distinguishes between self-love and love of the all. He
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writes that:

[I]n childhood we desire the self, live in the self, love the self, but in old
age we live not for the self, desire something beyond the self, love not
the self, and that life is only a transition from love of the self (i.e. from
the individual life, from this life) to love not of the self (i.e. to a general
life, not this life), and therefore, to the question 'what is to be done?' I
would answer: 'Love not the self,' i.e. I would resolve each moment of
doubt by choosing the way in which I might satisfy love not of the self.21

Thus, when Stiva poses the question “what is to be done” about
his erotic drives, Levin’s unequivocal answer is “Don’t steal rolls.”
Even while the trajectory of Anna Karenina deviates from this
position – flesh inevitably becomes part of the marriage equation
for Levin and Kitty even if it generates a whole new set of
existential crises for Levin – the abnegation of self-love implicit in
Levin’s imperative “Don’t steal rolls” is the underlying link
between Tolstoy’s theory of history and discourses on love and
aesthetics.
iv. The Task of the Reader: Love

It’s clear that Tolstoy took up the “Don’t steal rolls” stance
when he attempted to challenge self-love in favor of this “love of
the all.” If one could reconfigure this binary pair of self-love
versus “love of the all” into the dichotomy between the love of the
flesh and the love of the spirit, the subtitle to Tolstoy’s Commentary
on the Gospels – “Victory of the Spirit over the Flesh” – embodies
this very transition that characterizes Tolstoy’s later writings. As
I’ve attempted to argue, the narcissism and over-inflation of an
individual’s place in the universe implicit in the glorification of the
flesh compels Tolstoy to eventually reject the temporal nature of
the flesh altogether.
If we recall for a moment Socrates’ speech in Plato’s
Symposium when Diotima elevates creative beauty above temporal
beauty and preferences its immortality, she figures this
relationship in terms of birth:

…everyone would rather have such children than human ones, and
would look up to Homer, Hesiod, and the other good poets with envy
and admiration for the offspring they have left behind – offspring,
which, because they are immortal themselves, provide their parents with
immortal glory and remembrance.22

102

KUPENSKY, “Don’t Steal Rolls,” Tolstoy’s Symposium

As such, one can see why the notion of a “genealogy” is such a
pregnant term when it comes to describing the relationship
between two authors or texts. If the “gene” in biological terms is
what is passed on from parents to children in the temporal realm,
then the literary genealogies that emerge in this intertextual space
illuminate the types of authorial interrelations that are so often
reduced by these theories of “influence” or “intertextuality” alone.
For an author to take on the genes and characteristics of
another author, the creation of a genealogy can easily be seen as
emerging out of a strong act of respect – or perhaps one may say –
of love. Gayatri Spivak suggests in “The Politics of Translation”
(1992) that the intimacy implicit in the act of reading is indicative
of the presence of love of the text, which grants the reader
permission to “transgress from the trace of the other – before
memory – in the closest places of the self.”23 Spivak’s claim that
“translation is the most intimate act of reading”24 introduces the
paradigm of “translation” as an essential relationship central to the
synthesis of inter-cultural and inter-historical literary movement.
The paradigm of translation, then, would imply that the central
problem is fundamentally located in linguistic difference, though
Spivak maintains that “language is not everything. It is only a
vital clue to where the self loses its boundaries” and as such “our
stake in agency keeps the fraying down to a minimum except in
the communication and reading of and in love. (What is the place
of “love” in the ethical?) The task of the translator is to facilitate
this love between the original and its shadow.”25
So, if we are to bring Tolstoy’s discourses on love, history,
and aesthetics together, his translation of Plato’s Symposium into
Anna Karenina sets up a literary genealogy predicated upon the
very principles of love espoused by Plato. Furthermore, Tolstoy
uses this clear link to Platonic thought ideologically and
genealogically to authorize his attack on what he sees as the artists
of the Western world whose production consists entirely of the
flesh. I will close with the suggestion that Tolstoy’s attitude
towards Western artists such as Shakespeare is not – as Harold
Bloom would have us believe – an act of poetic misprision but
instead an act of love.
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The Symposium
as Metanarrative
Steven McClellan,
Pennsylvania State University
Plato’s Symposium, while quite brilliant as to the insights
that it has traditionally been interpreted to have offered in the
realms of emotion, love, knowledge, and human relationships is a
primary example of a metanarrative. It expresses the need for the
construction of a universalizing theory that gives legitimacy to the
particular subject being described, in this case, love. Plato uses
those particular justifications of this subject and transpose them to
legitimize an overarching brand of knowledge, in this case,
philosophy. A metanarrative is a“[hi]story” in which “knowledge
is no longer the subject, but in the service of the subject.1 Those
who create these metanarratives do so in order to legitimize their
own functions:
If they feel that the civil society of which they are members is
badly represented by the State, they may reject its
prescriptions…This reintroduces the critical function of
knowledge. But the fact remains that knowledge has no final
legitimacy outside of serving the goals envisioned by the
practical subject, the autonomous collectivity.2

In this essay, I argue that this was Plato’s very purpose for writing
the Symposium. It was an attempt to justify and legitimize a way of
life that had been called into question by the trail and death of
Socrates. Plato’s Symposium was the attempt at inverting the
narratives of the society that condemned Socrates and construct a
new narrative, based on love of knowledge. First, I discuss the
Symposium’s construction as a narrative, and how Plato uses this
The Comparative Humanities Review
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particular construction to build caricatures of normal authorities of
Athenian culture, inverting them. Then I discuss the threat that
Socrates apparently posed to society, and why Plato chooses love,
or Eros, to build his case against this argument. Finally, I will
argue that Plato’s argument that only philosophers can truly
understand Eros, breaks down the normal conception of love, and
places it at the hands of a way of life that was thought to be
threatening to ethical life of the community.
The Symposium is the story of a gathering that took place
during the crucial years of the Peloponnesian War, just a year
before Alcibiades’ Sicilian expedition. Athens at this time is an
empire on the brink, although final defeat is not yet in sight. This
gathering is said to have occurred in 416 B.C., and the telling of it
occurs in 404 B.C., the latter being after the war is lost by Athens to
Sparta.3 Present, of course are Socrates, perhaps the greatest
Athenian philosopher, as well as the great comic and adversary of
Socrates, Aristophanes. He is the only other contemporary of
Socrates to actually speak about him besides Plato, and his words
are not kind; naturally he is present. If there is a comic poet, then
there must be one of the tragic stock, and he is presented in
Agathon; although he is but a shade of the great Sophocles and
Euripides, his youthful vigor provides one of the driving points
throughout the Symposium. Also present, and offering up their
services in specialization, are Pausanias, a realist and Agathon’s
lover; Phaedrus, an idealist, Eryximachus the doctor, and finally
Alcibiades, the very lively embodiment of the glory and splendor
of a heroic tragedy. These are the main characters that give a
speech during the Symposium. However there are other important
personages, such as Diotima, and Apollodorus. Each one of these
characters has a role to play, as Plato makes use of them to
emphasize a particular point during the narration.
The Symposium itself is being told by an outsider who
admires Socrates; in turn, the narrator heard the story from
another enthusiast of Socrates, who confirmed the story with no
other great authority than Socrates himself. One could only
imagine that if anything resembling the gathering took place,
where Plato fit into this chain of hearsay. This highlights the
extent to which word was spreading around Athens of the kinds of
conversations Socrates and his group of followers were having.
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The telling does offer us the unique and descriptive insight that a
narrative supplies, and can provide the actions of the speaker, as
opposed to the reader doing the blocking in his own mind.
The moment in time that the Symposium takes place is
important for several reasons. As said, it takes place at the time
right before the collapse of the Athenian war effort, which is
brought on by the failure of Alcibiades’ famed Sicilian expedition,
a campaign in which Thucydides claimed that the participants had
an “Eros” for Sicily, one of the few mentions of Eros by the
renowned historian.4 This was the time in which the Athenian
people were beginning to mistrust both Alcibiades and Socrates,
and the former had once been the star of the public eye. This again
makes the timing of the symposium important because of the
accusation by both the Athenian state, and later by Nietzsche that
Socrates was the greatest threat to artistic and noble inclinations.5
There is truth to this argument, and Plato even acknowledges it by
the occurrence of the Symposium immediately after Agathon’s
victory in the Lenaean Festival, one of the greatest expositions of
tragic poetry. And as Allan Bloom rightly points out, “if
philosophy did not destroy Athenian culture, it prospered in its
demise.”6 It is in this atmosphere of controversy in which Plato is
attempting to rescue and legitimize philosophy against the “noble”
arts. He does so by stripping away one of the major characteristics
of poetry, Eros, and transposing it to philosophy.
The Symposium begins when an unidentified friend calls
out to Apollodorus, a follower of Socrates. This friend has heard
an account of the discussion of Eros that occurred between the
great minds of Athens, and wishes to know what was really said.
However, Apollodorus was not present either, and can only offer,
as said, a secondhand account that was provided by Aristodemus.
It is then that Apollodorus claims that he makes it his business to
know exactly what Socrates does and says each day (Plato 172c).
Apollodorus explains that until he did so he “simply drifted
aimlessly…in fact, I was the most worthless man on earth as bad
as you are this very moment: I used to think philosophy was the
last thing a man should do” (173a). This provides both the
example of the almost cult-like following received by Socrates, and
the one that is mocked by Aristophanes in Clouds; after all,
Aristodemus, who Apollodorus has received the story from, is so
far gone that he walks barefoot like his mentor (173b). It also
displays well the fact that many in Athenians do not hold
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philosophy in high regard. The purpose of this opening is clear,
and Plato is trying to focus on the exterior of Socrates, and thus the
imitation of him. As shall be seen later, Alcibiades inverts this
exterior, by being the figure of beauty and virtue, while Socrates
becomes the ugly, vulgar, almost criminal being that Nietzsche
displays (215b).8 This is the mere beginning of Plato’s inversion of
the norms of Athenian society, which he moves from Socrates
actually bathing and dressing for the occasion (174a), to him
reversing the normal pederastic norms between himself and
Agathon throughout.
It would appear that Plato chose an interesting manner of
making his narrative. Love and the erotic are not entities that
necessarily breed agreement and consensus in a community, and
indeed very much of our understanding of relationships are
contrary to the community. But what Plato wants to do is to
liberate Eros from the laws and restrictions that place boundaries
on what is possible, and by the fact that he addresses almost
immediately the issue of pederasty (which does not mean that he
accepted it) suggests that he was required to begin from the
prejudices of the symposium’s participants. Plato is here making a
clear distinction from what was being taught in Judaism, and what
will later become the Christian faith. According to Jewish law,
there is nothing beyond the law, other than God who gave it,
whereas Plato, as with the other Greeks, looked to nature to
provide laws based on reason and understanding nature. Jewish
law is based predominately on the procreative action, and God is
seen as the ultimate Father. In the Republic, the family is effectively
destroyed by the relative indifference to sacred prohibitions, and
the desire to create the best citizens. To Plato, the family becomes
the mere means to the end that is the city and the intellect. This is
in blatant contradiction to the Judeo-Christian tradition, and it is
interesting that so many Christian neo-Platonists could accept this
opposition. This arises out of the Greek habit of seeing the family
as imperfectly natural because it, “more than perhaps anything
else in human life, requires myths, conventions, and prohibitions
to hold it together, all of which stand in the way of the full
development of man’s powers, particularly the intellectual ones.”9
For Plato, the development of these intellectual abilities is
the purpose of life, and the drive is Eros, which creates the
important concept of seeing things as part of the whole. The
philosopher sees not the particular, which ordinary people
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experience, but rather the general; they see the permanent rather
than the changing, they see the intelligible rather than the visible.
In short, he understands Forms. It is this ability to look at
everything in a general way and have a complete understanding of
human nature that allows them to come to true knowledge. Plato
again is quick to criticize those such as Eryximachus who proclaim
that those who are specialized in specific fields are more practical.
This is the sum of the Symposium as a text: individual speakers give
their innermost thoughts on love, creating a dialogue of specifics
that, taken as a whole, represent the general. Therefore, the
speakers create a form of metanarrative that moves from the
distinctly individual as it is presented by the speaker, to a general
explanation as to the meaning and purpose of Eros, the god of
love.
It must be made clear that when one speaks of Socrates, one
implies Plato, the true author. Socrates becomes the mouthpiece
for his student, and the relation that ends up being concluded as a
true “Platonic love” is the one that is realized in the relationship
between Plato and Socrates (the point that Alcibiades misses).
Therefore, it is essential that a hermeneutical approach be taken in
terms of understanding the composition of the text itself. Plato
utilizes all three kinds of classical rhetoric in Symposium: Phaedrus
begins with the conventional epideictic rhetoric, the typical public
speech; Pausanias displays the deliberative, “the tool of the
political man in attempting to influence public discussions about
war and peace and the enactment of laws”;10 the third kind,
forensic rhetoric, which is used in the courts (in terms of defense
and accusation) is most closely displayed by Alcibiades, who
accuses Socrates of corrupting him.
We also have the typical Socratic dialectic of dialogue,
which is honestly what makes Plato a great writer as well as great
philosopher. The Symposium differs however, from other Socratic
dialogues in that Socrates is limited in his ability to simply
question the other speaker and allow him to divulge his own
conclusions; in fact, Socrates is himself engaged in this manner by
Diotima. The nature of the Symposium as a gathering of a
community of individuals already sets limits on the manner in
which Socrates can speak; he prefers to take people personally,
and the great ability of Socrates is to “force individuals to listen to
him and to agree with him even when they passionately do not
wish to do so,” a point made by Aristophanes.11
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The role of individuality is essential to what Socrates tries
to put forward, for it is this singular nature of the philosophic
process that makes it erotic. This is why Socrates attacks Agathon,
and (nearly) gets him to admit that he would be shameful
addressing a crowd of wise men – the poet is not erotic. Socrates
concerns himself with the crowd only inasmuch as he can draw
out the individuals and seduce them with his brand of knowledge.
For Socrates, rhetoric is about persuasion, and dialectic is about
truth; this is why he was disappointed in Agathon’s speech.
Socrates attempts to change the style of the speakers who give
their praise of Eros. He not only wants to do this because he seems
more comfortable with engaging in interpersonal dialogue, but he
also asserts that, like a lover, he needs a response. This is the
connection between Socrates and the other, which makes his
particular kind of philosophy erotic. Socrates begins his dialogue
with Agathon by trying to get him to admit that love is not simply
love, a point that Agathon completely missed, but love of
something. But Socrates he is not implying the kinds of love
between family, or even friends, because what is a son or daughter
without a mother or father? Socrates is reaching for something
more deep and profound here, something that is more shameful,
more uncomfortable, more unexamined – something erotic. This is
another part of what makes the Socratic brand of questioning so
erotic.
For probably neither of us knows anything noble and good, but
he supposes he knows something when he does not know, while
I, just as I do not know, do not even suppose that I do. I am
likely to be a little bit wiser than he in this very thing: that
whatever I do not know, I do not even suppose I know.12

This is the famous line uttered by Socrates while standing trial for
the corruption of the youth of Athens in the Apology. However,
Socrates replies to Eryximachus’ suggestion for a discussion on
love in the Symposium with enthusiasm, for “How could I vote
‘No,’ when the only thing I say I understand is the art of love?”
(177d). This line could be seen as a quip by Socrates, another
example of that famous Socratic irony. Perhaps Socrates assumes
that knowledge is something that cannot be obtained and readily
held on to: it constantly fluctuates, and is something that must be
striven for continuously. If this is so, then there are to be serious
repercussions for the Platonic system itself.
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Nonetheless, Plato seems to accept some version of this
theory himself: in the Symposium, Diotima argues that “everything
mortal is preserved, not like the divine, by always being the same
in every way, but because what is departing and aging leaves
behind something new, something such as it had been” (208a-b).
How can one have absolute knowledge on a condition such as
love, or justice, if it is always changing, and is not stable? Does
Socrates here attempt to claim that love is something which does
not change and remains static? These are the questions that are
fundamental when Socrates comes to speak towards the end of the
Symposium, and he not only claims to be the only person who
understands what is love, or the erotic, but he does so in a very
insulting manner. He understands the other speakers to be merely
trivial tourists to the soul and body, while he, as a philosopher (the
distinction between the various professions of the speakers
becomes highlighted here), can solely understand that love (Eros)
is the most liberating element for the soul. As Diotima will make
clear, the philosophic life is the highest rung on the ladder to
which a human being can climb, and it is one that is only reserved
for those lovers of knowledge. Socrates understands that his life is
finite, and this is something that many miss. Eros is the
recognition of finitude, and Socrates accepts Aristophanes’ idea of
human incompleteness. For Socrates, this incompleteness is this
finitude, and not only does he accept it, but is also comfortable
with it.
Plato seems to attempt to legitimize the rules of his own
game, namely philosophy. He understands that in society, one
does not need philosophy like one needs other kinds of trades
which legitimize the narratives of the community (priests, poets,
artists, statesmen, generals, prophets, etc). These kinds of
narrators have arisen in all societies, yet only in ancient Greece did
philosophy appear and persist, later being passed to the Romans
and Muslims. For Plato, philosophy is not merely a manner of
thought or a way of explaining complex ideas, it is not a dogma, or
even a doctrine – it is a way of life. He must therefore find a way
to show that philosophy not only matters as a respectable kind of
narrative, not only on specific topics such as nature, ethics, God,
society, or love, but also that it matters for philosophy itself.
Another one of Plato’s inversions then, is that philosophy is not
love of something, such as knowledge, it is love itself. The
Symposium is his attempt at showing how philosophy, the “love of
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knowledge,” can be a respectable and legitimate way of life.
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An Unconventional
Symposium on Love
Michelle Gallagher,
Bucknell University
In Plato’s Symposium, Socrates and some of his companions
congregate to discuss the nature of Love. Although each speaker’s
individual interpretation of the meaning and origin of true love
differs, all of their ideas are built upon similar philosophical
principles. If a similar conversation was conducted between
philosophers of different time periods and backgrounds, however,
the ideas presented about love would become tremendously more
diverse. In addition to debating the actual definition of love, the
question of how it is expressed would arise. Is love defined
through the pursuit of wisdom, the connection of two souls,
beauty and sexual desire, or perhaps by some bio-psychological
instinct? Interpretation of love fluctuates greatly between
individuals, depending on their religious, philosophical, or
personal views on the subject. Experience and social influence
effect how individuals perceive this topic, and throughout the
years authors, poets, scientists, and philosophers have expressed
opinions that reflect their varied backgrounds.
For instance, in Plato’s Symposium, Ovid’s Amores, Dante’s
Vita Nuova, and Freud’s copious collection of relevant works, the
meaning of love is questioned, examined, and rationalized; and in
each work, a unique perspective is conceived. With such different
views on the subject, an assembly identical to the one in Plato’s
Symposium involving these four famous figures would
undoubtedly ignite conversation diverse in themes, ideals, and
beliefs according to the participants’ time periods and personal
philosophies. Despite their obvious differences, however, would
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there be a common ground to which all three could relate? Could
some connection be made in their conversation in spite of their
cultural and idealistic differences? Although it is impossible to
predict what this conversation would actually entail, these
authors’ works, written about love, assist in forming a conjecture
about how they would approach their speeches. The following
speeches are the ones that would occur in my creative rendering of
a symposium involving Ovid, Dante, Freud and Plato, who will
express their theories on the characteristics and meaning of true
love.
As it was will be portrayed, the first to give his speech
would probably be Ovid. In the Symposium, the speeches are given
in a meaningful order, beginning with the speeches that are the
most materialistic, tangible, and simple-minded and ending with
the most complex, logical, and profound. As the speeches
progress, they also begin to build off of one another, using former
ideas and improving or disproving them. Compared with the
other writers, Ovid’s perspective on love is the most superficial
because he focuses more on physical beauty and sexual desire.
Following his speech would probably be Dante’s, whose personal
insight on love concentrates on the spiritual connection of the
lovers, and on its control over a lover’s soul. Although Freud’s
ideas may not be considered by most readers to be deeper
conceptually, he was late to the party, so he had to follow rather
than precede Dante. Placing Freud after Dante provides the perfect
opportunity for him to attack religion. He rejects Dante’s focus on
spirituality as an unnecessary, imaginary aspect of love and is also
less superficial than Ovid because he incorporates the importance
of the actual purpose of sex (survival and satisfying the id). The last
speaker would most appropriately be Plato, who would be able to
unify the previous ideas with his own theories about true love. He
would connect the ideas of the spiritual bond of lovers and the
manifestation of physical love through its reproduction in beauty;
in addition to these ideas, he would offer a new dimension to the
subject by emphasizing the necessity of pursuing knowledge and a
higher truth in one’s search for true love.
Though these four thinkers have significantly different
views on the topic of love, some connections can be made in their
opposing concepts. The conversation escalates in substance of
argument, becoming deeper as the speeches progress. Their
discussion’s focus begins with the physical, then continues to the
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spiritual and the natural, and then finally transcends these topics
while simultaneously incorporating them in an explanation of a
higher pursuit of truth. In this particular party of men, the topic of
love is discussed in such breadth that almost anyone could identify
their own opinions on true love with one of the speeches or a
combination of them.
~*~

Prior to the event of speech-giving, Ovid, probably the most cheerfully
enthusiastic of the group, was designated to begin the discussion; he
accepted the position quite affably. Freud had not yet arrived, so Dante
would follow Ovid. Since Plato suggested the discussion in the first place
and introduced the topic being discussed, it seemed most logical that he
would be the last to speak.

Ovid:

“So I am to be first, am I? I rise to the occasion—love is a
feeling I have come to express so strongly and deeply, and tonight
it is ripe in my memory from a night spent with my heavenly
Corinna. The verses pour out of me since I have become the prey
of that boy whose arrows never stray, and the overwhelming
beauty of that girl I love. Cupid has shot his subtle dart; love’s in
possession, tossing my poor heart. I’ll yield, but not out of
cowardice. No, not at all. To love my Corinna is a noble calling, for
love is like war:
Be somewhere ahead, and the lover too
Will trudge on for ever, scale mountains, ford swollen rivers,
Thrust his way through deep snow.
Come embarkation-time he won’t talk of ‘strong north-easters’,
Or say it’s ‘too late in the season’ to put to sea.
(Ovid 1. 9.9-13)

Although the dangers are clear to us both, we persevere since we
know the cause—our love—is one which is worth any peril we
may meet. This is how love can be understood, you see, for when
lovers are so passionately committed to one another, even the most
precarious situation cannot deter their devotion.
“Take for instance this love affair of which I have been
speaking, with the beautiful angel who moves me from idleness to
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bravery, from dull indifference to a fiery passion! By day I send
her secret letters which convey my love and desire to see her again,
and I wait for her reply with desperate hope of seeing her that
night. The daytime has become wretched and vile to me since I
have discovered that true happiness exists only in her angelic
presence in the secrecy of nighttime. Though it is forbidden, my
love for her cannot be contained; it is bursting from my body in
perpetual anticipation of the moment when I will next be able to
touch her. Her visage is forever impressed in my mind, her voice
ringing in my memory. She frustrates me when she dwells on the
appearance of her dress or the color of her hair; her selfconsciousness is ridiculous—every part of her radiates beauty,
every inch of her body perfected by my loving gaze.
I couldn’t fault her body at any point.
Smooth shoulders, delectable arms (I saw, I touched them),
Nipples inviting caresses, the flat
Belly outlined beneath that flawless bosom,
Exquisite curve of a hip, firm youthful thighs.
But why catalogue details? Nothing came short of perfection,
And I clasped her naked body close to mine.
Fill in the rest for yourselves! Tired at last, we lay sleeping.
May my sestas often turn out that way!
(1.5.18-26)

“But to love her by worldly means does not do her beauty
justice, so as you can see I have made my love for her immortal
through the art of poetry. Her beauty will live forever within my
words so that my love can eternally endure and grow. What more
could one offer than everlasting love? This is true love—love that
will never die, even when the lover is no longer living. ‘So when
the final flames have devoured my body, I shall / Survive, and my
better part live on’ (1.15.41-42). Love is not corporeal…you must
see that true love stretches beyond our bodily realm, indestructible
in its immortality. I bestow this upon my fair Corinna, our love
undying within the illustrious words that I create, for ‘My gift is
poetry, the praise / Of beautifufl girls. I can make them immortal.
Fine dresses, / Jewellry, gold, all perish. But the fame / Bestowed
by my verse is perennial’” (1.10.59-63).
Dante:
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“Well done, Ovid. You have proclaimed your feelings of
love quite clearly and eloquently, as would be expected from such
a distinguished poet…”

Dante is momentarily interrupted as Sigmund Freud makes a fashionably
late appearance, rolling in his famous couch behind him.
Freud:

“Apologies for the late arrival! Who would have thought
these ancient Greek doorways were so narrow! Haha!”
Plato:

“Sigmund, welcome! You’ve just missed Ovid’s very…poetic
speech, but you’re just in time to hear our friend Dante! Please
Dante, proceed.”
Freud settles on his couch. Dante is annoyed but continues.

Dante:

“Yes, well as I was saying…Ovid, your passion for the one
you love has become eminent through your manner of speech, but
my love is a different love. It is a love that burns within my soul
and by the will of God. Love is a subject to which I am very well
acquainted from the experience of loving another with unrelenting
devotion. Since the moment I first saw my gracious and virtuous
Beatrice, Love began to take control of my life and my soul. This is
what causes love to be so unpredictable—we have no power to
determine our souls’ desires or who we love because when it is
present, love determines our actions and how we feel. For my
Beatrice, beauty has no end, much like your Corinna. However,
my love for Beatrice extends far beyond the softness of her skin,
the perfection of her form, or the light within her bright eyes; her
beauty emanates so indefinitely that it has breached the
obstruction of my body and penetrated into my soul. From that
immortal beauty and graciousness, my soul was immediately
captured and my bodily function became not of my own free will,
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but of God’s.
“The love of which you speak is merely the expression of
physical desire. What you do not realize is that true love exists
beyond sexual pleasure or physical contact—it exists in a spiritual
form, mystical and intangible, captivating the souls of lovers. My
feelings of true love weaken me almost to the point of death; the
only life remains in hope of seeing my gracious lady again and in
my poetry. All of my hopes and desires lied in her mere greeting, a
gracious gesture to acknowledge her awareness of my existence.
When her sweet greeting enters my ears, I become so overcome
with ecstasy that I must depart from everyone as if intoxicated.
Allow me to quote from a sonnet written about my unremitting
love for my Beatrice which describes the merciless hold my god
and master, Love, has upon my heart:
Often it is brought home to my mind
the dark quality that Love gives me,
and pity moves me, so that frequently
I say: ‘Alas! is anyone so afflicted?’:
since Amor assails me suddenly,
so that life almost abandons me:
only a single spirit stays with me,
and that remains because it speaks of you.
I renew my strength, because I wish for help,
and pale like this, all my courage drained,
come to you, believing it will save me:
and if I lift my eyes to gaze at you
my heart begins to tremble so,
that from my pulse the soul departs.
(Dante Sc. 16, Sonnet 1)

“Love revealed himself to me through many visions. In my
first vision of Love, he held my heart in his hand, my lady
wrapped in the other, and obediently she ate it in front of me; Love
began to weep and drifted away from me with my lady still in his
arms.
Joyfully Amor seemed to me to hold
my heart in his hand, and held in his arms
my lady wrapped in a cloth sleeping.
Then he woke her, and that burning heart
he fed to her reverently, she fearing,
afterwards he went not to be seen weeping.
(Sc. 3, Sonnet 1)
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Now it is obvious even to the basest of fools what this vision
implied, but at the time I was shaken and bewildered. Eventually I
came to realize that through my love for Beatrice, I became closer
to God. I saw that my love, which was virtuous, passionate, and
true, was God. Then an even further comprehension dawned on
me—Beatrice, who inspired all of these virtuous feelings, was not
merely a woman or an object of licentious desire, but God. Like
Christ, her person was the manifestation of God in human flesh,
and she became my savior. Now we can see that true Love will
control our actions, our words, our souls. It becomes our master,
our god, and our only will to live. ”

Freud, who may or may not have been rolling his eyes throughout the last
speech, took his turn next...
Freud:

“Though Dante’s speech was full of passion for the subject,
I must say that if we all had such feelings about love, then
mankind would be doomed. How could we ever reproduce and
survive as a species? Dante, I wonder if you ever even
touched…but never mind, among the many problems I found with
your definition of love was your dependency on religion.
Unfortunately, this dependency is all too common among humans,
but if you were truly honest with yourself you would realize that
religion is a fabrication of your own fantasy. In the search for the
meaning of life mankind created religion, and though it provides
momentary happiness, in the long run it merely becomes an
obstacle to human intelligence. ‘To anyone with a friendly attitude
to humanity it is painful to think that the great majority of mortals
will never be able to rise above this view of life’ (Freud 22).
“In reality, purpose in our lives as humans is achieved
when we satisfy our pleasure principle. As I explained in
Civilization and Its Discontents, one of the main factors that threaten
our happiness is our relationship with other humans. So man tries
to avoid unpleasure to gain happiness; I am, of course, speaking of
the way of life which makes love the center of everything, which
looks for all satisfaction in loving and being loved. One of the
forms in which love manifests itself—sexual love—has given us
our most intense experience of an overwhelming sensation of
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pleasure and has thus furnished us with a pattern for our search
for happiness. So there you are—it all comes down to sex, really.
Sex is natural, instinctual, for sexuality exists within us even as
infants and allows us to survive as a species. It also satisfies the
pleasure principle, and all of this leads to becoming happier, leads
to what we call “love.” Let me take a moment to recall a later
passage from Civilization and Its Discontents to elaborate further on
this topic:

People give the name ‘love’ to the relation between a man and a
woman whose genital needs have led them to found a family; but
they also give the name ‘love’ to the positive feeling between
parents and children, and between the brothers and sisters of a
family, although we are obliged to describe this as ‘aim-inhibited
love’ or ‘affection’. Love with an inhibited aim was in fact
originally fully sensual love, and it is so still in man’s
unconscious. Both—fully sensual love and aim-inhibited love
extend outside the family and create new bonds with people who
before were strangers. Genital love leads to the formation of new
families, and aim-inhibited love to ‘friendships’… (91)

This passage pertains, of course, to the most natural forms of love
or sexuality, though much more about this subject can be
understood by reading my Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality.
Back to our topic of love, though…even love of beauty is sexual
since ‘beauty’ and sexual ‘attraction’ were once the original
characteristics of an object of sexual desire. Although I regretfully
missed Ovid’s speech, I am sure that he spoke of beauty as he does
in his poetry, and this would be the perfect example of sexual
attraction being referred to as beauty, and also an example of
‘genital love’. The only problem with the way love is perceived is
that humans often try to romanticize it or glorify it into some
higher, even religious, experience. Although I have only touched
upon a mere fraction of what love really is, it should be clear now
that love is something that is instinctual, which can be explained
scientifically and logically. Thus love is no mystery; it is inherent.”
Plato:

“I would like to thank you all for your contribution to our
discussion tonight, as all of you have introduced stimulating ideas.
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True love, however, lies outside the descriptions of the
presentations tonight. The love that each of you has described,
though each quite distinct from one another, is not love in its true
form. Your love is merely the reflection of real love. It is true that
beauty and a bonding of spirit are needed in love, as you have
argued. For example, contemplate what Diotima said on this
subject: love is created through reproduction of and through
beauty, which is achieved by the continuation of life and ideas. I
am reminded of what was said in Ovid’s and Sigmund’s speeches
when I recall this quote by Diotima: ‘Reproduction goes on
forever; it is what mortals have in place of immortality. A lover
must desire immortality along with the good, [since] Love wants
to possess the good forever’ (Plato 207a). Dante is also correct in
saying that a bond between the souls of lovers is necessary, but
love is found even further beyond these two elements. True love
(the real love that has only a reflection in our world) can only be
achieved through the pursuit of knowledge and higher truth.
Though you do seek this higher truth through God, Dante, you fail
to understand that the true form can never actually be reached. To
identify true love with a worldly being such as your beloved
Beatrice is ridiculous, for she is not love herself, but instead the
channel through which you become closer to the truth.
“When we also consider what Socrates said about this
topic, we can see that love is something that is desired because it is
something we do not have. Only through this search of knowledge
of a higher form of love, beyond our material comprehension of
the universe, will we ever find what we have decided to call ‘true
love.’ Worldly pleasures and superficial beauty taints your vision
of love, Ovid, but in some ways your intentions to express love are
in the right mind. You say that your poetry makes your love
immortal. In this way, you are becoming closer to the true idea of
love because your physical love becomes the reflection of the true
love that exists in some higher place—your poetry. True love
cannot be found through poetry, however, unless this poetry seeks
out the real love through pursuit of wisdom and knowledge. In
conclusion, I must emphasize that it is highly impossible that true
love can actually ever be reached through our mortal
comprehension. In our discussion of the meaning of true love, the
meaning is unfathomable; it is almost a trick question. As humans,
we may only become close to the real form of love; while we are
living, our understanding of love is merely the pursuit of true
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The Illusion of Forms
Soohyun Alexander Lee,
Bucknell University
i. Introductory Dialogue

Standing behind two strangers in a line for a street vendor
between Tenth street and Third Avenue of Manhattan, I overheard
a conversation between a man in a dark wool coat and long,
scraggly hair and a young woman with her hair tied in a bun.
Their conversation continued, even after they had their orders. He
ordered a hotdog, or a dirty-water hotdog1 as they’re commonly
called, and she had a bottle of water. I was curious about how
their conversation started, so I asked the man working at the
vendor, “Sir, how did those two begin speaking?”
“She not like what he wanted,” he said in broken English.
“What did he order?”
“Hotdog,” he said.
“What didn’t she like about that?” I asked, as I mentally
sounded out the name on his certification.
“Love?” replied Pollodorusa.
“Are they lovers? They don’t act like it. Look how they
quarrel like strangers! There isn’t that fastidious zeal of lovers,
only a slight warmth in the cold distance between two strangers
when they happen to conflict. Look how she keeps her distance
and turns from his glance! Those are not lovers.”
“Rational mean to avoid irrational, but even most rational
goal started by irrational. They come to here everyday, always
same order, but today, for first time, they speak. The first time
they meet, they argue! She usually quiet and keep to herself, but
today, when she near him in line, she start asking many question,
speaking many ideas. This first time they saw each other, though
The Comparative Humanities Review
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always same line, maybe two, three customer apart…”
Pollodorusa said, though he trailed off when the two began again.
I discovered that the man in the dark coat was named
Geros, a famous New York City artist. Dried acrylic paint caked
his fingers. Fine wrinkles near his eyes and lips saturated each of
his expressions with a peculiar caution. He always took large
strides, but each careful and slow enough so that he didn’t walk
too quickly. He looked almost thirty, but he had a boyishness in
his behavior that made me question that assumption.
The woman, whose name is Endia Feromenos, according to
her student ID, had a youthful urgency in her eyes and regularly
shifted the uncomfortable weight of the textbooks she held in her
arms. She leaned on either one or the other leg, uncertain which
was the most comfortable.
Geros stepped out of the line with a hotdog in his hand,
content and ready to take a bite but he knew that he wouldn’t be
able to just yet.
“I still can’t believe that you’re going to eat that. Can you
imagine what you’re doing to your body? I certainly don’t
understand why you would eat something so unhealthy! Good
health is something we ascend to and something we ascend from
(Plato 310-311), so for us to become better is to become more of
what better is detailed to be. You give many young people
inspiration to work at becoming what you are, and this entails a
responsibility, regardless of whether or not you thought you
willed it to be so. It is a consequence of being a part of a society,
because those who rise to be exceptional must lead lives to which
the rest aspire.” Endia exclaimed.
“I eat this hotdog because I am hungry,” Geros stated
flatly.
“Please, there must be more.”
“More to the reason why I want to eat this hotdog or more
to what I will have to eat after this hotdog?”
“I should think that they are one in the same, if this is how
you eat.”
“You are right, but allow me to explain.”
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ii. Geros Justifies his Decision

“First I will tell you that whether this was a hotdog or a
fresh salad is not important when hunger is concerned, because
one does not have a greater value in its diminishment of hunger
than the other. Hunger, whether I eat this hotdog or a fresh salad,
will die when I eat, but wakes, as if it were in a light slumber,
when perturbed by simply the passing of time (Plato 203E-204A).
In time, my stomach will require more food and it will not have
mattered whether I ate this hotdog or if I ate a salad instead. How
my hunger is aroused is just as insignificant, for it only matters
whether I am hungry,” Geros said.
“How could this be so? It would seem that the hunger
aroused by starvation is separate from that hunger that is aroused
by the sight of good food. I haven’t had lunch today, but the
unappetizing sight of that hotdog does seem to diminish my
hunger. It would then seem that hunger is not only a consequence
of time, but also the other senses and what effects they produce,
appealing or not,” Endia replied.
“You make the mistake of confusing hungering for
something with being hungry, for they are separate. When
hungering for a certain kind of food, you will only think of all the
finest foods, according to the specific taste or tastes that are
desired. When thinking this way, everything about what is
hungered for will strike you as beautiful in every way (Plato 204C204D), since what is not in accordance to the particular cuisine that
you are seeking will be disregarded, as if it were not food at all,
considering food as the primordial lover of hunger.
“How this is separate from hungering for a specific kind of
food is that hunger, in and of itself, must be a lover of food, in and
of itself, and not for its taste but for its ability to satisfy hunger. In
other words, hunger desires food for all of that food is, not just a
single attribute of food, such as taste. But I should be careful not to
separate hunger from its person – me, in this case – for what
hunger seeks is my satisfaction, which leads to happiness. My
reasoning is that I cannot be happy if I am hungry because I am
not satisfied when I am hungry. Therefore, if the hunger leaves
me dissatisfied as having a lack of food, any food will satisfy my
hunger. This is because hunger is devoted to just one kind of love,
to all of food, and it is in this special relationship that we use
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words that describe the whole of it: hunger and hungry” (Plato
205D).
Endia said, “But you would say that all hunger is the same?
I would think that this is not the case, for there are religions that
do not allow the consumption of certain meats and then there are
those who allergic to other types of substances. If I were to believe
that hunger is satisfied by the consumption of any food, it would
mean that those who are of the sort of religion with diet
restrictions find satisfaction regardless of their sacrilege and those
who are biologically refrained from certain foods find satisfaction
in spite of their great discomfort afterwards.”
“Would you then consider religion and allergic reactions a
part of what it is to be hungry?” asked Geros. “When one begins to
feel hungry, is that hunger tapered by preferences? That would
mean that some of the discomforts of being hungry could be
alleviated by thought alone, and that would not be the same kind
of hunger we have been discussing so far.”
“Please elaborate.”
“It may help to think of hunger as a gluttonous son of
Dionysus, reclined on a couch and too heavy and large to move
from that spot. Because he cannot move, he sits on that couch and
sleeps. He only wakes when he is hungry, when he will eat until
his hunger is satisfied, only to fall asleep again afterwards. Of
course, this son of Dionysus does not exist and is just a metaphor,
but hunger can be thought of in that way. He knows only one
thing, that is satisfying his hunger, and that is the only reason that
he lives. That avatar resembles hunger in that it has one purpose:
the consumption of food. It may be predicted, but there is more to
understand about hunger,” Geros explained.
“Many of my friends who admire your work say that they
do so because your paintings represent many of the pressing
concerns of life, though all I see are blotches of paint. I don’t
understand how you can produce a form to represent all things
within its genus of existence, when, for instance, a thing will
change and no longer be the same as what it was in the past. An
example that comes to mind is a tree with thirteen leaves: this
particular tree has the form of trees with thirteen leaves, but when
that tree sheds a leaf, it will no longer be of that form of trees with
thirteen leaves. In that case, why even concern ourselves with
forms when it would only cause more trouble to chart out each
and every possibility to grant legitimacy to forms?
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“I can’t help but think of the cave analogy from the
Republic. I would think that amongst themselves, one would be
the best at identifying the shadows of the objects that pass by the
fire. If one of them identified a plant of one species that has many
leaves then a plant of a different species, distinguished visibly, to
them, only by a fewer number of leaves, as plants in general, is
that individual correct in his evaluation? It would seem to me that
a plant with x number of leaves would be called one thing and the
other plant with x – y leaves would be called something
completely different. This is all speaking within the world of the
cave, of course.”
Geros took a bite of his hotdog before he continued to
speak. Endia showed disgust on her face, but waited eagerly for
his response. Geros wiped his mouth then spoke.
“To understand the nature of whatever we are studying. In
this case, to say that there is a single form of hunger would allow
us to know what it is to be hungry. Without knowing what the
form of hunger is, it would seem obscured by many other states
that may be confused, at face value, as hunger. In such a case, a
hunger for a specific taste may be confused with being hungry
(Nehamas 308-309).
“This also applies to your questions regarding the cave
parable. If there was a separate name for every plant and tree by
the number of leaves they have, we would not know them by
“plant” or “tree” but rather those specific names. What would we
know about the world if we were to make these divisions? That
there exist whatever objects but we would not know much more
than that. Categorizing them by similarity allows us to
understand the characteristics of that thing and all things like it,
approaching a definitive nature of that object.”
“So how does the form of hunger reveal the nature of
hunger itself?”
iii. The Form of Hunger

Endia Feromenos beseeched Geros to walk with her to
Eighth Street, where her school is. She spoke of an obligation that
Geros had to finish supplying the idea of a form of hunger. She
could not go about her ways, she implored, as a diet-conscious
individual without having understood what the very nature of
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what it is she sought to restrict. Geros obliged and they began
walking away from the stand. I paid Pollodorusa and began
following them, thanking him for speaking with me, but he began
following them as well! Pollodorusa and I walked behind the two,
so that we could listen to the rest of their conversation. They
walked slowly, so it was difficult for us to follow inconspicuously.
“The nature of hunger,” Geros started as he swept his arms
to signify something large, “is rooted in us, and what we desire.
Being hungry, essentially, is the desire for something, but what it
desires will also help to explain its nature. What is it that we
hunger for?”
“Food,” replied Endia Feromenos.
“Correct, but as we’ve concluded earlier, food is also
happiness. Do you remember how we came to this conclusion?”
“Yes, we connected food with happiness as a cause for
satisfaction of the state of hunger.”
“You are right. But what, then, is the happiness that we
seek when we are hungry? Or, in other words, what is the
happiness that we feel when we satisfy our hunger?” asked Geros.
“Could it be by ending an aching for something?”
“Close, but let us examine the question more specifically.
Food is goodness because hunger is a state of dissatisfaction,
which is unhappiness, and to satiate hunger is to consume food, so
food would bring satisfaction, the relief of dissatisfaction and
unhappiness. Therefore, it can be said that hunger is really desire
for the good. It is also in the nature of hunger, or its form, to
always be in that state, for the moment that the desire stops,
hunger itself stops and the form is no longer active, or, as I’ve put
it, is dead. Hunger seeks food eternally, or, in other words, we are
eternally hungry (Plato 206A).
“Now that we have introduced a new concept, we must
take it upon ourselves to examine the nature of that as well. We
have introduced eternity. Though we have an eternal hunger, we,
ourselves, are not eternal. We are mortal, so whatever is eternal,
or immortal, is beyond us humans. We can only come close to that
eternity by eating to replenish ourselves, and this could be
explained by why the lack of food and the state of hunger is also a
state of unhappiness. When one is hungry and continues to deny
him or herself food, discomfort and unhappiness will result
because there is something necessary that is missing. Without
food, one does not consume the proper nutrients to survive, so by
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eating, we choose to live longer, for how much longer is an
unspecified amount of time, so it hopes for immortality. I would
consider it an affair that is beyond humans, or perhaps we may
call it a godly affair (Plato 206C-206E). Look at the Greek gods, for
example, and how often they feast and drink!”
Geros continued, “But without complicating this matter
with involvement of gods, it seems that the form of hunger is
much more than we originally expected! Our hunger is not
actually for happiness, but for the enduring reproduction of that
happiness. Alternatively, if we simplify that statement, it seems
that hunger is the desire for immortality itself.”
“I don’t understand what you are saying,” Endia
Feromenos huffed.
“Because hunger is eternal, the only way we may truly
satisfy it is by seeking to gratify it eternally. Because we cannot do
this, as mortals, we come as close as we can by eating food. If food
is representative of that eternal gratification that we seek, it can be
justified to say that hunger is the desire for immortality” (Plato
207A).
“In that sense, can’t we say this about drinking in the same
logic and sleeping as trying to prolong ourselves? In fact, it even
seems that many things can be in the name of the pursuit of
goodness, as we’ve defined it, like eating sweets, stealing, and,
why, even love!”
Pollodorusa lit up at the mention of love.
“Therefore, regardless of what form we state it as, though
we will continue to use hunger, it is not the desire for good things
but for the good itself. I feel that you understand why I chose the
hotdog as my lunch. It doesn’t matter what I chose to eat, because
I sought the whole form of satisfaction of my desire for
immortality. Soon hunger will awaken again, that fat son of
Dionysus, and I will eat again.”
Geros and Endia Feromenos reached a large building and
stopped in front of it.
“Is this where your class is being held?” Geros asked.
“It is. I’m terribly late though; the class is almost finished,”
Endia replied.
“Then you should hurry and go inside!”
“What does it matter? My class is for the replenishment of
knowledge, which is also constantly fleeting (Plato 208a-208c).
Whether I study in my class or I study with you, I seek to replenish
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the knowledge that has left me with fresh knowledge. This is the
same as eating, I would say. I seek the same thing, that same
immortality or eternal gratification, so it should not matter how I
specifically go about it.”
iv. The Concerned Citizen

Endia Feromenos and Geros walked into a diner next to the
academic building. They sat and began speaking more casually,
most likely on more lighthearted matters. A great pressure began
to rise inside of me, from my gut to my throat. The conversation
that the two had had spurred my soul, excited it with ideas and
thoughts. I felt compelled to enter and sit with them to join in
their conversation. The more I lingered on their words, the more
that their conversation began to seem like a place, a vast place, full
of majestic things, inventive in every lot and veiled in mystery,
umbrageous by a virtuous shadow that left all people pregnant
with tremendous ideas.
Pollodorusa walked past me, with a slight “humph” as he
passed, wondering why I stood there like a helpless fool. He
entered the diner and sat at a table adjacent to them. He retrieved
a notepad from his pocket and began, what seemed like, recording
what he had heard.
I entered the diner as well. I approached Pollodorusa but
the closer that I got to Endia Feromenos and Geros, the more
forceful the excitations of my soul became. By the time I reached
Pollodorusa to sit beside him, I couldn’t contain myself. I instead
sat at the table with the two. My abrupt act interrupted their
conversation and they simply stared at me. I couldn’t withstand,
in spite of my embarrassment, and words flowed from me, as if
they were entirely separate beings, only momentarily carried by
my body.
“Excuse me, the two of you. I couldn’t help myself from
eavesdropping on your conversation. I was in line behind you at
the street vendor and followed you here to listen to how your
conversation would conclude. Though I enjoyed listening to your
conversation very much, I feel that it is important that I spoke up.
You may consider me a concerned citizen, one concerned about the
society as a whole, which includes you as much as it does me. My
concern in this position isn’t about the conversation that you had,
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for its contents were lovely and accurate, but rather the way that it
has seemed to have ended.”
Endia Feromenos looked at me questionably but Geros
spoke.
“By all means.”
“Thank you. It would seem to me that your conclusion that
it is more important to identify the nature of things, such as
hunger, before identifying the various parts that belong to that
larger thing, what may be called a genus, is true, as all your logic
seems to pass without problem. Hunger in and of itself is, as you
have said, the desire for food, or satisfaction. I followed, with you,
the road that you paved in logic as you led food into symbolizing
happiness itself, then goodness. But I would suggest that this is
not the conclusion but a first step in forming principles, guidelines
in which we form habits and conduct in life. To use the conclusion
that you two have reached as a principle is premature, I believe,
and would like to discuss further how one should apply that idea
of understanding of the nature of a thing on a life composed of
obligations, interaction, and other such social contracts and mores.
I would like to urge the importance of why living by seeing all in
this logic of forms would be devastating.
“To live the life considering only the ends and not the
means, in this case, as all in the equal pursuit of good, it would
collapse the hold of society as a stable entity. If we all knew
hunger as the desire for immortality and did not discriminate on
the means, this land would be full of the fat sons of Dionysus. I
can accept that we all seek the form of the good, but what I cannot
accept is that the form of the good is the same for all people. This
may contradict the very notion of a form, but if it does, perhaps the
forms are not as useful as we suspected.”
Geros replied, “The good that we reached in satisfying
hunger is only when hunger is present, so it is only when we are
hungry when the consumption of food is good. To eat without the
presence of hunger does not apply to the conclusion that we have
come to. If one eats when he or she is not hungry, it will lead to
discomfort, what we have reasoned to be unhappiness, and
further, adverse to good.”
“Allow me to explain in further detail: The reason why a
form is detrimental to society is that it overlooks harmony. All
men may harmoniously understand the form of good, otherwise it
would not be a form, but the means by which one attains that form
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are certainly not harmonious. In order for society to work, each
individual must modify the means to their individual attainment
of happiness, or the good, in a way that allows others to pursue
equally their attainment of happiness. The laws placed onto
society allow this to happen. There must be strife for harmony
(Curd 37: Heractlius 71-73). We know the best way to attain the
good for ourselves, but this is in strife with being considerate for
society. We are in strife with the laws that restrain us, for those
who want but cannot have, or those who would benefit most
without an observation of the law are limiting their freedoms in
attaining happiness. This law is what I meant earlier when I spoke
about principles. We must resign some of our wants without
satisfaction, because they are harmful for the society. So this
conflict is not between the individual and the society, but the
individual against other individuals, and the necessity to live
together to prosper.
“We may consider working tenaciously to live comfortably
as another pursuit of the good, but if we are only to look at the
end, the happiness, then we may seek that same happiness at the
expense of another. Therefore, the form of good may explain the
origin of our intent, but it should not dictate our actions. There is a
time when one must fulfill some duty to society, or make some
sacrifice, so that he may pursue the good in peace with other
people.
“Considering my argument, I would say that the catalyst of
your conversation should be reexamined. She was simply
concerned with what you ate, for if you continued to eat whatever
is most convenient or, at the time, tastiest to you, and if you
neglect the means and see only the ends, your health will be at risk
and you may not be able to produce the inspirational paintings
that you do. Your art inspires others to work hard, and that
position as a role model is your sacrifice to society that will restrict
the way that you pursue your desires. For if you die, or if your art
stops, you will not die alone but you will take with you a part of
each person who found your work important to them.
“Though it may be comfortable to think otherwise, our
lives contribute to a greater tapestry of society. To destroy
ourselves would destroy some of this social tapestry, thereby
damaging the whole. If you speak of the form of good, I suggest
that you consider more carefully the means to that good because
they are vastly important.”
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Endia Feromenos and Geros sat in silence, pondering all
that I had said. My throat was dry from my attempt to speak
clearly and quickly, but I felt as if I gave birth to an idea, great or
impecunious in value. Endia Feromenos gave a sort of hum while
Geros raised his hand to beckon the waitress.
“A coffee for this young man, please. We will be here a
while.”
ENDNOTES

1. The water used to boil the hotdogs isn’t changed throughout the
day
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